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Abstract 
 
 
Since the days of Empire, Britain has employed familial discourse, often with 
negative connotations, to describe her relationship with her colonies. In the 
nineteenth century the idea, put forward by the British, that the Empire was a 
family blurred the lines between the domestic and the international arenas. This 
practice of familial discourse continues today, albeit in something of a different 
form, as Britain and the fifty-two states, which make up membership of the 
intergovernmental organisation known as the Commonwealth, frequently refer to 
themselves as a family of nations. From the vantage point of the twenty-first 
century, the Commonwealth and its familial rhetoric might seem outdated, even 
anachronistic; yet, the notion of the Commonwealth as a ‘family’ continues to 
endure and is used liberally by the Head of the Commonwealth (the Queen), the 
Commonwealth Secretary General, and Commonwealth Heads of Government 
during their biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings.  
 
When a group of post-colonial states and their former coloniser continue to refer 
to themselves as family, what is the significance of this label? Is it simply a way for 
smaller, less powerful states to cement ties with richer, more powerful ones? 
Perhaps, a way for former colonial powers to hold on to some semblance of 
power? Or is there some kind of legitimacy behind this rhetoric, that positions the 
Commonwealth, in the eyes of its member states, as analogous to an actual 
family? These questions form the puzzle at the heart of this thesis. In attempting 
to answer these questions, the thesis combines historical and theoretical analysis 
with empirical evidence to consider African understandings of the Commonwealth 
in order to question whether a familial metaphor, employed in the nineteenth 
century to bring the idea of the wider Empire home to the British, is anything 
more than an empty signifier for post-colonial Commonwealth states today.  
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At the head of the Commonwealth is a family. This family does in a 
very real sense symbolise the family nature of the 
Commonwealth…Thus not only the British, but French Canadians, 
Maltese, Africans and others, people of advanced and people of 
primitive culture, see this family symbol not as something alien, but 
as something which is their own. It is not altogether fanciful to 
compare this conception with that of the Holy Family in the Christian 
world.  
 
- Clement Attlee (1949) 
 
 
I am thinking of rather a special family - a family of nations - as I 
recall fascinating journeys to opposite ends of the world. During the 
course of these visits we met and talked with a great number of 
people in every sort of occupation, and living in every kind of 
community and climate. Yet in all this diversity they had one thing in 
common: they were all members of the Commonwealth family. 
 
- Queen Elizabeth II (1970) 
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1 
 
Introduction: 
Rather a special family of nations? 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the days of Empire, Britain has employed familial discourse, often with 
negative connotations,1 to describe her relationship with her colonies. In the 
nineteenth century the idea, put forward by the British, that the Empire was a 
family blurred the lines between the domestic and the international arenas. This 
practice of familial discourse continues today, albeit in something of a different 
form, as Britain and the fifty-two states, which make up membership of the 
intergovernmental organisation known as the Commonwealth, frequently refer to 
themselves as a family of nations. 2 From the vantage point of the twenty-first 
century, the Commonwealth and its familial rhetoric might seem outdated, even 
anachronistic; yet, the notion of the Commonwealth as a ‘family’ continues to 
endure and is used liberally by the Head of the Commonwealth (the Queen), the 
Commonwealth Secretary General, and Commonwealth Heads of Government 
during their biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings.  
 
When a group of post-colonial states and their former coloniser continue to refer 
to themselves as family, what is the significance of this label? Is it simply a way for 
smaller, less powerful states to cement ties with richer, more powerful ones? 
Perhaps, a way for former colonial powers to hold on to some semblance of 
power? Or is there some kind of legitimacy behind this rhetoric, that positions the 
Commonwealth, in the eyes of its member states, as analogous to an actual 
family? These questions form the puzzle at the heart of this thesis. In attempting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I discuss both the negative and positive uses of the familial label in Chapter 2.  
For an example of these practices see John Carothers, The Psychology of the Mau Mau 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 1955); Jock McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and 'the 
African Mind' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Willie Abraham, The Mind 
of Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962). For discussion and analysis of British 
discursive practices see Roxanne Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of 
Representation in North-South Relations (Minneapolis, MN and London: Minnesota 
University Press, 1996).  
2 Philip Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire: The House of Windsor, the British 
Government and the Postwar Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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to answer these questions, the thesis combines historical and theoretical analysis 
with empirical evidence to consider African understandings of the Commonwealth 
in order to question whether a familial metaphor, employed in the nineteenth 
century to bring the idea of the wider Empire home to the British, is anything 
more than an empty signifier for post-colonial Commonwealth states today.  
 
While valuable contributions to our understanding of the origins, growth, and 
development of the Commonwealth as an international organisation have been 
made by historians and international relations scholars, there has been no 
sustained theoretical or critical analysis of the Commonwealth, nor has there been 
any real discussion of the meaning behind the continued usage of the metaphor of 
the Commonwealth as a family. This has resulted in a body of literature that is 
largely prosaic and lacking in any critical exploration with little in the way of 
questioning how or whether the family label has any meaning for contemporary 
Commonwealth states. Interested in injecting a more critical and theoretical 
analysis into what is an enormous canon of literature on the Commonwealth, this 
thesis explores ideas of identity and responsibility, shared history and shared 
values by examining the Commonwealth through cosmopolitan and 
communitarian theory, alongside African experiences and ideas about the 
Commonwealth collected from interviews with elites in Zimbabwe and Rwanda. I 
then use these ideas to draw conclusions both about the endurance of the 
Commonwealth and the wider theoretical debate.  
 
The thesis works in two directions. Firstly, through the lens of historical analysis 
and normative communitarian theory, I examine the Commonwealth from its 
roots in the British imperial ‘family,’ where the family metaphor was used both to 
blur the lines between home and away while Britain attempted to shore up the 
idea of a wider British national racial identity geographically across the Empire in 
the settler colonies; and also as a way in which to describe the perceived 
superiority of the British against the inferiority of the colonised peoples. I then 
bring the historical focus forward to apply a communitarian lens to the roots and 
development and shared history and practices of states within the Commonwealth 
family since the organisation’s official inception in 1948/9. Following this 
examination of what I perceive to be the communitarian side of the 
Commonwealth, I then, secondly, explore the changes that took place, firstly 
around 1965, with the establishment of a Commonwealth Secretariat, and later in 
the 1990s with the adoption of a set of human rights principles and the later 
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opening up of Commonwealth membership beyond states with a constitutional 
connection to Britain. These changes, many on the back of the organisation’s 
successful anti-apartheid crusade, ushered in a Commonwealth which appeared to 
be less reliant on the idea of shared history as its raison d’être and more in tune 
with changes in the global arena following the end of the Cold War and the turn 
towards human rights. Through these changes and the Commonwealth’s focus on 
shared values and individual rights, the organisation appears to have taken a 
cosmopolitan turn.  
 
I will expand and elaborate on communitarianism and cosmopolitanism in later 
sections of this chapter, suffice it to say for my attempts to inject a more critical 
and theoretical analysis into the study of the Commonwealth, an exploration of 
the organisation through the twin lenses of communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism gives the impression that the Commonwealth appears to be both 
communitarian - troubling the way in which communitarian IR theorists typically 
theorise the community, and cosmopolitan - expanding its membership beyond its 
shared history to become a more inclusive organisation which, rather than uphold 
the organisation’s previously rigid non-interference policy, now claims to value 
and protect the rights of all two billion citizens across Commonwealth states.  
 
From this theoretical foundation I then narrow the lens to focus on the 
Commonwealth in Africa and offer a much needed and, until now, neglected 
understanding of the Commonwealth from its non-Western members using 
understandings and experiences by Zimbabwean and Rwandan elites to help 
praxis speak back to theory. I argue that by examining the Commonwealth 
through the lens of cosmopolitan and communitarian theory we can understand 
relationships between post-colonial states as thicker - in the Clifford Geertz sense 
of the word 3  - and more nuanced; but before expanding on theoretical 
explanations and outlining the ways in which the theoretical and empirical 
analysis employed over the following five chapters will proceed, I first want to give 
a clearer idea of how the concepts of the Commonwealth and the family are to be 
understood throughout the thesis; beginning with the idea and understanding of 
the Commonwealth and in addition offer an understanding as to where the 
organisation stands on the international stage.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 As I explain in more detail in Chapter 3, Geertz uses the idea of thick descriptions to refer 
to the social and cultural commonalities between groups and the idea that inherited 
membership means stronger more meaningful connections. Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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1.1.1 The Commonwealth  
 
The Commonwealth is an often forgotten organisation in an international arena 
overflowing with, inter alia, international, transnational, intergovernmental 
organisations. While the organisation - which was officially formed in 1948/9 and 
now consists of fifty former British colonies, plus Britain, Mozambique and 
Rwanda - might once have had a clear purpose and relevance as a group of 
postcolonial states, together with their former coloniser, offering assistance and 
recognition to newly independent fledgling states, what powers of political 
persuasion it once had were laid to rest with the dismantling of the South African 
apartheid regime in 1995. It is largely understood in the literature on the 
Commonwealth, which, until the mid 1990s was bursting with accounts and 
descriptions of Commonwealth-wide boycotts and Commonwealth agreements 
against arms trade with South Africa, as well as Commonwealth assistance in 
bringing Rhodesia/Zimbabwe to independence, that the organisation’s grand 
mission was to assist with the decolonisation process and promote anti racism 
across Southern Africa.4 These accounts of a group of post-colonial states working 
together, under the Commonwealth banner, to bring down the last vestiges of 
colonialism have since been usurped by research which is largely focused around 
the continued relevance of the Commonwealth in contemporary world politics.5  
 
This research often takes the form of one of two themes: either a lament for what 
was once an organisation with the power to unite over a third of the world’s 
population through its shared values of democracy, the rule of law, and human 
rights; or a blinkered understanding that the end of the organisation might be 
nigh, followed by suggestions and strategies of how the organisation might regain 
something even close to the sense of purpose it once seemed to enjoy.6 Some of 
the Commonwealth’s keenest observers, and those who refuse to acknowledge its 
demise, have laid the blame for the organisation’s lack of relevance and forgotten 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For an overview of the history and grand mission of the Commonwealth see W. David 
McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-90 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998); James Mayall, ‘Introduction’, in The Contemporary Commonwealth: 
An Assessment, 1965-2009, ed. James Mayall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 1-20. 
5 Michael Kirby provides a good overview of the relevance of the Commonwealth, see 
Michael Kirby, ‘The Commonwealth of nations today: Historical anachronism or focus for 
universal values?’, Commonwealth Law Bulletin 37, no. 1 (2011): 39-59. 
6 See Zoe Ware, ‘The Commonwealth at 60: Thoughts from the new generation’, The 
Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 98, no. 404 (2009): 547-
554; Don McKinnon, ‘Where next for the Commonwealth?’ in The Commonwealth 
Yearbook (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008); Victoria te Velde, The 
Commonwealth Brand: Global Voice, Local Action (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
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status on the Commonwealth Secretariat not doing enough to advertise its brand.7 
Poor brand management has resulted in accusations that the Commonwealth is a 
neo-colonial institution from some Commonwealth heads of state.8 Compounding 
this argument is the fact that Britain is its largest funder, and the 
Commonwealth’s headquarters (the Secretariat) are based in London, sometimes 
giving the impression that Westminster still holds the reigns. And yet, in spite of 
the Commonwealth’s relatively weak stature as an international grouping, new 
states have continued to join, often citing, in the case of Rwanda - the newest state 
- the Commonwealth’s shared values as the attractive part of membership.9  
 
Over the years, since its official inception, with the accession of a newly 
independent India, the Commonwealth has grown and developed from a club-like 
group of white settler colonies with Dominion status, to an international 
organisation with shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
One of the biggest changes to the Commonwealth, and the one to receive the most 
attention in the academy, was the organisation’s official transition from a club-like 
association of states into an international organisation with the establishment of 
an independent Secretariat along with the appointment of a Secretary General, in 
1965.10 Since the establishment of the Secretariat, under the supervision of various 
Secretary Generals, the Commonwealth has developed a number of mechanisms 
to help persuade Commonwealth governments to remain committed to democracy 
and the rule of law. These include the creation of a set of human rights principles, 
by which Commonwealth states agree to abide, and the establishment of a 
committee, referred to as the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, which has 
the power to suspend member states for up to two years.11  
 
The preceding paragraphs offer something of an overview of what the 
Commonwealth is and its position in world politics, but to conclude that this is all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a discussion of the Commonwealth’s lack of brand awareness see Oren Gruenbaum, 
‘Brand awareness’, The Commonwealth Update (2015). Available at: 
http://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/brand-awareness/ 
8 I refer here to accusations of neo-colonialism by the Zimbabwean President Robert 
Mugabe and the Gambian President Yayha Jammeh.  
9 As I will show in Chapter 6, many interviewees as well as the Rwandan media point to 
shared values of democracy and the rule of law as Commonwealth attractions. 
10 The establishment of the Secretariat and its importance of the Secretary General is 
discussed in Stuart Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma: The role of the Commonwealth 
Secretary General’, in The Contemporary Commonwealth: An Assessment, 1965-2009, 
ed. James Mayall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 65-82. 
11 The principles, referred to as the Harare Principles from the 1991 Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting from which they were launched, are now officially a part of the 
organisation’s new membership criteria.  
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that I have in mind when I refer to the Commonwealth in the thesis would be only 
half the story. This is because, in an ontological sense, the Commonwealth is often 
referred to as more than the sum of its parts,12 and this makes explaining, or 
pinning down what the organisation is rather more difficult. Key figures in the 
Commonwealth have, over the years, declared that it is easier to define what the 
Commonwealth is not, rather than what it is. This can be seen in the former 
Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson’s proclamation that the Commonwealth: 
 
is not an empire, an alliance, a power bloc, or a mutual security group. 
It is neither a diplomatic unit nor a trading and currency system for its 
members. Indeed, it is not an organisation requiring formal obligations 
or commitments...While there is no constitutional or legal relationship 
amongst all its members, there is a social, even a family, relationship 
which persists. This is not easily defined but does certainly distinguish 
Commonwealth meetings and discussions from other international 
gatherings...13 
 
What is significant about Pearson’s observation is that although made over fifty 
years ago, we can find similar references articulated more recently. In 2013, 
former Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon, described the 
organisation as meaning something different depending on where you lived 
geographically and politically across its fifty-three states. As McKinnon put it, 
with differing views of the Commonwealth from Africa, Europe, South and East 
Asia, or Oceana, ‘you are never going to get one definition which everyone will say 
‘yeah, that’s it.’’14  
 
These snapshots of elite opinion go some way to understanding my comment 
above that the Commonwealth is more than the sum of its parts. But these 
references are not confined to descriptions by Commonwealth elites. According to 
empirical research carried out by the Royal Commonwealth Society across a 
number of Commonwealth states, the very idea of what the Commonwealth is, 
what it does, and what it stands for, as understood by Commonwealth citizens, 
stretches further than intergovernmental bodies to include, ‘the web of informal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This was a phrase used most recently by the previous Commonwealth Secretary General 
in his 2014 Commonwealth day message. See Kamalesh Sharma, ‘Secretary-General’s 
message, Commonwealth day 2014’. Available at: 
http://thecommonwealth.org/media/press-release/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-
message-commonwealth-day-2014. 
13 Lester Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Volume Three: 
1957-1968 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 289. 
14 McKinnon makes these observations in the BBC Radio 4 programme ‘Start the Week’ 
aired on 25 February 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01qw8bq. 
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ties, shared experience, language, business links, legal frameworks and 
parliamentary systems that bind together countries with a shared colonial 
legacy.15 For the some 500 interviewees and contributors to discussions, surveys, 
and opinion polls, the Commonwealth is about ‘values and principles;’ as one 
interviewee put it, ‘more like a family than a factory.’16 What, then, does this mean 
for our understanding of the Commonwealth in the chapters that follow? 
 
Over the following five chapters, the definition I have in mind when referring to 
the Commonwealth is primarily the idea of the group of states and their 
interactions under the auspices of Commonwealth relationships guided by a 
Secretariat accorded little in the way of decision making or power. As the 
Commonwealth is an organisation that follows the idea that heads of state and 
their foreign ministers are the key decision-makers on Commonwealth policy, 
including decision-making with regards to disciplining any state that has gone off 
the rails, and that all decision-making will be made among leaders with the idea of 
consensus in mind, this gives a firm foundation to this view of the organisation. 
While the thesis does not ignore the existence of the Secretariat and the Secretary 
General - it even discusses the establishment of the Secretariat in Chapter 4 - the 
nature of the Commonwealth as an international organisation remains clearly a 
focus on state-state relations with the link being Britain, and this is the idea I have 
in mind throughout the thesis - an idea that, likewise, appeared to be shared by 
most of the Zimbabweans I interviewed for the discussion in Chapter 5. 
 
With these points in mind, much of the first three chapters of the thesis takes a 
relatively broad look at the membership of the Commonwealth as a whole. But, as 
the Commonwealth consists of fifty-three member states, with a combined 
population of around two billion, and stretches geographically across five 
continents, it became clear during the planning stages of the thesis that, at a 
certain point, a tighter geographical focus would be needed. I have chosen to focus 
the empirical chapters of this thesis on the African Commonwealth, more 
specifically Zimbabwe and Rwanda, for this purpose. I will expand in more detail 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The research consisting of public opinion polls conducted to test the awareness about 
the Commonwealth among citizens in South Africa, Canada, Jamaica, Britain, Australia, 
Malaysia, India, as well as a series of online discussions and interviews in Sri Lanka, 
Cyprus, Ghana, New Zealand, and Trinidad and Tobago. See Joanna Bennett, 
Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah and Zoe Ware, An Uncommon Association, a Wealth of 
Potential: Final Report of the Commonwealth Conversation (London: The Royal 
Commonwealth Society, 2010). 
16 Bennett, Sriskandarajah and Ware, An Uncommon Association, a Wealth of Potential.  
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on my reasons for the focus on Zimbabwe and Rwanda later in the chapter, for the 
remainder of this section I want to elaborate on the theme of the Commonwealth 
family. 
 
1.1.2 The Commonwealth family 
 
In her Christmas broadcast in 1970, the British Monarch - Queen Elizabeth II - 
referred to the member states of the Commonwealth as ‘rather a special family of 
nations.’17  This was not the first time that a member of the British royal family 
had utilised familial discourse to refer to the collection of former British colonies. 
Following the abdication of King Edward VIII and the ensuing scandal, the British 
government, along with the media, had attempted to build a picture of family and 
family values around the new king and royal family. In her first Christmas speech 
in 1952, soon after the death of her father, Queen Elizabeth promised to continue 
her father and grandfather’s work and pledged duty and allegiance to the wider 
Empire/family.18 As Jennifer McGuire points out, ‘In much the same way as the 
monarchy had been promoted since George VI, the Palace and the BBC 
represented Queen Elizabeth to the Commonwealth in terms of traditional family 
values linked to Christian virtue.’ 19  In many of her addresses to the 
Commonwealth since, the Queen has made familial references, either drawing 
comparisons between her own family and the wider group of Commonwealth 
states or referring directly, as in the 1970 speech, to the Commonwealth as a 
family.  
 
As the Queen holds the symbolic position as the Head of the Commonwealth, the 
reference to the fifty-three states as a family has been taken up and utilised by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat as an unofficial description of the organisation and 
the some two billion people that it represents.20 The application of the familial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The Royal Family, ‘Christmas broadcast 1970’. Available at: 
https://www.royal.uk/christmas-broadcast-1970. 
18 The Royal Family, ‘Christmas broadcast 1952’. Available at: 
https://www.royal.uk/queens-first-christmas-broadcast-1952. 
19 Jennifer McGuire, ‘Till death do us part? Commercial TV, Changing family values and 
Queen Elizabeth II’s Commonwealth’, in Orb and Sceptre: Studies on British Imperialism 
and its Legacies, in Honour of Norman Etherington, ed. Peter Limb (Melbourne: Monash 
University Publishing, 2008). Available at: 
http://books.publishing.monash.edu/apps/bookworm/view/Orb+and+Sceptre%3A+Stud
ies+on+British+Imperialism+and+its+Legacies%2C+in+Honour+of+Norman+Etheringt
on/141/xhtml/chapter12.html. 
20 The Commonwealth Secretariat has taken the family metaphor further and has 
produced a short film showing who and what the Commonwealth family are, and what it 
	   17	  
metaphor to describe the group of states with a constitutional connection to the 
United Kingdom, however, pre-dates Queen’s 1952 speech to the Empire and 
Commonwealth and was first used officially in the mid nineteenth century to help 
bring the idea of the British overseas Empire home. As I outline in more detail in 
Chapter 2, in an attempt to shore up the Empire in the wake of turbulent 
economic and political changes, the British blurred the lines between home and 
away/international and domestic by thinking of the settler-colonies of the Empire 
as an extension of the British national community ‘bound by shared norms, 
values, and purpose.’21 The idea that it was possible to translate a sense of national 
self-consciousness across the globe was helped by the idea that the Empire - and 
the idea of a Greater Britain - was a family forming what J. R. Seeley called an 
‘ethnological unity.’22 
 
The family metaphor has undergone distinct temporal changes both in ideology, 
in reference to the Empire/Commonwealth since the mid-nineteenth century, and 
in terms of what the family does, or means, in practical terms for its members. 
This was evident with regards to Britain’s relationship with her colonised peoples 
beyond the Anglo-Saxon ethnological unity outlined above. Ideas about race and 
nationality intersected in the nineteenth century in complex ways.23 To add to this 
complexity, familial discourse was often utilised by the British alongside scientific 
racist ideology to preclude the possibility of equality or progress by the native 
indigenous populations of the colonies, and to justify the need for continued 
British rule.24 Indigenous peoples, in the role of the family children to the British 
parent, were described, utilising the rise in popularity of Darwinian explanation 
and scientific discovery, and this was a practice that continued well into the era of 
decolonisation. 25  As decolonisation proceeded apace and Britain needed to 
maintain a relationship with states such as India, what the family meant and its 
purpose for member states changed once again into, for Britain, compensation for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
means to be a part of the Commonwealth family. See: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 
‘The Commonwealth family’. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=px0IQMNjppc. 
21 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 
1860-1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 113. 
22 J. R. Seeley cited in Bell, The Idea of a Greater Britain, 113. 
23 For an interesting overview on the many complex and confusing intersections between 
race, nationality, and gender see Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and 
Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995). 
24 See Bell, The Idea of a Greater Britain.  
25 I will discuss the British use of scientific racist ideology in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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the loss of Empire,26 and for former colonies, an anchor against which they could 
moor their new found recognition and growth.27 
 
Today, the family metaphor continues to be applied by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the Queen to the describe the fifty-three states and over two 
billion people who inhabit those Commonwealth states. But the Queen and the 
Secretariat are not the only ones to refer to the Commonwealth as a family. While 
the application of familial rhetoric is far from routine or regimented, references to 
the Commonwealth as a family can be found frequently by British politicians, 
particularly Conservative backbenchers and Lords. Perhaps the most well-known 
of these is Lord David Howell, formerly Minister for the Commonwealth in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office under Margaret Thatcher and keen observer of 
the Commonwealth, who, when I interviewed him for this thesis, reiterated the 
Queen’s reference to the Commonwealth as a special family.28 For Howell, the 
Commonwealth is an excellent channel for Britain’s soft power as well as a way in 
which to solve many of the issues of inequality today.29 Howell’s opinion is one 
which is shared by previous Commonwealth Secretary Generals and special 
envoys whose opinion pieces frequently appear in The Round Table the 
Commonwealth journal of international affairs.30  
 
References such as these, from sources such as these, to the Commonwealth as a 
family point directly to familial discourse being utilised by the British to 
compensate for loss of its position on the world stage and loss of Empire. To 
further fan the embers of Britain’s imperial past, these same Commonwealth 
Secretary Generals, Conservative politicians, and some high commissioners, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 For discussion around lingering ideas of Empire see Kwasi Kwarteng, Ghosts of Empire: 
Britain’s Legacies in the Modern World (London: Bloomsbury, 2011); Wendy Webster, 
Englishness and Empire, 1939-1965 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
27 For a discussion on the benefits of post-colonial relationships see Tamar Golan, ‘How 
can France do everything that it does in Africa and get away with it?’, African Affairs 80, 
no. 318 (1981): 3-11.  
28 Interview with Lord David Howell, London, 1 May 2015.  
29 See David Howell, ‘The place of the Commonwealth in the international order’, The 
Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 87, no. 345 (1998): 
29-32. 
30 These views are held up particularly by Ramphal and McKinnon. See Shridath Ramphal, 
‘The Commonwealth in the global neighbourhood’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 86, no. 342 (1997): 175-85; Don McKinnon, ‘A 
Commonwealth of values; a Commonwealth of incomparable value: Reflections of a 
Secretary-General 2000-2008’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs 97, no. 394 (2008): 19-28. See also, Hugh Segal, ‘The 
Commonwealth as a force for good’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs 101, no. 3 (2012): 261-66. 
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special envoys and keen Commonwealth observers, over the years, have made 
claims that the Commonwealth is a unique organisation. 31 Its uniqueness,  they 
suggest, comes from its shared history and friendly, family-like relations between 
states.32 These claims, in practical terms, are nothing more than empty platitudes 
with little if anything in the way of evidence to back them up. Claims about the 
Commonwealth being unique in its familial discourse also fall short, as evidence 
and research show that the Francophonie and the Organisation of Ibero-American 
states also refer to themselves in familial terms.  
 
In an article exploring the usage of familial labels among post-colonial groups of 
states, authors Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz note that these 
familial relationships display some attributes of collective identity in which the 
‘notion of family implies ties of loyalty and solidarity, not just arm’s-length 
exchange, and thus particular obligations.’ 33  While the study offers insights 
beyond the Anglophone Commonwealth into some of the reasons why European 
former colonial powers hold on to familial discourse, the research views these 
relationships solely through the European ex-colonial lens, effectively ignoring the 
other side of the post-colonial relationship. The question then arises: if former 
European colonial powers continue to refer to their ongoing relationships with 
their former colonies in familial discourse, how do the former colonies understand 
these labels? But, this question is not raised entirely without evidence.  
 
While I have painted a picture in this section of the Commonwealth family as 
largely a British reference, to conclude that this familial rhetoric is confined solely 
within the discourse of the British would be to ignore familial references made by 
Commonwealth heads of state and high commissioners beyond the Western 
frame. The most recent evidence of such familial discourse can be found in the 
transcripts of the closing press conference of the 2015 Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting, held in Malta. The conference, chaired by a panel of heads 
of state consisting of: Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Kenya), Joseph Muscat (Malta), 
Baron Waqa (Nauru), John Dramani (Ghana), and Jerome Stuart (Barbados), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For examples of references to the ‘unique family,’ see Commonwealth Secretariat, 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Report 2007 (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2007). 
32 I discuss the body of Commonwealth literature in more detail in later sections of this 
chapter. 
33 Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, ‘After Empire: National identity and 
post-colonial families of nations’, European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 2 
(2002): 270. 
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closed the meeting, which had focused on three days of workshops and discussion 
around the theme of ‘Adding global value’ and the Commonwealth’s strengths to 
effect change on the global stage.34 Pondering the outcomes of the three-day 
event, Prime Minister Stuart noted that the meeting had been a success ‘due to the 
values shared as a Commonwealth family.’35 Taking this further, with an eye 
towards issues of climate change and international terrorism, Kenyatta added that 
the Commonwealth needed to move forward as a family to tackle such global 
problems.36 These statements suggest the contours of a familial discourse that 
stretches further than speeches by British policy makers and the Queen.  
 
It may be argued, of course, that these references to the Commonwealth family are 
little more than empty platitudes. On the one hand, I am cautious of attempts to 
reify non-British references to the Commonwealth as a family as evidence of 
something more than a signifier for a shared historical grouping. And yet, on the 
other hand, I think an attempt to look behind the notion of the Commonwealth as 
a family, in its various incarnations, may usefully open up a range of answers to 
questions raised about the organisation’s ability to endure. I thus approach the 
idea of the Commonwealth family with questions about the shared history and 
values of the Commonwealth to recover and illuminate an array of specific ideas 
about the organisation and the relationships between its member states. To help 
further our understanding of the Commonwealth I want to find a place for the 
organisation within international relations theories on identity and 
responsibility.37 To do this, I want to apply cosmopolitan and communitarian 
theory and situate the Commonwealth within wider theoretical debates. 
 
1.2 Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism  
 
One of the central aims of this thesis, as I have outlined above, is to put the 
relevance of the contemporary Commonwealth into perspective. Understanding 
what the organisation means to its member states is a key factor in achieving this 
aim. To help understand the Commonwealth, I want to examine the organisation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See ‘The Theme for the CHOGM Malta 2015’. Available at: 
https://chogm2015.mt/about#commonwealth-theme. 
35 Jerome Stuart in ‘Concluding Press Conference CHOGM 2015’. Available at: 
https://chogm2015.mt. 
36 Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta in Concluding Press Conference CHOGM 2015’. Available at: 
https://chogm2015.mt.  
37 These categories are based on Samuel Scheffler’s division of cosmopolitanism into two 
key ideas. See Samuel Scheffler, ‘Conceptions of cosmopolitanism’, Utilitas 11, no. 3 
(1999): 255-276. 
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through the lenses of communitarianism and cosmopolitanism respectively. The 
field of normative IR theory has traditionally been mapped as a debate that 
centres around the ideas of identity, boundaries, and the ethics of co-existence, 38 
in the belief that the global and the national are discrete conditions that mutually 
exclude each other. 39 On one side of the debate, there are cosmopolitans who 
believe that we, as humans, ought not be defined solely by the nationality into 
which we were born, but instead think of ourselves more as belonging (at least 
potentially) to a single community that encompasses all human beings regardless 
of their race, political affiliation, religion, or sexuality. For cosmopolitans, being a 
member of this worldwide community of human beings means that we have 
certain moral and ethical responsibilities to our fellow humans to alleviate 
hunger, poverty, persecution, homelessness, or any of the numerous other 
afflictions that continue to affect those in less fortunate positions than ourselves.40  
 
Contrary to the cosmopolitan view of the individual as untethered, 
communitarians believe that we are defined by the communities into which we 
were born, and our identities are fixed.41 For communitarians, the common 
locality of one’s family, community, town, city, and state, represents a unified 
space that cultivates qualitative relationships and helps us to form identities.42 We 
cannot conceive ourselves as independent from the communities that we inhabit, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For a detailed overview of the theoretical debate see Richard Shapcott, International 
Ethics: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); Ian Clark, Globalisation and 
International Relations Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Janna 
Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry (Abingdon: Routledge, 
1992); Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic 
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
39 The debate largely centres around the debate over distributive justice and the question: 
to whom do we owe duties? There is an enormous body of literature on distributive 
justice. I provide a small snapshot here: David Held and Garrett Wallace Brown, eds., The 
Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); Charles Jones, Global Justice: 
Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Gillian Brock, 
Global Justice: Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Charles 
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1979); Brian Barry, ‘Humanity and justice in global perspective’, in Ethics, 
Economics and the Law, eds. J. Ronald Pennock and John Chapman (New York: New 
York University Press, 1982), 219-52; Brian Barry, ‘International society from a 
cosmopolitan perspective’, in International Society, eds. David Maple and Terry Nardin 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 144-63. 
40 Thomas Pogge, ed., Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the 
Very Poor? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Peter Singer, The Life You Can 
Save: How to Play Your Part in Ending World Poverty (London: Picador, 2010); Peter 
Singer, ‘Famine, affluence and morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1972): 
229-43.  
41 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
42 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).  
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and our highest and most complete moral existence is one we can only obtain 
through being members of a community. 43  Hannah Arendt captured the 
communitarian position well when she observed that you cannot be a citizen of 
the world as you can a community, because the world is vague and hopelessly 
vacuous.44  
 
Shared language and shared memories help to cement communal feelings and 
interests associated with being part of a community, which, in turn, make it easier 
to comply with the norms and values of one’s community.45 We are embedded in 
the common history and values of our communities and this helps to solidify 
mutual recognition of a ‘we-feeling’ or belonging among members.46 When it 
comes to ethical and moral responsibility, for communitarians, one’s ties to one’s 
family, community, and nation dictate the boundaries of our responsibilities.47 
Communitarians argue for a politics of the good – that is the good of the 
community – over a politics of the rights of the individual. As most 
communitarians see it, this solidarity or ‘we-feeling’48 is established by a number 
of shared elements, which work together to help present a picture of the common 
good. These elements, which I describe in the thesis as inheritance, shared values, 
and solidarity, all work together to give the impression that the communities into 
which we are born are meaningful.49  
 
One of the central arguments of this thesis that, despite the fact that it is an 
international organisation made up of independent states, the Commonwealth, 
which views itself as a family, shares many of the elements that are central to the 
communitarian thesis outlined above. This shared history and family element, as 
well as shared language and shared values, points which I will elaborate on and 
return to throughout the thesis, are often described both by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and in the vast body of literature devoted to the organisation as the 
unique selling points of the Commonwealth. This observation troubles the idea of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).  
44 Hannah Arendt quoted in Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Really existing communities’, Review 
of International Studies 25 (1999): 143.  
45 Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations 
of International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).  
46 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York 
and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
47 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 
48 Brown, International Relations Theory, 70. 
49 Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 43.  
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communitarianism, which theorises identity and responsibility within the borders 
of the state. And yet, while the Commonwealth appears to exhibit communitarian 
traits, thus presenting a more nuanced understanding of relationships between 
states on the international arena, the organisation has, since the mid 1990s, 
adopted a cosmopolitan outlook. This grew in part out of attempts to establish 
clear goals for the organisation beyond the decolonisation process and the issues 
of race, human rights, and equality amplified by the struggles in South Africa 
against the apartheid regime.  
 
Cosmopolitanism, within the Commonwealth, centres largely around the 
promotion of universal principles of human rights which were enshrined in the 
Harare Declaration in 1991. Accompanying the Principles was a more relaxed 
approach to cross-border intervention and a willingness to use diplomatic tools to 
contribute to the attainment of global goals shared by Commonwealth member 
states and beyond. To fully adapt to this cosmopolitan outlook, the 
Commonwealth, for the first time, defined itself officially as an organisation of 
peoples as well as states and went a step further in 1995 when it opened up its 
membership to states outside of the constitutional/colonial connection to 
Britain.50  
 
How are we to view the Commonwealth through the cosmopolitan and 
communitarian frame? From one angle, the organisation appears to be stretching 
communitarian understandings of community with ideas of shared history that 
stretch beyond the state. From a different angle, the Commonwealth is striving to 
be a cosmopolitan organisation where states work together to achieve universal 
human rights goals. It is difficult to position the organisation in one camp or the 
other, or, indeed, if we should position it at all. With this in mind, the argument of 
this thesis is that the Commonwealth inhabits a kind of threshold zone between its 
communitarian past and its cosmopolitan future. In exploring this claim, I have 
attempted to find a balance between theoretical analysis and empirical 
observation by firstly examining the organisation through the lenses of 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism and showing the agreements and 
shortfalls of each, and secondly by examining the views and understandings of the 
Commonwealth from two states on opposite sides of the shared history/shared 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The first state to be admitted to the Commonwealth outside of the Anglophone group of 
former British colonies was Mozambique. te Velde discusses Mozambique’s accession in 
detail in her study of the continuing attraction of the Commonwealth as a global brand. 
See te Velde, The Commonwealth Brand. 
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values debate. For the reminder of this section of the chapter I want to outline in 
more detail how the empirical chapters of the thesis will help to draw conclusions 
about the communitarianism and/or cosmopolitanism of the organisation.  
 
1.2.1 The communitarian family 
 
I have already outlined why I believe that the Commonwealth family appears to 
offer a more nuanced understanding of relations between states. But, what I have 
not yet addressed is that the thesis likewise shines a spotlight on the tendency by 
many communitarian theorists to over-simplify cultural homogeneity and gloss 
over the fact that communities - or in this case families - are far from the neat, 
culturally homogenous, happy, safe, loving places that communitarians describe. 
What interests me in this respect are the messier aspects of the Commonwealth 
family. While the thesis argues that the Commonwealth conforms to many of the 
main tenets of the communitarian thesis - shared history, shared values, and so 
on - it likewise troubles the communitarian thesis by showing that families can be 
cruel, messy, ambiguous, as well as, in the case of the Commonwealth family, 
culturally and historically diverse places. Throughout the thesis, I am deeply 
interested in the myriad examples of this messiness and diversity, however where 
the thesis makes its most original contribution is in its empirical study of two 
cases in the African Commonwealth - Zimbabwe and Rwanda.  
 
The choice to focus my empirical chapters on Zimbabwe and Rwanda is informed 
by the fact that both states have challenged the shared values and shared history 
of the Commonwealth and, as such, have raised important questions about the 
continuing relevance of the organisation. What is significant about both of these 
cases is they provide a cross section of the main elements under scrutiny in this 
thesis and, when viewed together, demonstrate a certain amount of flaunting of 
both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. As a means by which to explore 
African understandings of the Commonwealth with its messy and violent history, 
diverse culture, and problem children Zimbabwe and Rwanda are exemplary 
cases. By focusing on Zimbabwe and Rwanda, I wish to open the idea of the 
Commonwealth as a family to a theoretical analysis that has so far been sorely 
lacking in the Commonwealth literature. Seeking only the view from the British 
side of the Commonwealth, as I argue in the following section most of the 
literature does, cannot, in my view, explain what lies behind Commonwealth 
endurance or the continuation of the family theme. To ask why being a member of 
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the Commonwealth family remains attractive to states - despite its lack of real 
purpose - involves investigating not only the reasons for interest from new 
members but also the tensions that manifest in the old.  
 
Beginning with Zimbabwe, if one of the aims of the thesis is to show how the 
Commonwealth family troubles communitarian thinking in IR, then the empirical 
study in the case of Zimbabwe is exemplary as it troubles the communitarian idea 
of the family itself. This is because, in 2003, amid accusations of human rights 
abuse and election tampering, and after being suspended from the 
Commonwealth for a two year period, the Zimbabwean government withdrew the 
troubled state from the family altogether. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 
5, there were many additional factors that drove the Zimbabwean President to 
walk away from the Commonwealth, and, likewise, many additional ways in which 
Zimbabwe troubles the idea of family, but the most noteworthy, for the purposes 
of this introduction, was the role of three key players: the Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo, the South African President Thabo Mbeki, and the Australian 
Prime Minister John Howard. Each of these figures played a key role in the 
Commonwealth’s decision to suspend Zimbabwe.51 But where the Zimbabwean 
familial story becomes most interesting is that each one of these men is viewed 
differently and variously as a traitor, partner, brother, and betrayer of the 
Zimbabwean state.  
 
This information was conveyed to me during fieldwork in Zimbabwe. In a bid to 
understand the withdrawal of Zimbabwe and whether, or how, the withdrawal had  
affected the troubled state, I travelled to Harare in 2015 to carry out a series of 
interviews. I will elaborate on the methodological aspects of the fieldwork in later 
sections of this chapter, as well as in the empirical chapters themselves, but for 
the purposes of this overview the information that I was given, and the stories that 
I was told by Zimbabwean elites, painted a very ambiguous picture of a state and 
its people who, as they saw it, were not fully out of the Commonwealth, but out 
enough to feel the loss of not being part of a family that helped facilitate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The Commonwealth sent two missions to Zimbabwe in 2002, one was the official 
Commonwealth Election Monitoring Team and the other was a Troika which consisted of 
Obasanjo, Howard, and Mbeki. The Troika had the final say on whether the 
Commonwealth would announce the Zimbabwean elections free and fair. I expand on the 
Troika and the key figures involved in Chapter 5 of the thesis, but for an overview of the 
events that led to the withdrawal of Zimbabwe from a Commonwealth perspective, see 
Don McKinnon, In the Ring: A Commonwealth Memoir (London: Elliott and Thompson, 
2013). 
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independence of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1979.52 Compounding the complication 
further was the fact that, even though Zimbabwe is no longer officially a member 
of the Commonwealth family, many Zimbabweans believe that only one person 
left the Commonwealth and the rest of the country remains.  
 
The inside-but not quite/outside-but not fully dichotomy that the Zimbabwe case 
presents complicates the communitarian idea that families and communities are 
neat, settled places. Through the case of Zimbabwe the Commonwealth becomes 
interesting as it is through the fudging of the distinctions between inside and 
outside, international and domestic that we can begin to see how its member 
states help make the Commonwealth family such an exemplary case for grounding 
the theoretical dichotomy at the heart of normative IR studies. And yet, what 
makes the Commonwealth more intriguing is that, while on the one hand the 
thesis attempts to show, through both theoretical analysis and empirical 
application, that the Commonwealth fits the main tenets of the communitarian 
thesis, on the other hand it also provides a view of how the Commonwealth 
appears to look through a cosmopolitan lens.  
 
1.2.2 Cosmopolitan organisation? 
 
In 1991, out of the messy, clogged up family infighting around the question of 
sanctions on the apartheid regime in South Africa, and following the end of the 
Cold War, the Commonwealth attempted to recreate itself as a more ideal-utopian 
cosmopolitan organisation. A key characteristic of this cosmopolitan outlook was 
a set of human rights principles - the Harare Declaration - which turned the focus 
from a family of nations to a family of two billion members with individual human 
rights. One of the first real tests for the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism saw 
the organisation attempt to discipline Zimbabwe, which led the troubled state to 
walk away. This loss left the Commonwealth vulnerable and, since then, it has 
largely focused its suspension and disciplinary mechanisms on military coups and 
the restoration of democracy.53 But, in 2009, following a change in membership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 For an overview on the role the Commonwealth played in the independence of 
Zimbabwe see Mayall, ‘Introduction’, 3-20. 
53 Since the suspension and withdrawal of Zimbabwe, in spite of widespread human rights 
abuse across the Commonwealth, the only states to have been suspended are Fiji and 
Pakistan. Both states were suspended for coups. In the entre time that the Commonwealth 
Ministerial Group (CMAG) has existed, it has only suspended states on 5 occasions: 
Nigeria, Fiji x2, Zimbabwe, Pakistan x2. See ‘Withdrawals and suspension’, The 
Commonwealth Network. Available at: 
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criteria, which opened up the Commonwealth to a more cosmopolitan and 
inclusive membership, based more on the shared values of democracy and human 
rights, rather than the shared history of colonialism, Rwanda joined the 
organisation, offering a chance to repair the hole that Zimbabwe had left behind.  
 
Rwanda had no historical, nor constitutional, connection to any of the other fifty-
two members of the Commonwealth and, therefore, none of the messiness that 
often accompanies familial relationships. Much like Achille Mbembe’s description 
of Africa, Rwanda, by analogy, and coming from a recent history of genocide, was 
characterised by its apparent emptiness.54 For the Commonwealth, paraphrasing 
Mbembe, Rwanda provided a blank slate, it was an exemplar of nothingness onto 
which the Commonwealth could project its ideal values.55 But, while Rwanda 
might have seemed the ideal test case for the Commonwealth’s turn to 
cosmopolitanism, the troubled state also brings its own baggage.  
 
On closer examination the case of Rwanda tells a double story, as we begin to see 
that by turning its gaze towards the Commonwealth, the fragile East African state 
was turning its back on the malignant communitarianism of its own Francophone 
family. While there is nothing particularly striking about this observation, after 
all, France’s alleged role in the Rwandan genocide is the subject of much 
research,56 what is particularly interesting is that, when we look behind Rwanda’s 
application to the Commonwealth we find questions and potential sources of 
disjuncture around Rwanda’s ability to project the image of an ideal child who has 
come to save the family. This is because, by embracing the Anglophone 
Commonwealth, the Rwandan government has been able to advance an anti-
Francophone agenda, which has potentially damaging results for the Francophone 
Rwandans who are being excluded or left behind. 
 
The case of Rwanda, then, is a messy one, and yet, it is an increasingly common 
assumption, by many of the Commonwealth’s keenest observers, that the 
accession of new states, such as Rwanda, are proof that the organisation remains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth/commonwealth-
membership/withdrawals-and-suspension/.  
54 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony: Studies in the History of Society and Culture 
(Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press, 2001), 4. 
55 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 4.  
56 See, for example, Daniela Kroslak, The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007). 
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relevant.57 In Chapter 6, I question whether Rwanda’s own troubled, violent 
family, characterised by a number of laws ushered in by the Rwandan government 
since the 1994 genocide, makes it such an ideal member of the Commonwealth in 
its cosmopolitan form.  
 
Over the next 5 chapters I will examine the Commonwealth, first in its entirety as 
it moved from a small group of Dominion states to the fifty-three strong 
membership it enjoys today, and then through the ideas and understandings of 
these two African states, but before doing so I want to discuss a number of 
problems within the existing Commonwealth literature. This will help underscore 
the originality of the thesis, while also showing why a study of this kind makes an 
important contribution to both the body of literature on the Commonwealth. 
 
1.3 Commonwealth literature and its discontents 
 
While there is an enormous canon of literature devoted to the Commonwealth, 
these studies have taken a largely historical focus on the developments within the 
organisation,58 and as a result, questions of a critical or theoretical nature have 
historically been excluded. This exclusion has, to an important degree, been 
complicit in building a particular construction of the Commonwealth as 
something much more important, and much more relevant, than it is in reality. In 
a scathing attack in 2000, Ian Taylor drew attention to this issue when he pointed 
out that the corpus of literature devoted to the Commonwealth is, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This is an argument that runs throughout the discourse from the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the literature on the Commonwealth. Although no significant study has 
been done on why states evince an interest in joining the organisation, te Velde’s research 
offers a brief discussion of states that have taken an interest. See te Velde, The 
Commonwealth Brand. 
58 The most comprehensive studies, which provide perhaps the best overview of both the 
organisation itself and the vast literature devoted to it, are McIntyre, British 
Decolonisation, 1946-1997; McIntyre, A Guide to the Contemporary Commonwealth; W. 
McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth 1965-90; W. David McIntyre, The 
Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, 1869-1971 (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1977); W. David, McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth (London: 
Blandford Press, 1974); J. D. B. Miller, The Commonwealth in the World (London: 
Duckworth, 1965); David Adamson, The Last Empire: Britain and the Commonwealth 
(London: Tauris, 1989). However, for a thematic overview of Commonwealth literature up 
until the early 1990s, see Patricia Larby and Harry Hannam, The Commonwealth (New 
Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 1993). For an overview of the main 
journal articles by historical theme see Alex May, ed., The Commonwealth and 
International Affairs: The Round Table Centennial Selection (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010).  
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‘overwhelmingly descriptive, historical and lacking in theoretical substance.’59 In 
Taylor’s view, much like the Commonwealth itself, the literature devoted to the 
organisation, ‘has...sought to avoid controversy and has been largely devoid of any 
strong critical reflection.’60 Taylor’s critique prompted those interested in the 
Commonwealth to think beyond the disciplinary borders of historical observation. 
And yet, since Taylor made this observation, little has changed.61 Those who write 
on the Commonwealth continue to produce prosaic studies rarely critical and 
seldom theoretical in their approach to the organisation.  
 
It is not entirely clear why this is the case. A survey of the literature reveals, 
however, two interesting observations, which might go some way to explaining the 
reasons for the largely critically and theoretically anaemic Commonwealth canon. 
The first is Krishnan Srinivasan’s suggestion that, some of the organisation’s 
keenest observers feel that criticising the Commonwealth is akin to criticising the 
Queen, who remains widely respected across the Commonwealth as the head of 
the organisation. 62  Evidence for this can be found in a number of sources 
including, but not restricted to, both the British and international media as well as 
biographies of former African heads of state. 63  Reflecting on the Queen’s 
connection to the Commonwealth and her popularity, Charles Douglas-Home, 
editor of The Times, in 1984, observed, ‘in thirty two years as Head of the 
Commonwealth, the Queen’s stature had increased enormously...Crown and 
Commonwealth are in my view indivisible.’64 A further example, in 2003, shows 
the Director-General of the Royal Commonwealth Society refer to the unifying 
role which the Queen had undertaken in the last 50 years. In his view, ‘That role 
has at times been decisive in holding together a diverse association in times of 
crisis...There is no groundswell in the Commonwealth to diminish the role of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ian Taylor, ‘Legitimisation and de-legitimisation within a multilateral organisation: 
South Africa and the Commonwealth’, Politikon: South African Journal of Political 
Science 27, no. 1 (2000): 51. 
60 Taylor, ‘Legitimisation and de-legitimisation within a multilateral organisation’: 51. 
61 There is, perhaps, one exception which is te Velde’s attempt to examine the 
Commonwealth through the lens of its membership criteria, its recent enlargement, and 
its constant reincarnation. See te Velde, The Commonwealth Brand. 
62 Srinivasan charts a number of incidences where the Queen is mentioned by 
governments for their continued membership in the Commonwealth. See Krishnan 
Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).  
63 Particularly noteworthy in this respect are studies on Kwame Nkrumah’s relationship 
with the Queen. See David Rooney, The Political Kingdom in the Third World (London: I. 
B. Tauris, 1988); David Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah: The Father of African 
Nationalism (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990). 
64 Charles Douglas-Home, ‘Crown and Commonwealth (II)’, The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 292 (1984): 360. 
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head: indeed, the opposite is the case.’65 Such examples are striking in their 
unbending assurance of the Queen’s Commonwealth stature, and go some way 
towards underscoring Srinivasan’s claim.  
 
The second observation, related to the reasons for the largely prosaic nature of 
Commonwealth literature, relates to the lives of the authors themselves. While 
critically surveying the body of literature, in 1976, J. E. Spence pointed out that 
many of the authors writing on the Commonwealth were ‘publicists or politicians 
at the end of their careers.’ 66 While there is nothing particularly striking about 
this observation, it is Spence’s conclusion that these political figures, in the 
twilight of their careers, are desperately searching for ‘some magic formula to give 
the Commonwealth a ‘vital’ role to play as a ‘third force’ in international politics,‘67 
that is revealing. Putting a more recent spin on Spence’s observation, Srinivasan 
points out that the Commonwealth segment of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), ‘for years oversold the special quality of 
Commonwealth relations, while the rest of the FCO remained unconvinced and 
was more oriented towards Europe and the United States.’68 This observation is 
interesting, it suggests that the search for an elusive magic formula continues to 
be the spectre that haunts the Commonwealth as, contrary to Spence’s 
observation that this practice is restricted to those who no longer have an active 
role in politics, the practice of elevating the Commonwealth’s status is something 
that is much more common and much less restricted to retirees.  
 
Whatever the reasons for the lack of critical focus on the Commonwealth, the body 
of literature on the organisation can at best be understood through a loose 
typology accredited to Peter Lyon, who divides the literature into two categories, 
which he labels, on the one hand, ‘utopian boosterism’ and on the other, ‘cynical 
dismissal.’69 Those who practice utopian boosterism fit the descriptions of the 
previous paragraph, while those who cynically dismiss the Commonwealth 
frequently sound the death knell of the organisation. Neither group, in Lyon’s 
view, has subjected the Commonwealth to any searching analysis.70 If there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Director General of the Royal Commonwealth Society cited in Srinivasan, The Rise, 
Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth, 111. 
66 J. E. Spence, ‘The future of the Commonwealth’, The Ditchley Journal 3, no. 1 (1976): 
70.  
67 Spence, ‘The future of the Commonwealth’: 70. 
68 Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth, 119. 
69 Peter Lyon, ‘Foreword’, in Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British 
Commonwealth (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xiii. 
70 Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth, 3.  
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appears to be a sense of frustration here, it concerns the extent to which the gulf 
between prosaic descriptions of the Commonwealth, which have a tendency to 
utopianise its achievements, and real critical analysis appears to widen even in the 
face of efforts to bridge them. Equally concerning is a tendency, by many 
contributors to the literature, to confuse the difference between what they believe 
the Commonwealth is capable of achieving and what it actually achieves.71  
 
In many ways this thesis is a sustained quarrel with this body of literature. But, 
while I am critical of the attempts to utopianise the Commonwealth in the 
literature, this utopianisation, in its various incarnations, usefully opens up a 
range of questions that shape my inquiry. For example, why does the 
Commonwealth continue to refer to itself as a family and why does it believe, 
despite the French and the Spanish post-colonial organisations likewise applying 
the family label, that its family is unique? Does the family label disguise the 
messiness and dysfunction that often appears to define relations between 
Commonwealth member states? Is the family metaphor and the family rhetoric 
employed by the Queen, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and some heads of state, 
anything more than a simple description of a group of states who were once part 
of a larger imperial family - by force rather than by choice? And, finally, as I have 
already mentioned, has the fact that the organisation refers to itself as a family 
had an effect on Commonwealth endurance?  
 
What is of interest here is that there has been very little attention to any of these 
ideas or questions in the literature. While valuable contributions to our 
understanding of the application of metaphor in politics have been made by a 
number of political scientists and sociologists,72 who note that many political 
leaders are highly dependent on familial metaphors and analogy to cement their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Many of the Commonwealth’s most avid exaggerators are former Secretary-Generals, in 
particular Shridath Ramphal and Kamalesh Sharma. See, for example, Shridath Ramphal, 
‘The Commonwealth in the global neighbourhood’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 86, no. 342 (1997): 175-85; Richard Bourne, ed., Shridath 
Ramphal: The Commonwealth and the World: Essays in Honour of his 80th Birthday 
(London: Hansib, 2008). Recently, the out-going Secretary General Kamalesh Sharma has 
begun to do this also. See Sharma’s speech to King’s College London, Kamalesh Sharma, 
‘The global value of the Commonwealth’ Public Lecture Series, 21 November 2013. 
72 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980); Sara Hayden, ‘Family metaphors and the nation: Promoting a 
politics of care through the million mom march’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 89, no. 3 
(2003): 196-215; Adrian Beard, The Language of Politics (London: Routledge, 2000); Jan 
Bosman, ‘Persuasive effects of political metaphors’, Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 2, 
no. 2 (1987): 97-113; Zoltán Kövesces, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Jonathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric: The 
Persuasive Power of Metaphor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
	   32	  
hold on power domestically,73 rather less attention has been paid to the question 
of whether the familial metaphor extends to the domain of international relations 
and foreign policy. Michael Schatzberg, in his study of the use of the familial 
metaphor in the politics of states in Middle Africa, found that, although not as 
prevalent as the domestic arena, familial, particularly paternal, metaphors do 
cross into the realm of the international. 74  While contributions such as 
Schatzberg’s are invaluable to our understanding of the political use of the family 
metaphor, there has been no exploration in the Commonwealth literature around 
the roots and origins of the family label, and whether this might have different 
meaning across the different regions and individual states. 
 
It is curious that such a gap exists, given the extensive focus in recent years on the 
nineteenth century family in history and literature.75 We have only to turn to the 
work of Jennifer McGuire and Philip Murphy to recognise the scope for such 
enquiry. While, in the past, McGuire’s work has focused on the British royal 
family as a model for the Commonwealth and explored how the family of George 
VI was upheld as the ideal Christian family and model for the wider Empire,76 
Murphy’s more recent research charts the relationship between the Queen, the 
British government, and the Commonwealth. 77  Both McGuire and Murphy 
provide a useful window into the world of the British Monarch and her 
relationship with the Commonwealth. They can be situated in the context of a 
burgeoning interest in the interrelated histories of post-war Britain, Empire, and 
decolonisation. Yet, whereas both authors take an interest in the Commonwealth, 
the Queen, and the idea of the family, their work is, nevertheless, entirely British-
centric.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The most prolific example is, of course, the Kim dynasty in North Korea. For a 
discussion on the intergenerational strength of the familial metaphor in its starkest form 
see Charles Armstrong, ‘The role and influence of ideology’, in North Korea in Transition: 
Politics, Economy and Society, eds. Kyung-Ae Park and Scott Snyder (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 3-18.  
74 By Middle Africa Schatzberg refers to Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Kenya. Michael Schatzberg, Political 
Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2001), 17-19. 
75 There has been extensive focus see for example Elizabeth Buettner, Empire Families: 
Britain and Late Imperial India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Leonore 
Davidoff, Megan Doolittle, Janet Fink, and Katherine Holden, The Family Story: Blood, 
Contract and Intimacy, 1830-1960 (London: Longman, 1999); John Tosh, Manliness and 
Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Britain: Essays on Gender, Family and Empire 
(Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005); Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds. At Home with 
the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).  
76 McGuire, ‘Til death do us part?’. 
77 Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire.  
	   33	  
 
While some may not view this as a major criticism, after all the Commonwealth is 
essentially a British organisation, what is intriguing is the lack of non-Western 
voices writing in the corpus of literature devoted to the Commonwealth. Even 
more noteworthy for the purposes of the focus of the empirical chapters later in 
this thesis, is the relative lack of empirical evidence - in the form of interviews or 
media analysis - on the Commonwealth from any of the fifty-two (non-British) 
Commonwealth member states. It is seldom that the literature on the 
Commonwealth invokes the voices and opinions of elites from Commonwealth 
countries, or attempts to read the organisation through non-Western eyes.78 And 
seldom that the views and opinions of the wider Commonwealth family are sought 
in connection to any of the issues and questions outlined above. Ruth Craggs 
made a similar observation in her review of Murphy’s research on the Queen and 
the Commonwealth. As Craggs points out, while viewing the Queen’s relationship 
with the Commonwealth through the eyes of a British Commonwealth and royal 
historian is interesting, a non-British view from elsewhere in the Commonwealth 
would be equally, if not more, interesting for the purposes of understanding the 
idea of Commonwealth, Empire, and royalty from the perspective of Britain’s 
former colonies.79  
 
Cragg’s suggestion is particularly pertinent in the light of the recent events such as 
the lawsuit brought by the group of elderly Kenyans (known as the Mau Mau) 
against the British government in 2012,80 or the recent decision by Jamaica to 
push forward for a republican agenda.81 In light of these and other developments, 
the notion of the Commonwealth as a family appears to lose its shine. If members 
of the Commonwealth are bringing lawsuits against Britain and attempting to cut 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Although there are a small number of Round Table articles written by African authors, 
these writers largely fit the description of Spence’s ‘publicists and politicians’ at the end of 
their careers. There is very little if any empirical evidence of interviews with African elites 
across the African Commonwealth.  
79 Ruth Craggs, ‘Review of Monarchy and the end of empire: The House of Windsor, the 
British government, and the postwar Commonwealth’, Reviews in History no. 1610 
(2014), online.  
80 The Mau Mau lawsuit involved a group of elderly Kenyans who were interned in a 
concentration camp in Kenya during the 1950s and early 1960 during the Kenyan 
Emergency. They successfully sued the British government for colonial compensation in 
2013. For an overview of the case see ‘The Mau Mau claims’, available on the website of 
the British law firm who helped fight the legal case. Available at 
https://www.leighday.co.uk/International-and-group-claims/Kenya/The-Mau-Mau-
claims. 
81 For a simple yet thorough discussion of Jamaica’s decision to become a republic see 
Joseph Wint, The Queen of Jamaica (Bloomington, IN: Westbow Press, 2012). 
	   34	  
their ties to the British Monarch, what does this mean for the notion of the 
Commonwealth as a family?  
 
It is rare that critics invoking the concept of the Commonwealth as a family reflect 
on what this really means for the Commonwealth’s non-British members. Most 
obviously, and highly surprisingly, the voices across the rest of the 
Commonwealth have been all but ignored.82 As an exploration of the metaphor of 
family and how we might use the concept to ground the normative debate, then, 
this thesis offers a corrective to the largely prosaic and Western-centric literature 
by including the voices of Zimbabwean and Rwandan elites.  
 
The thesis largely focuses on the period from when the official Commonwealth 
began, with the accession of India in 1948/49, to the contemporary 
Commonwealth today. Nevertheless, in evaluating critically the conception of the 
Commonwealth as a family and the ways in which it can, and has, contributed to 
the appearance of more nuanced relations between Commonwealth states, it is 
necessary to take a step back briefly into the British Empire where the application 
of familial discourse began. In this way, the thesis begins with a less theoretical 
and more historical exploration of the family label and how it has been employed 
by Britain to describe her relationship with colonial and post-colonial states since 
the middle of the nineteenth century. In this way, the thesis provides some 
historical context for the idea of the Commonwealth as a family, before engaging 
with the more theoretical and analytical debate. By attending to the 
Commonwealth as a family with its roots stretching back to the past, we may at 
once broaden our sense and understanding of the endurance of the organisation 
in a much broader way than exists in the current literature.  
 
The central aim of this thesis, then, is to provoke a critical analysis of the 
Commonwealth while injecting some long overdue theoretical and empirical 
research, through the cases of Zimbabwe and Rwanda, into what, as I have shown 
in the section, is a very stale uncritical literature. In order to explore the cases of 
Zimbabwe and Rwanda and how they both view, fit into, and problematise the 
theoretical puzzle at the heart of this thesis, the thesis draws on qualitative data in 
the form of interviews carried out with elites in both states. My project is to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 te Velde does include interview data in her exploration of changing Commonwealth 
membership, but this is little more than interviews with officials from the Rwandan High 
Commission in London. te Velde, The Commonwealth Brand.  
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explore how elites in the African Commonwealth understand the organisation and 
what valence and political and social meaning the Commonwealth family has for 
African states. Through the views and opinions of elites, we can broaden our sense 
of the complexity and messiness that runs through the Commonwealth family and 
by doing so open up new theoretical and critical channels through which to study 
the Commonwealth and its family beyond the British idea. By steering the 
discussion towards a view of the Commonwealth from two very different members 
of the Commonwealth - one historic and one new - I provide a new and unique 
perspective on how non-Western members view the Commonwealth. In the 
following section I am going to provide an overview of the methods and 
approaches I use to do this.  
 
1.4 Methods and methodological influences  
 
Methodologically, the thesis is grounded in a constructivist approach that views 
international relations between states as being fundamentally shaped by shared 
meanings, ideas, and norms.83 Constructivist Alexander Wendt has argued that 
change is a slow process, it follows then that if norms and ideas are internalised or 
institutionalised over a long period, such as those of loyalty, solidarity, and 
reproduction, that are ingrained in family membership, then they are deeply 
embedded and difficult to change.84 In employing a constructivist approach, I 
intend to push beyond the simple ‘fact’ that a group of post-colonial states refer to 
themselves as a family in order to probe how embedded meanings, ideas, and 
norms have shaped identity and the relationship between Britain and other 
members of the Commonwealth. To supplement the constructivist approach, and 
in light of the discussion earlier in the chapter regarding the lack of critical or 
theoretical studies on the Commonwealth, the thesis draws on a number of 
additional literatures in its study of the Commonwealth family, most notably 
imperial history, Victorian literature, and post-colonial theory.85   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 1, 24; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International 
norm dynamics and political change’, International Organisation 52, no. 4 (1998): 891.  
84 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 315. Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz argue 
that the self-described families of states (Commonwealth, Francophonie, Ibero-American 
Organisation) present a distinctive set of identities and norms in the period since 
decolonisation. Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz, ‘After Empire’: 270. See also: Jo Ann Fagot 
Aviel, ‘Spanish aid policies’, in The Ibero-American Space: Dimensions and Perceptions 
of the Special Relationship between Spain and Latin America, eds. Joaquin Roy, Albert 
Galinsoga Jordá (Miami, FL: University of Miami Press, 1997).  
85 There is a wealth of relatively new research on Victorian views and attitudes of the 
family and its wider application to the Empire. This new direction has largely been 
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One study in particular has helped push the research in several directions. This is 
Michael Schatzberg’s work on the political legitimacy of paternal and familial 
metaphors in the governance of several middle African states.86 For Schatzberg, 
who has researched extensively the use of metaphor in African politics, the idea 
that the nation is an extended family with the head of state as father, is an notion 
which is deeply rooted in many African cultures.87 Schatzberg’s classic work, 
which operates at one level as an insightful discussion of the family metaphor in 
African politics, has also been a significant player in looking beyond the West, and 
the Weberian forms of legal domination that underscore the legitimacy of the 
state,88 to create an analytical space for a combination of cultural, mental, and 
emotional images of local importance which might rival established Western 
notions of power and legitimacy.89 Schatzberg’s work proved invaluable as a 
starting point in attempting to understand how the metaphor of the family might 
be viewed as something deeper than a simple label to describe a group of states.  
 
In addition to Schatzberg’s work on Africa, the thesis draws on the vast body of 
literature devoted to the issues, domestic politics, and foreign policy in Zimbabwe 
and Rwanda, in order to understand more fully the political climate in both states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
influenced by feminism, postcolonial critiques, and cultural studies, through the work of 
scholars such as Antoinette Burton, Catherine Hall, and Kathleen Wilson who, in their 
work, explore the ways in which gender, race, sexuality, and power are produced, 
represented, negotiated, and challenged in a number of imperial contexts as well as how 
identities were shaped by Empire both at home and abroad. See Antoinette Burton, 
Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Antoinette Burton, At the Heart of 
Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian Britain (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); Catherine Hall, ed., Cultures of Empire, A Reader: 
Colonisers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: 
Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); 
Kathleen Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in 
Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
86 Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa. 
87 See also Michael Schatzberg, ‘The metaphors of father and family’, in The Political 
Economy of Cameroon, eds. Michael Schatzberg and I. William Zartman (New York: 
Praeger, 1986), 1-19; Michael Schatzberg, ‘Power, legitimacy and ‘democratisation’ in 
Africa’, Africa 63, no. 4 (1993): 445-61. 
88 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1978).  
89 For further analysis on political language and perceptions see: Alfred Schultz, The 
Phenomenology of the Social World, trans George Walsh and Frederic Lehnert (Evanston, 
IL: Northwest University Press, 1967); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social 
Construction of Reality: A Treaties on the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday-Anchor, 1966). 
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at the time of withdrawal and accession to the Commonwealth, respectively.90 As 
might be expected, there is an enormous literature on both Zimbabwe and 
Rwanda and the domestic, regional, and international relations of the states,91 but 
rather less on the relationship that both states have, or have had, with the 
Commonwealth. 92  Additionally, in comparison to the number of Western 
academics and policy makers, whose voices and opinions all add to an enormous 
corpus of Commonwealth observation and thought, there are far fewer African 
voices from which to gain a more nuanced perspective on whether the 
Commonwealth is still relevant in Africa.93 
 
This observation swayed my decision to build the empirical part of the thesis 
around interviews with elite actors from Zimbabwe and Rwanda. As a result, most 
of the empirical content of the thesis is based on approximately 30 interviews 
carried out with elites mostly in the capital cities of Harare and Kigali from the 
beginning of January until the end of March 2015. The elites include government 
and political authority figures, political activists, academics, trade unionists, civil 
society operatives, journalists, youth leaders, and individuals, often with some 
connection to the Commonwealth. I chose to carry out interviews with elites 
because, despite its declarative commitment to promoting the rights of each of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in 2003, while Rwanda officially joined 
the organisation in 2009.  
91 I do not want to list these here as both Chapters 5 and 6 cite heavily from these 
enormous literatures.  
92 There is a reasonably large focus in Commonwealth literature on the Ian Smith regime 
and the lead up to Rhodesia-Zimbabwe independence, but apart from a few chapter 
sections, which discuss Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth in the wider 
context of political violence and election tampering, there are very few studies devoted to 
discussion or analysis of Zimbabwe-Commonwealth relations. The one study that is 
possibly the exception for its detailed discussion of Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth is 
Ranka Primorac and Stephen Chan, eds., Zimbabwe in Crisis: The International 
Response and the Space of Silence (Abingdon: Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2007). In as 
far as Rwanda-Commonwealth relations are concerned, this thesis is the first 
comprehensive, detailed, and empirical study to devote any attention to Rwanda since its 
accession to the Commonwealth. 
93 Ali Mazrui probably provides the most comprehensive study. See Ali Mazrui, The Anglo-
African Commonwealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion (London: Pergamon 
Press, 1967). Since the 1969 publication of Mazrui’s work on the Commonwealth and 
Africa, however, there has been no detailed study on Commonwealth-African relations 
from an African scholar, beyond academic articles and book chapters. There is, perhaps, 
one exception and that is the work by the Nigerian ex-Commonwealth Secretary-General 
Emeka Anayaoku, nevertheless, this work consists rather less of reflection on the 
Commonwealth and Africa and more on the Commonwealth during his time as Secretary-
General. See Emeka Anayaoku, The Missing Headlines: Selected Speeches (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1997); Emeka Anyaoku, The Inside Story of the Modern 
Commonwealth (London: Evans Brothers, 2004); Emeka Anyaoku, The Commonwealth: 
Facing the Challenge of One World (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994); Emeka 
Anyaoku, The Commonwealth: A Force for Democracy and Development (London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997).  
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two billion members, the Commonwealth is largely a top-down political 
organisation. Thus, while it may be recognised by many across the 
Commonwealth for its historical connections, the Commonwealth Games, and the 
Queen, there is a far greater understanding of what the Commonwealth is and 
does among political and non-state actors who, in some cases, have had direct 
contact with Commonwealth decision or policy-making.94 
 
Interviewees were gathered through a snowballing process which began, in both 
Rwanda and Zimbabwe, by contacting potential interviewees cold. To supplement 
interview data, the empirical chapters of the thesis also draw on Commonwealth 
and government reports, political speeches, official reports by international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs), local media articles, and also on my own, 
personal, observations while I was out in the field. All interviewees have been kept 
anonymous due to the somewhat politically volatile nature of their governments.  
 
At the heart of the research are semi-structured interviews; which speaks to my 
epistemological commitment to giving a voice to Zimbabweans and Rwandans. 
The semi-structured interview provided open-ended questions, 95  which were 
aimed at encouraging subjects to talk about how they viewed the Commonwealth 
and its effect on, and dealings with, their respective countries. Interviewing elites 
in Rwanda and Zimbabwe offered an empirical insight into African perspectives 
on the Commonwealth rarely seen before in the Commonwealth literature. 
Following the constructivist logic outlined above, my analysis focuses on the 
generation of familial-communitarian discourses in Zimbabwe and ideological-
utopian-cosmopolitan discourses in Rwanda, and makes related arguments about 
the significance of these discourses to the theoretical discussion at the heart of the 
thesis. Here I am contributing to a tradition of accentuating the significance of the 
social context in which politics occurs, while highlighting ideational factors as 
influential in international relations. 96  For constructivists, the discourses 
generated by state actors are influential in determining state conduct as well as, 
often in the case of non-state actors, generating influential discourses about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 I refer here to a number of interviewees I met in Zimbabwe who had had behind the 
scenes roles in the Lancaster House talks - the talks which led to Zimbabwe’s 
independence. Additionally, at least one Rwandan interviewee had had connections to the 
Commonwealth Young Leaders Programme.  
95 Anne Galletta, Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond: From Research 
Design to Analysis and Publication (New York: New York University Press, 2013).  
96 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
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norms and ‘appropriate’ state behaviour. 97  My interviewees provided fruitful 
insight into how both Zimbabweans and Rwandans view the Commonwealth, and 
how they understand the effect that each of their respective states has had on the 
Commonwealth, and vice versa.  
 
In spite of the relative ease with which the interviewees talked about the 
Commonwealth and reflected on their states’ position in, or out, of it, there were, 
at times, some difficulties with methodology. Writing on the challenges of doing 
‘dangerous fieldwork’ in Africa, Pamela Nilan has noted that ‘the researcher as 
human subject is in flux, dealing constantly with shifting realities and 
contradictions.’98 These realities and contradictions came to the surface during my 
fieldwork in Rwanda and caused me to grapple with the question of how to treat 
what interview subjects said; how to do justice to what they meant; and how to 
distinguish between the hidden and public transcript.99 Truth is always an issue in 
fieldwork experience as the wealth of literature on this topic suggests.100 But how 
do we determine what is the true opinion and what is the government line? 101 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See, for example, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: 
Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1998); Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’; 
Mervyn Frost, Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations (London, 
Routledge, 2008). 
98 Pamela Nilan, ‘’Dangerous fieldwork’ re-examined: The question of the researcher 
subject position’, Qualitative Research 2, no. 3 (2002), 368. 
99 This concern stems from the nature of my questions and discussion with interviewees in 
Rwanda, and more specifically, around the subject of language and identity. It is a well 
known and widely researched fact that the Rwandan government has attempted to 
recreate the idea of identity in Rwanda since the 1994 genocide. This involves the passing 
of a number of laws which make it illegal for Rwandans to talk about ethnicity using the 
pre-1994 labels: Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. In post-genocide Rwanda everybody is, in theory, 
simply Rwandan. See Helen Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda’, 
Ethnicities 8, no. 1 (2008): 5-41; Helen Hintjens and David Kiwuwa, ‘Not ethnicity, but 
race: Unity and conflict in Rwanda since the genocide’, in Perspectives on Contemporary 
Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence or the Politics of Conviction?, ed. Santosh Saha 
(Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), 77-105. 
100 Larissa Begley, ‘The RPF control everything! Fear and rumour under Rwanda’s 
genocide ideology legislation’, in Emotional and Ethical Challenges for Field Research in 
Africa: The Story Behind the Findings, eds. Susan Thomson, An Ansoms and Jude 
Murison (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 70-83; Andrea Purdeková, ‘Even if I 
am not here, there are so many eyes: Surveillance and state reach in Rwanda’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 49, no. 3 (2011): 475-97; Lidewyde Berckmoes, 'Dealing with 
deceit: Fieldwork encounters and lies in Burundi', in Emotional and Ethical Challenges 
for Field Research in Africa: The Story Behind the Findings, eds. Susan M. Thomson, An 
Ansoms and Judith Murison (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 123-38; Judith 
Vorrath, 'Challenges of interviewing political elites: A view from the top in post-war 
Burundi', in Emotional and Ethical Challenges for Field Research in Africa: The Story 
Behind the Findings, eds. Susan M. Thomson, An Ansoms and Judith Murison 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013),  57-69. 
101 In the last two decades following the genocide in 1994, the Rwandan government, led 
by Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), have implemented a major 
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I discuss these difficulties and further issues of positionality in some detail in both 
empirical chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), nevertheless, one of the most important 
realisations that came from my interviews in Rwanda, is the unlikelihood that 
there would be a position or truth, beyond the government position, given by 
interviewees. In Zimbabwe, this did not seem to be an issue, as many of my 
interviewees seemed happy to talk freely and candidly about what they 
understood to be their take on the reasons why Zimbabwe withdrew from the 
Commonwealth, and whether it would ever return. Their responses often 
appeared to be driven by emotion, which saw them swing from simple story-
telling narrative to exasperation and annoyance at the way Zimbabweans had 
been treated by both their government, the Commonwealth group of states, and 
the wider international arena. No story followed exactly the same narrative - 
which suggested interviewees were not repeating the official stories told by the 
Zimbabwean government.  
 
What interview subjects say provides a springboard into wider conceptions of the 
Commonwealth and what it means to the their particular state. The bulk of the 
empirical part of the study deals with elite actors’ experience being part of a state 
that has left or joined the Commonwealth. Much of their contribution is based on 
feelings towards the accession or withdrawal of their respective states from the 
organisation. This has also informed the ways in which I have used interviewees’ 
ideas to implicitly depict wider conceptions of the relationship between their state 
and the Commonwealth and their state and Britain. Since the study is based on an 
interpretive reading of the interview data, my analytical judgment inevitably 
comes into play. As the task of qualitative research, to borrow Allan Kellehear’s 
phraseology, is on persuading rather than proving,102 the precision granted to 
certain alternative, quantitative forms of methodology is neither a possibility nor a 
goal in these circumstances. The veracity of my judgment, therefore, is a task that 
I leave in the reader’s hands. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
crackdown on discussing ethnicity. Although two decades have passed since the genocide 
and there has been little active violence in this time, the political situation in Rwanda is 
restrictive, with the government tightly controlling the media, limiting civil society, and 
intimidating the general public into silent acquiescence. See Timothy Longman, 
‘Conducting research in conflict zones: Lessons from the African Great Lakes region’, in 
Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A View from Below, eds. Dyan Mazurana, Karen 
Jacobsen and Lacey Andrews Gale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 260.  
102 Allan Kellehear, The Unobtrusive Researcher (St. Leonard’s, New South Wales: Allen 
and Unwin, 1993), 25.  
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1.5 Plan of chapters 
 
The thesis plays out over five chapters and introduces a range of historical, 
theoretical, and empirical perspectives through which we might explore how, from 
its historical antecedents to its contemporary usage, the Commonwealth family 
label might be understood today. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 form the theoretical and 
historical backbone of the project and provide the basic orientation. The three 
chapters follow a loose chronological framework, which begins in the colonial 
period, in Chapter 2, moves away from the colonial context to the formation of the 
Commonwealth and the period between 1949 and 1965, in Chapter 3, and ends 
with an exploration of how the Commonwealth attempted to modernise both 
around 1965 and following the end of the Cold War until the present day, in 
Chapter 4. I have chosen, in this way, to show a progression in thinking between 
the Commonwealth’s communitarianism, which I largely argue is grounded in the 
organisation’s past, and its cosmopolitanism, which I argue is the 
Commonwealth’s attempt to stay relevant as an international organisation by 
looking to the future. And yet, as I have already pointed out, the Commonwealth 
appears to be both cosmopolitan and communitarian. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a brief and broad introduction to the Commonwealth family 
label by exploring the historical foundations, beginning with its usage during the 
nineteenth century. After surveying the Victorian cult of domesticity and the ways 
in which the idea of the family left the confines of the domestic realm and was 
used in a more international capacity to describe the wider imperial family, the 
chapter considers the ways in which the British applied the language of family in a 
more derogatory capacity, firstly to provide an ‘Other’ against which to juxtapose 
the superiority of the British, and later during the decolonisation process. The 
final part of the chapter considers the more contemporary usage of the family 
label.  
 
While Chapter 2 provides some historical background to the family label, 
Chapters 3 and 4 take a more theoretical route. The chapters attempt to strike a 
balance between the empirical and the theoretical by examining the 
Commonwealth through the twin lenses of communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism. Chapter 3 examines the extent to which the Commonwealth 
might be described as communitarian. It begins by tracing three main ideas 
within communitarian thinking that appear to underscore the idea of community. 
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Many critics are frustrated by the lack of clarity by communitarian theorists to 
explain what they mean when they talk about community, but the chapter argues 
that we can find running through much communitarian literature three main 
ideas which are: inheritance, shared values, and solidarity. After fleshing out the 
main ideas and arguments within these three constituent elements, the chapter 
then attempts to examine the Commonwealth through the communitarian lens. 
The final section of the chapter turns the lens back on to the theory and uses the 
more messier communitarianism of the Commonwealth to problematise the idea 
that communities are over-simplified and culturally homogenous as some 
communitarian theorists like to claim.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the Commonwealth’s turn to cosmopolitanism that gathered 
speed following the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the 
end of the Cold War. It demonstrates how the Commonwealth attempted to take a 
more cosmopolitan outlook to encompass the individual rights of all two billion 
Commonwealth citizens. These rights were enshrined in the Harare Declaration 
which has become the organisation’s principle rights-based document. But while 
the heads of state agreed by consensus to adopt the Harare principles, there has 
been less enthusiasm about abiding by the promise to protect the human rights of 
Commonwealth citizens. This lack of enthusiasm for human rights is one of the 
main reasons that Zimbabwe walked away from the family in 2003. Since the loss 
of Zimbabwe, the Commonwealth has opened up its membership criteria to 
become a more inclusive forward-looking cosmopolitan organisation. But what 
does this mean for the organisation’s communitarianism that it seems reluctant to 
leave behind? 
 
Chapter 5 begins the empirical exploration behind the claims that the 
Commonwealth appears to be both communitarian and cosmopolitan offering a 
view of the withdrawal of Zimbabwe through a familial lens. If the Commonwealth 
as a whole troubles the notion of communitarianism, then Zimbabwe troubles the 
very idea of the family itself. Through the voices and opinions of Zimbabwean 
elites the chapter explores how the conception of the Commonwealth as a family 
was troubled by the departure of one of its most problematic children, and how 
Zimbabweans feel about being on the outside of the Commonwealth family 
looking in. 
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If Chapter 5 is concerned with the family of the Commonwealth’s past, then 
Chapter 6 offers a glimpse at the organisation’s future. The chapter explores the 
accession of Rwanda to the Commonwealth through the voices and opinions of 
Rwandan elites. Little has been written on Rwanda’s reasons for joining the 
organisation and the effect, if any, that joining the Commonwealth has had on 
Rwanda.103 I draw on evidence from a series of interviews I carried out in Rwanda 
to paint a picture of how Rwandan elites believe that that Rwanda and the 
Commonwealth have mutually assisted each other. Behind these stories of mutual 
affection however lie the realities of the Rwandan government’s draconian 
attempts to recreate ethnicity and identity in the fragile state. The Rwandan 
president talks in the language of the Commonwealth, about togetherness and 
good practice; likewise, Rwandan elites speak about the Commonwealth as if 
salvation will be forthcoming in their accession to the organisation. But what do 
the Commonwealth and Rwanda really gain from each other? And is this enough 
to keep the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitan aspirations alive?  	  
Taken together, these chapters provide resources for thinking about the 
Commonwealth on a more critical and theoretical platform. The concluding 
chapter brings together these resources and the analyses of the five chapters. I 
discuss the nuances as well as the messiness of the Commonwealth family. Family 
itself is a messy concept and much of the thesis is concerned with the ways in 
which family - in the way the Commonwealth uses the term - is problematised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 As I mentioned earlier, to date there is less than a handful of studies on Rwanda in the 
Commonwealth, this consists of: Will Jones, ‘Rwanda: The way forward?’, The Round 
Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 103, no. 3 (2014): 347-49; te 
Velde, The Commonwealth Brand. 
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England…resembles a family, a rather stuffy Victorian family, with not 
many black sheep in it but with all its cupboards bursting with 
skeletons. It has rich relations who have to be kow-towed to and poor 
relations who are horribly sat upon, and there is a deep conspiracy of 
silence about the source of the family income. It is a family in which 
the young are generally thwarted and most of the power is in the hands 
of irresponsible uncles and bedridden aunts. Still, it is a family. It has 
its private language and its common memories, and at the approach of 
an enemy it closes its ranks. A family with the wrong members in 
control - that, perhaps is as near as one can come to describing 
England in a phrase. 
 
- George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn (1940) 
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2 
 
 
Mapping the Family: From Empire 
to Commonwealth 
 
In the introduction chapter, I briefly discussed how the idea of the Empire as a 
family permeated British political discourse long before the Commonwealth’s 
inception as an intergovernmental organisation;1 but what are the political roots 
of this metaphor and why does the family label continue to be used so liberally, 
not only by the British monarch, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and British 
politicians, but also by Commonwealth heads of government? In later chapters, I 
will examine two empirical case studies, looking for ways in which individual 
Commonwealth member states in Africa have helped to complicate the idea of 
family and how they view their place in the organisation and its history and 
future. In this chapter, I want to explore the wider, more historical and 
metaphorical side of the family label in order to lay down some foundations for 
the discussion in the chapters that follow.  
 
I am going to do this by thinking about how the notion of the Empire as a family 
was created by the British during the nineteenth century and how it moved 
through different manifestations both domestic and international, from the mid-
nineteenth century, where familial discourse first appears, to its modern usage, 
where the label is used liberally by Commonwealth Secretary Generals and the 
Queen, as head of the Commonwealth, to describe fifty-three states and 
approximately two billion people who make up the wider contemporary 
Commonwealth. Underlying these manifestations are temporal changes of two 
distinct kinds: firstly how the meaning and ideology of ‘family’ changes over time 
and at different historical junctures - for example, the transformation of family 
from the private to the public realm during the reign of Queen Victoria; secondly, 
what families do also changes with time - for example what Britain, as parent state 
did, or need to do, to shore up a sense of national identification globally across the 
Empire in the settler colonies, was necessarily different during the colonial era as 
compared to at the time of decolonisation.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 McIntyre, British Decolonisation, 1946-1997, 16.  
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In showing these two distinct temporal shifts, I sketch an outline of the family, as 
the label was employed by the British, from the mid-nineteenth century usage of 
the term, where the variability of family forms became commonplace in British 
political and social discourse; 2  through decolonisation, where, in some well 
documented cases, the British used the language of family to show the childlike 
nature of colonial subjects in an effort to hold on to African colonies such as 
Kenya; and finally to the present application of the label to symbolise unity among 
Commonwealth states. Along the way, I explore the idea of the 
imperial/Commonwealth family as it moved from an emphatically white concept 
premised on a racialised notion of hierarchy as a way in which the British could 
bolster their position as the superior race;3 as a crutch against which newly 
independent states could anchor their search for recognition and identity;4 and as 
a way for the Queen to carry on a bond with her former Empire.  
 
This is not an attempt at a history of the Commonwealth - there is already an 
enormous literature that charts and describes the history of the organisation. 
However, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, very little of this literature has 
focused on the description of the Commonwealth as a family. This means that the 
language and imagery of the Commonwealth family are often used without much 
thought to what lies behind their usage. While this lack of attention might not 
seem significant, what is intriguing are the many ways in which the family label 
has come to be synonymous with the picture put forward by many who write on 
the organisation - in particular Secretary Generals and High Commissioners from 
bygone eras - as a unified and unique organisation; but as I outlined in the 
introduction chapter, the Commonwealth is not unique. Many of the 
organisation’s features that are held up as unique by its keenest observers - shared 
history, shared values being the most talked about among these - are nevertheless 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In their extensive research on the nineteenth century family and Empire, Leonore 
Davidoff and Catherine Hall argue that the variability of family forms cannot be 
overstressed. According to their research, the term ‘family’ was diverse and flexible with 
permeable boundaries which, inter alia, stretched to networks of kin, friends, and 
household servants. See Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and 
Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850 (Abingdon: Routledge. 2002), 31. 
3 See Anne McClintock and Roxanne Doty provide good introductions to the British use of 
familial discourse both during the Empire and at decolonisation. See McClintock, 
Imperial Leather; Doty, Imperial Encounters. 
4 Both Crawford Young and Tamar Golan have suggested that the Commonwealth and 
Francophonie were used by their African states as a way of mitigating the struggle for 
recognition. See Golan, ‘How can France do everything that it does in Africa and get away 
with it?’; Crawford Young, ‘The heritage of colonialism’, in Africa in World Politics: Post-
Cold War Challenges, eds. John Herbeson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1995), 19-39. 
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also the defining features of the Francophonie, the Organsation of Ibero-American 
states, and, to a great extent, also, the European Union and the African Union. 
 
The chapter begins with an exploration of the idea of family in nineteenth century 
Britain as a way of understanding how the notion of family moved from the 
personal to the domestic and from the domestic to the international. While I do 
not want to dwell too much on the colonial side of the family metaphor, as my 
focus in the thesis is on post-colonial Commonwealth relations, the implications 
of understanding Victorian family life are, however, of tangential relevance to my 
work, since I am interested in the ways in which the family metaphor came to be 
applied internationally. It is necessary therefore to step back and understand the 
temporal changes in the idea of the family and how this idea was changing in 
Britain in the middle decades of the nineteenth century in order that we might get 
a better picture of how, and why, the idea began to take on a more international 
aspect.  
 
2.1 The ideology of a Greater Britain and the ideology of the family 
 
I want to begin this section by putting the idea of the imperial family into context 
through the lens of the quest by the British in the nineteenth century for the idea 
of a Greater Britain - that is, an imagined community of British sharing the same 
race and values, stretched out geographically across the Empire. Duncan Bell has 
written that, the turbulent economic and political landscape of the nineteenth 
century was the reason behind British attempts to shore up the Empire as a 
guarantor of strength.5 One of the ways in which this was done, and the subject of 
Bell’s study - The Idea of Greater Britain - was to attempt to unite the United 
Kingdom with its settler colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and parts of 
South Africa. For the late Victorians, the Empire was an extension of the British 
national ‘self’ beyond the physical, geographical shores of the United Kingdom. It 
was through this imagined community composed of ‘neo-Britains’ 6 who were 
‘bound intimately by commonality of race, institutions, sensibility, and 
citizenship,’ that colonial political figures and unionists viewed the Empire at the 
time - as a seamless global nation.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain, 1. 
6 J. G. A. Pocock, The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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While the idea of a seamless global British polity, mapped around the united 
peoples of the mother-land and the settler colonies, distorts the ‘history of multi-
ethnic and polyglot societies far removed from the United Kingdom,’ 7 the idea of a 
global Britishness, nevertheless, sought to collapse distinctions between domestic 
and international/colonial and home and abroad while simultaneously 
emphasising the differences between those ‘neo-Britains’ in the settler colonies 
and the rest of the Empire.8 One of the ways in which these boundaries were 
troubled was semantically through the interchangeability of the idea of state and 
nation.9 This semantic muddying helped to grow the distinct idea that the wider 
global nation was populated by the same race, cementing the idea that Greater 
Britain was a racial polity. As Bell points out, there were largely two 
interpretations of the concept of nationality at work for the Victorians. For some, 
the notion of a Greater Britain conjured the image of a group of independent 
nations, yet for others the group was reduced to one large nation sprawling out 
geographically across the Empire.10 This division in interpretation centred around 
the question of whether national self-consciousness could translate across global 
distances.11 Running parallel to ideas of race and global Britishness, was the idea 
that the Empire was a family.12 
 
The Victorians, as John Burnett points out, were the most ‘family-conscious and 
home-centred’ society in English history,’13 yet, while the ideology of the family 
had remained largely stable, from the mid-nineteenth century it was subject to a 
period of rapid change.14 Having been previously confined to the realm of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Pocock, The Discovery of Islands, 181-91. 
8 Bell, The Idea of a Greater Britain, 34. 
9 Chris Brown, ‘State and nation in nineteenth century international political theory’, in 
International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First 
World War, eds. Chris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 457-469. 
10 Bell, The Idea of a Greater Britain, 113. 
11 Bell, The Idea of a Greater Britain, 113. 
12 There is a vast amount of scholarship on the Victorian and imperial family, here I 
provide a small fragment of it: Buettner, Empire Families; Julia Clancy-Smith and 
Frances Gouda, eds., Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French 
and Dutch Colonialism (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998); Antoinette 
Burton, ed., Gender, Sexuality and Colonial Modernities (London: Routledge, 1999); 
Mary Procida, Married to Empire: Gender, politics and Imperialism in India, 1883 - 
1947 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal 
Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, CA 
and London: University of California Press, 2002); Onida E. González and Bianca Premo, 
eds., Raising an Empire: Children in Early Modern Iberia and Colonial Latin America 
(Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2007). 
13 John Burnett, A Social History of Housing: 1851-1985 (London: Methuen, 1986), 98. 
14	  James Kilroy, The Nineteenth Century English Novel: Family Ideology and Narrative 
Form (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 12. 
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private, the family was now - in the middle decades of the nineteenth century - 
catapulted by an array of political and social issues out of the private realm of the 
home and into the light of seemingly unrelenting public discussion. Among the 
political and social issues that brought the family out of the privacy of the home 
were: the passing of the ‘Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act;’ the spectacle of the 
single woman (personified by the widowed figure of Queen Victoria); women 
leaving the home to work (the popular cult of Florence Nightingale);15 and large 
scale forced and voluntary emigration.16 All of these things transformed the 
nineteenth-century family from a home-centred private, domestic space, into a 
site of instability, ideological conflict, and inconsistency. 17  These social and 
political issues go some way to explaining how the notion of the family became 
something of a spectacle in Victorian Britain, but they do not explain how the 
notion of the family crossed from the domestic to the international. If working 
women, divorce, and emigration troubled the idea of family in the domestic 
sphere, how did these, or other factors, blur the familial lines between the 
domestic and the international?  
 
The answer to this question finds parallels in the troubled semantics that 
underscored the debate around the idea of the nation and the national self 
discussed earlier in this section. We need only consider the fluid definition of the 
family as outlined in the 1851 census to get a clearer picture of how the familial 
lines between home and colonies became blurred. The census marked the 
beginning of a more advanced form of Victorian enquiry where everyone and 
everything could be looked upon scientifically and arranged hierarchically.18 This 
was the age of obsessive attention to detail and enquiry, and the definition of 
family reflected this as the census tackled the axiomatics of collective life. 
Included in this enquiry were questions such as: What was a family; and, what 
was a house? The Victorian family, that had once been famously described as ‘a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For an interesting discussion of the life of Florence Nightingale and her outright 
rejection of the Victorian cult of domesticity see Signe O. Wegener, James Fenimore 
Cooper Versus the Cult of Domesticity: Progressive Themes of Femininity and Family in 
the Novels (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2005). 
16 For a detailed discussion of nineteenth century roots of globalisation and how forced 
and voluntary migration lends strength to theories of ‘de-territorialisation’ see Keith 
Hanley and Greg Kucich, eds., Nineteenth-Century Worlds: Global Formations Past and 
Present (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
17 Anne Digby, ‘Victorian values and woman in public and private’, Proceedings of the 
British Academy 78 (1992): 195-215. 
18 McClintock offers an interesting analysis of the Victorian obsession with measuring and 
hierarchy. See McClintock, Imperial Leather. 
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little kingdom within itself,’19 was now defined in much more capacious social 
terms that saw it:  
 
[not] as the children of one parent, but as the persons under one 
head…the householder, master, husband, father…wife, children, 
servants, relatives, visitors, and persons constantly or accidentally in 
the house…’Family,’ in the sense which it has acquired in England, may 
be considered the social unit of which parishes, towns, counties, and 
the nation, are composed.20  
 
As the census shows, by the mid-nineteenth century the range and complexity of 
meaning and ideology of what a family was had moved from one of private to one 
of public extension that defied simple summary or exposition. The boundaries 
between what was considered family and non-family became increasingly fluid 
and, as Esme Cleall, Laura Ishiguru and Emily Manktelow have pointed out, this 
did not confine itself to the domestic arena.21 
 
In a number of ways, and helped considerably by the imagined community of the 
united Greater Britain discussed at the beginning of this section of the chapter, 
this looser definition of family stretched beyond the borders of the nation and was 
mapped onto the ideology of Greater Britain. As families were separated across 
geographical lines, either through emigration or through work, the family label 
helped to negotiate alternative constructs of domesticity overseas.22 In these ways, 
the emotional and structural dynamics of family life blurred the boundaries 
between domestic and imperial and troubled the meaning of family. While there 
are myriad examples in the literature to support this observation, one that is 
particularly telling in this respect is an observation by Cleall, Ishiguru, and 
Manktelow who note: 
 
Imperialism provided new arenas for sexuality, domesticity and 
kinship, and contestations over the implications of these opportunities 
were intimately entwined with understandings of identity and power in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This was the description of the family by the liberal physician Peter Gaskell in 1833. 
Gaskell cited in Anthony Wohl, ed., The Victorian Family: Structures and Stresses 
(London: Croom Helm, 1978), 202. 
20 Census xxxiv cited in Karen Chase and Michael Levenson, The Spectacle of Intimacy: A 
Public Life for the Victorian Family (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
21 Esme Cleall, Laura Ishiguru and Emily Manktelow, ‘Imperial relations: Histories of 
family in the British Empire’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 14, no. 1 
(2013). Online. 
22 Elizabeth Buettner has written extensively on the re-construction of family life in 
colonial India where she refers to the colonial administration, quoting Kipling, as ‘British 
men making their careers in India.’ See Buettner, Empire Families, 1. 
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colonial contexts. Whilst absence, distance and surrogacy stretched the 
limits of the family...sexual relationships that bridged what were 
construed as distinct ‘racial’ groups could reconfigure the boundaries 
of colonial rule.23 
 
This ‘reconfiguring of boundaries’ is even more specifically taken up and 
problematised by Elizabeth Buettner, who troubles the idea of family in her 
description of the imperial family in colonial India. For Buettner:  
 
since India was not among the parts of Britain’s Empire meant for 
permanent white settlement, those maintaining a presence there over 
several generations did so without formally emigrating...This created 
specific forms of racial, class, and geographical identity that enabled 
them to remain separate not only from Indians but also from members 
of European descended communities domiciled in India.24 
 
Unlike the so-called ‘neo-Britains’ in the settler colonies, these ‘exiles’ inhabited a 
shadowy space. As Angela Woollacott aptly sums up, they were ‘insiders in the 
Empire because of their whiteness while simultaneously outsiders in England due 
to their colonial origins.’ 25  These notions - ‘reconfiguring boundaries’ and 
‘shadowy spaces’ - all help to trouble the idea of the family as a solely domestic 
entity and show how, in more than one respect, the demarcation between the 
domestic and the imperial grew blurred. What these examples all have in common 
is that they underscore the more social aspects of the family; but what about the 
political side?  
 
Far from being confined to the more social aspects of society, changes in the 
political sphere formed an integral part of the Imperial family’s crisis of publicity. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the parallel threats and upheavals of the 
Divorce Bill in England and the uprising in India which, despite taking place in 
different corners of the Empire, nevertheless had a profound influence both on 
each other and on the British political psyche. Threats to the family played out in 
the British government: as members of Parliament debated divorce, India 
appeared as an immense screen on which the fantasy structures of the imperial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Cleall, Ishiguru and Manktelow, ‘Imperial relations’. 
24 Buettner, Empire Families, 1-2. This inside/outside dichotomy is a theme which recurs 
in Chapter 5 of the thesis in the case of Zimbabweans who likewise trouble the idea of 
family with their claims that, despite the official withdrawal of their state from the 
Commonwealth. 
25 Angela Woollacott, To Try Her Fortune in London: Australian Women, Colonialism, 
and Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 34. 
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family could be projected.26 In the most general field of analogy, Britain and India 
were the married colonial couple. As Chase and Levenson point out, ‘What to do 
about India and what to do about marriage? - became entangled in one another, to 
the point where in talking about one, members of Parliament could at the same 
time be talking about the other.’27  
 
If, as I argued earlier in the section, the British need to shore up the union of the 
United Kingdom with the so-called settler colonies was a reaction to the turbulent 
economic and political conditions of the era from which the British Empire faced 
encroachment of a powerful set of global challengers in the United States, Russia, 
and Germany, then the language of family was likewise applied as the guarantor of 
stability against the turbulence ushered in with the threat of losing India which 
paralleled social change. The cult of domesticity permeated every social and 
political orifice of Victorian life as the family became a spectacle discussed on 
every level. India’s attempted parricide and the spectre of divorce haunted the cult 
of domesticity as the image of the self-dependent single woman (whether single, 
divorced, or widowed) reshaped the dogma of domestic respectability and the 
ideology of the family. With divorce legal and women leaving the home, the 
privileged position of the British male began to diminish.28 The family, and all it 
had come to represent, – legitimacy, race and national belonging – was in crisis. 
In the very real sense, the ideal of domesticity had fallen apart at home and 
Britain needed to (re)-stabilise the norm of family.  
 
In addition to the shoring up of the Empire as a guarantor of British strength, 
what was needed was a scapegoat against which the Greater British family could 
define and re-affirm itself and with this came a temporal change not only in the 
ideology of the family and who was incorporated into and under the family label, 
but also in the function of the imperial family, that is, what Britain as parent 
could, or needed to, do to maintain its status as head of the family. In the name of 
Darwinism and anthropology, Britain discovered a way to reinvent the power of 
the patriarchal father and the colonies proved to be fertile ground. 29  The 
performance of superiority - in particular racial superiority - was crucial for the 
British, and, in the colonies, there was no shortage of ‘Others’ against which to 
juxtapose.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Chase and Levenson, The Spectacle of Intimacy. 
27 Chase and Levenson, The Spectacle of Intimacy, 192. 
28 Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes.  
29 McClintock, Imperial Leather, 240. 
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2.2 The changing family role: From Empire to decolonisation 
 
In an illuminating passage near the beginning of Imperial Leather, a study of the 
interconnection of race, gender, and sexuality during the Victorian era, Anne 
McClintock traces the etymology of the verb to domesticate, deriving from 
dominus, lord of the domun or home, to a pre-1964 usage that meant ‘to civilise.’30 
This hierarchical idea of domesticity helps to shed some light on the temporal 
shift in the function and use of the idea of the Empire as a family and how the idea 
of hierarchy and civilisation was utilised by the British - that is wider and much 
messier application of the family metaphor by the British across the Empire.  
 
Through the advent of social Darwinism after 1859, the British discovered a way 
in which to sanction national hierarchy - through the image of the evolutionary 
Family of Mankind.31  As McClintock points out, ‘Since the subordination of 
woman to man and child to adult was deemed a natural fact, hierarchies within 
the nation could be depicted in familial terms to guarantee social difference as a 
category of nature.’32 To the hierarchical structure, which placed the white British 
male squarely in the position of racial superiority, was then added the colonial 
native. Africans in particular were described variously as: children, backward and 
immature. These descriptions, wrapped up in the collective motif of ‘the family of 
man,’ enabled the British to portray imperial subjects as lacking the rationality 
generally attributed to adults.33 While Britain, the patriarch at the head of the 
family, was rational and civilised, the members of her great global family, in 
juxtaposition, were irrational, uncivilised, and child-like. Arguably, not just the 
colonial native but also orphans, the diseased, the poor along with many other 
types ex-centric to the traditional family structure served this purpose of 
stabilising the norm via a process of othering.34  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 McClintock, Imperial Leather, 35. 
31 Mike Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945: 
Nature as Model and Nature as Threat (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
32 McClintock, Imperial Leather, 357-58. 
33 This was particularly significant in Kenya during the Emergency. The British needed to 
depict the Mau Mau as inferior and irrational. See E. G. Wyatt, ‘Mau Mau and the African 
mind’, Contemporary Review 184, no. 4 (1953): 206-11; Carothers, The Psychology of 
Mau Mau.  
34 Kohlke, Marie-Luise, and Christian Gutleben, eds., Neo-Victorian Families: Gender, 
Sexual and Cultural Politics (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2011), 20. 
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Descriptions such as these permeated British culture as the cult of scientific 
discovery garnered strength.35 This spilled over into novels and popular culture as 
writers like Henry Rider Haggard in his adventure novel King Solomon’s Mines 
described the intellect and nature of Africans as: ‘some five centuries 
behind…Civilisation, it would seem, when applied to black races, produces effects 
diametrically opposite to those we are accustomed to in white nations: it debases 
before it can elevate.’36 In this and myriad other ways, the colonised were depicted 
by the British to be permanently inferior and child-like.  
 
While the mother country, in every sense of the word, was struggling to maintain 
its status and position, ‘the trope of the organic family became invaluable in its 
capacity to give state and imperial intervention the alibi of nature.’37 The concept 
of the family, then, with its ingrained ideas of hierarchy and inequality, beautifully 
denoted the superiority of the British coloniser over the inferiority of the 
colonised native subjects. Notwithstanding the usefulness of the social Darwinism 
to boost the image of Victorian male superiority, this ‘Othering’ appeared once 
more as a tool, not only when the Empire was at its highest power, but it also 
continued into the following century, where the Empire was seemingly coming to 
an end. A cursory examination of literature on decolonisation reveals that the 
family metaphor continued to be employed by the British to denote superiority 
well into the twentieth century and contained many of the oppositions shown 
above. This is most evident in the case of Kenya and the Mau Mau rebellion, 
where British attempts to hang onto the colony saw a continuation of violence 
which was often justified through the rhetoric of hierarchy, paternalism, and 
family discipline.  
 
The British occupation of Kenya lasted until 1963, when the British ceded 
sovereignty over the East African colony. The achievement of independence 
followed a long and sustained period of struggle for freedom by the Kenyans, 
which the British attempted to quell through systemic violence which included the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This was also the era of enforced child emigration as male delinquent children were sent 
to southern Africa, the removal of indigenous children from their parents - often into 
Church-run establishments intended to ‘civilise’ and turn native children into model 
Victorian girls and boys, and state-run institutions described in the language of family. See 
Ellen Boucher, Empire’s Children: Child Emigration, Welfare, and the decline of the 
British World, 1869-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
36 Henry Rider Haggard, King Solomon’s Mines (London: Signet, 1965). 
37 McClintock, Imperial Leather, 45. 
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use of internment camps, and torture.38 It was this struggle that led to the 
outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion,39 and the British counterinsurgency, which 
has been described by many historians as the ‘great horror story of Britain’s 
Empire in the 1950s.’40  
 
The Mau Mau rebellion is interesting from the perspective of the familial 
metaphor because British responses to it were based on discursive and 
disciplinary mechanisms which were imbued with a rhetoric that painted Kenyans 
as naughty rebellious children, who could not think for themselves, and Britain as 
the responsible, rational thinking parents, who needed to use every tool necessary 
to keep the children in line.41 By framing the Mau Mau rebellion in familial terms, 
the British were able to shape the narrative of the Mau Mau as a war between 
‘savagery and civilisation.’42 This idea of binaries was nothing new, as we have 
seen throughout this chapter so far. By framing the revolt in the language of 
savagery, the British hoped to shape thinking on the Mau Mau as a virtual collapse 
of the African mind. 43  Government propaganda, along with analysis by 
psychiatrists and anthropologists, offered a variety of tortuous interpretations of 
the Mau Mau as ‘atavistic,’ ‘tribalist,’ ‘racist,’ and ‘anti-Christian,’ which helped to 
cement the idea that many white settlers already believed: ‘that the adult African 
was simply a child.’44 To help underscore this image of the child-like African, a 
number of psychiatric and scientific studies were commissioned which all painted 
the Mau Mau as mentally unfit for self-rule.45 
 
What applied to Kenyans was largely applicable to Africans in general. According 
to John Colin Carothers, the official colonial psychiatrist and expert on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 There is a great deal of emerging literature on the British counter-insurgency and 
accompanying techniques. For a detailed overview and analysis see Caroline Elkins, 
Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of the British Gulag in Africa (New York: Owl 
Books, 2006); David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya 
and the End of Empire (London: Phoenix, 2005); Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, 
Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonisation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
39 Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Mickie Mwanzia Koster and Jerono P. Rotich,’Introduction’, 
in Kenya After 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones, eds. 
Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Mickie Mwanzia Koster and Jerono P. Rotich (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 3.  
40 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 1. 
41 Roxanne Doty, Imperial Encounters. 
42 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 1.  
43 Doty, Imperial Encounters, 107.  
44 McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and ‘the African Mind’, 60.  
45 The most well known of these studies are those by John Colin Carothers, see John Colin 
Carothers, The African Mind in Health and Disease: A Study in Ethno-psychiatry 
(Geneva: World Health Organisation, 1953); Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau. 
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‘African mind,’ whenever an African came into contact with European culture, 
which largely meant confrontation with new or unforeseen situations, he or she 
became highly vulnerable to psychotic breakdown.46 Like children, Carothers 
noted, Africans were:  
 
highly dependent upon physical and emotional stimulation; lacking in 
spontaneity, foresight, tenacity, judgment and humility; inapt for 
sound abstraction and for logic; given to phantasy and fabrication; and 
in general unstable, impulsive, unreliable, irresponsible and living in 
the present.47  
 
All these things pointed to one conclusion, which, particularly in the Kenyan case, 
was that the African members of the great global British family were delinquent 
children who were not ready for independence.48 The practice of describing the 
Mau Mau as irrational children with a propensity for poor mental health 
successfully ensured that democracy and independence could be deferred until 
the African condition could be seen to become more akin with the Western 
individual. Until Africans could think rationally and see themselves as civilised, 
independence would not be forthcoming.  
 
What I have been trying to show in the foregoing paragraphs is that, since its 
appearance at the height of the British Empire through to the final years of 
decolonisation, the British employed the family metaphor in two main ways. 
Firstly, as a way in which to encompass the enormity of the Empire with Britain at 
its head. And, secondly in a much more derogatory way to describe certain states, 
such as Kenya, that wanted independence before the British saw fit to let such 
states go. While a more comprehensive analysis of the British counterinsurgency 
against the Mau Mau is beyond the scope of this thesis, the evidence shown here 
suggests powerfully that the family label, when employed to encompass African 
states, was underscored liberally with ideas of racism, inferiority, and inequality. 
But this is only half of the story. The language of family employed by the British 
colonial administration in Kenya, was a far cry from the familial rhetoric being 
applied to persuade a newly independent India to retain her ties with Britain. 
While the British were infantalising Africans in Kenya, the use of the family 
metaphor in other parts of the Empire/Commonwealth had taken on a new 
meaning. The family’s purpose, that is what the family did, or needed to do, was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and ‘the African Mind’, 52.  
47 Carothers, The African Mind in Health and Disease, 87. 
48 Beverley Naidoo, Burn My Heart (London: Puffin, 2007).  
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about to undergo a major temporal change with the sole purpose of shoring up 
India - Britain’s largest creditor and buffer against the rising threat of 
Communism. This change forms the focus of the following sections of the chapter. 
 
2.3 The family motif: ‘Rather a special family of nations’ 
 
While the family metaphor had taken on a more violent image as a way to justify 
the delay in the independence of African colonies, elsewhere the theme of the 
great British global family had begun to take on a much gentler tone. One notable 
example of this can be seen in the familial rhetoric employed by the British Prime, 
Minister Clement Attlee, as he attempted to persuade his Indian counterpart, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, to halt India’s rapid progress towards republican status. Attlee, 
writing to Nehru in 1949, drew on the idea of the family and collective belonging, 
noting: ‘at the head of the Commonwealth is a family. This family does in a very 
real sense symbolise the family nature of the Commonwealth…people of advanced 
and people of primitive culture, see this family as their own.’49  
 
It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale behind the Attlee’s framing of the 
Commonwealth in familial terms; as I noted above, Britain needed to retain its 
ties with India as a creditor and trading partner, as well as needing a buffer 
against the rising tide of communism from the East.50 India, or, more accurately, 
Nehru, on the other hand, showed signs of wishing to remain in the 
Commonwealth, but was opposed to the idea of pledging allegiance to the 
Crown.51 The formula that emerged was the ‘acceptance of the King as the symbol 
of free association of the member nations and as such the Head of the 
Commonwealth.’52 For Nehru, under this agreement, no Indian citizen would owe 
allegiance to the British Monarch, nor could the British Monarch have any role in 
the functioning of the Indian government. This was a successful compromise, 
which paved the way for other newly independent republics to follow. By couching 
the Commonwealth in familial terms, Attlee was able to manoeuvre the figure of 
the King, as he put it, from ‘an abstract symbol connoting authority, often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Attlee cited in Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire, 3. 
50 Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth, 11. 
51 For a detailed analysis of the debates within India over India’s accession to the 
Commonwealth see Y. Rafeek Ahmed, ‘India’s membership of the Commonwealth - 
Nehru’s role’, The Indian Journal of Political Science 52, no. 1 (1991): 43-53.  
52 Sankar Ghose, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1993), 
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connected in the minds of some with an external power,’53 into a father figure and 
effectively reinvent the family trope as a metaphor for unity. Attlee’s attempt to 
separate the idea of Empire, as authoritarian and powerful, from the idea of 
Commonwealth, as united and family-like, marked a turning point in the British 
usage of the familial rhetoric to describe the relationship between Britain and her 
soon-to-be-independent colonies.  
 
It was almost certainly no coincidence that the family-as-unity ideology was being 
pushed at the end of the 1940s. In addition to changes taking place on the 
international arena, which saw Britain losing her grip on her once powerful 
Empire, there were significant changes taking place on the domestic front vis-à-
vis the social landscape and family values. David Cannadine highlights the rise in 
divorce as one significant change and threat to family values noting that, in the 
same year that India gained independence, the divorce rate in Britain reached a 
peak due to the disruption of war.54 This was aided, in no small measure, by the 
‘Legal Aid Act’ of 1949, which made divorce more accessible and more 
affordable.55 Divorce had loomed large in the British imagination following the 
abdication of Edward VIII and as a countermeasure against the damage inflicted 
on the Royal image, when George VI replaced his brother as the British Monarch 
he was promoted not only as King, but also as a family man with the ideal 
family.56  
 
When Queen Elizabeth came to the throne in 1952, she brought with her a revival 
of the Christian faith,57 which attempted to put family values back at the heart of 
society. This was achieved, as Jennifer McGuire notes, because ‘the Queen was 
seen to represent strong Christian moral leadership through her role as Supreme 
Governor of the Church of England.’58 The rhetoric of family values and Christian 
virtue became a common theme, most notably in the Queen’s annual Christmas 
broadcasts to Britain and the Commonwealth. The Queen’s first broadcast linked 
her own family and the families of her listeners to the concept of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Attlee cited in Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire, 3. 
54 David Cannadine, History in Our Time (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 
116.  
55 This is an interesting parallel with the legalisation of divorce in the mid-nineteenth 
century and its effect on Victorian society and the family image. Evidently Britain’s divorce 
rate over the centuries appears to be connected to her relationship with India. 
56 Sarah Bradford, George VI (London: Penguin, 2011).  
57 William Shawcross, Queen and Country (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2002), 43-
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58 McGuire, ‘Till death do us part?’.  
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Commonwealth as a broader family with shared values as she addressed the 
Empire:  
 
We belong, you and I, to a far larger family…the British 
Commonwealth and Empire, that immense union of nations, with their 
homes set in all four corners of the earth. Like our own families, it can 
be a great power for good.59  
 
The speech worked to consolidate the loyalty and affection of the people of 
Britain.60 What had been a metaphor for distinguishing degeneracy and hierarchy 
became a signifier for a supposed loving union of collective identity and 
belonging. This set a precedent for the years that followed where the family motif 
now permeates the discourse of the organisation. This sense of collective 
belonging and collective identity has transcended the conventional markers of 
national identity and has produced what some authors have described as a sense 
of ongoing solidarity and moral responsibility among Commonwealth states.61 
 
But if the Queen can be credited with laying down the foundations of a softer, 
gentler imperial/Commonwealth family, then what is also striking is that the 
remarks in her inaugural Christmas broadcast belie a paradox. Only months 
before she addressed the Empire in 1952 the British had declared an Emergency 
in Kenya. Thus, while the Queen was declaring the imperial family, and all 
families in it, a ‘force for good,’ in the heart of East Africa, the British were using a 
different kind of force as they began a ten year battle to hold on to what had 
become a highly idealised version of Africa in the eyes of the British public.62 
Rather than the family of one and indivisible, to which the Queen appealed in her 
speeches, the process of decolonisation taking place in the far flung corners of the 
Empire, as we saw in the previous section, was a much messier, violent process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II Christmas Broadcast 1952. Available at: 
https://www.royal.uk/queens-first-christmas-broadcast-1952. 
60 McGuire, ‘Till death us do part?’. 
61 Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz, ‘After Empire’: 270.   
62 The Kenya Association, founded in 1932, launched a public relations campaign to 
promote the attractions of Kenya to prospective settlers and lobbied for their interests at 
home in Britain. As a part of this push to promote the East African colony they helped 
launch ‘Truth for Kenya,’ a campaign which included parliamentary lobbying in order to 
underscore ‘the danger of Mau Mau to white civilised society in Kenya.’ See Dane 
Kennedy, ‘Constructing the colonial myth and remaking Kenya’, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 25, no. 2 (1992): 256-7. 
	   60	  
While the Royal speeches were permeated with ideals of family, tolerance, and 
values, in reality the great global British family was in disarray.63  
 
I began this thesis by questioning whether there was something more behind the 
simple family metaphor, but what I have not considered, beyond the brief 
discussion of Commonwealth literature in the previous chapter, is the Queen’s 
enthusiasm for the organisation and the lingering affection for the Monarch from 
both heads of state and the wider Commonwealth. Might the Commonwealth’s 
continued insistence on the unique family label, in spite of the obvious messiness 
of the family, have a deeper connection to the Queen and her role as head of the 
Commonwealth? This observation gestures to my earlier argument that the lack of 
critical analysis in Commonwealth literature may have some connection to a 
concern for the Queen. Given this observation, it seems important at this stage, 
then, to consider the role that the Queen has played in the up-keep of the 
conception of the Commonwealth as a family, and how this might contribute to 
strengthening the power of the family behind the metaphor.  
 
2.4 Bonds of affection: The relationship with the Queen 
 
Since fixing their gaze towards Europe in the 1970s, with membership of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), successive British governments have paid 
little more than lip service to the Commonwealth. More often than not, over the 
past two decades, each new government has announced its intention to put the ‘C’ 
back into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.64 This was the case in 1997, 
when Robin Cook took up the position of Foreign Secretary, and once again when 
William Hague took over the position in 2010. In a lecture delivered in 2011 to the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Hague drew attention to what he saw 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Elizabeth Buettner gives an interesting overview and analysis of the different views of 
decolonisation and the Empire in academic and popular literature, her findings are 
somewhat analogous with the real versus ideal view of the Commonwealth discussed here. 
See Elizabeth Buettner, ‘’Setting the record straight’?: Imperial history in postcolonial 
British public culture’, in Hybrid Cultures, Nervous States: Britain and Germany in a 
(Post)colonial World, eds. Ulrike Lindner, Maren Möhring, Mark Stein, and Silke Stroh 
(Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2010), 89-106. 
64 It has been widely documented that the British have lost any enthusiasm they once had 
for the Commonwealth. This, the literature argues, began during the 1970s with the 
British bid to join the European Economic Community. Various Foreign Ministers over 
the past two decades - notably Robin Cook and William Hague - have vowed to put the ‘C’ 
back in the FCO but nothing much has come of these promises. See William Hague speech 
to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference, ‘The Commonwealth is 
‘back at the heart of British foreign policy’’, 27 July 2011. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-commonwealth-is-back-at-the-heart-of-
british-foreign-policy.  
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as a problem with apathy and the Commonwealth. This is a problem which has 
fuelled an on-going debate, that I mentioned in the previous chapter, around the 
Commonwealth’s relevance. As Hague put it, ‘I’m not naïve about how difficult it 
is to breathe meaningful life into it. But it’s definitely worth the effort because it is 
the ultimate network.’ 65 While Hague’s observation appeared to have signalled a 
desire to re-engage with the Commonwealth, an observation which is supported 
by a surge of attention in the British media around the Commonwealth as an 
alternative trade partner in the lead up to, and aftermath of, the British 
referendum on European Union membership,66 this notwithstanding, very little 
attention has been given to the Commonwealth by the recent British government. 
In contrast, the Queen - in her capacity as the official head of the Commonwealth - 
has a much closer relationship with the organisation and its membership, and, as 
a result of this, some observers have argued, she might very well be the glue that 
holds the organisation together.67  
 
While the figure of a now aging monarch might seem like a crude foundation upon 
which to build an argument for the endurance of an international, 
intergovernmental organisation in the twenty-first century, it is nevertheless 
supported by a number of empirical observations. Among the strongest of which 
is that the Queen continues to be held in high esteem throughout the 
Commonwealth, both by heads of government, and by many of the two billion 
strong members of the wider Commonwealth family. Political biographer Robert 
Hardman has corroborated this view, noting that:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Robert Hardman, Our Queen (London: Hutchinson, 2011). 
66 It will be interesting to see if the Commonwealth’s profile is raised as a result of the 
referendum decision to leave the European Union. Speaking to the House of Lords, the 
new Commonwealth Secretary-General Baroness Patricia Scotland noted, ‘now that the 
UK has made its decision, the Commonwealth will become more pivotally important than 
it has ever been.’ Scotland cited in Alice Foster, ‘What does Brexit mean for the 
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67 Writing on the issue of Commonwealth endurance, David Starkey has conjectured that 
the Queen’s passion and enthusiasm for the organisation, ‘is the only reason the 
Commonwealth survives.’ See David Starkey in conversation with Bidisha, Susanna 
Rustin, ‘A right royal battle’, The Guardian, 4 December 2010. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/dec/04/saturday-conversation-monarchy-
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it is hard to detect the slightest appetite for severing the long and 
largely happy connection with the Crown…The monarchy is one of the 
few things which actually manages to reverse the organisation’s gently 
declining profile and give it a certain star quality amid all the other 
international talking shops.68 
  
Hardman’s point is interesting on a number of levels. Firstly, because it 
emphasises the point I made earlier in the thesis about the Commonwealth’s 
obsession with its own uniqueness: the ‘star quality’ to which Hardman refers, like 
much of the Commonwealth literature, elevates the Commonwealth to a position 
of exceptionality because, unlike other international organisations, the 
Commonwealth has a reigning monarch as the head of its organisation.69 And 
secondly, because it underscores a connection between the Queen and the 
Commonwealth that appears to have manifested in what we might describe as a 
‘close’ relationship between the Monarch and certain Commonwealth leaders 
which, I believe, goes some way to understanding the link between 
Commonwealth endurance and the Queen.  
 
Ben Pimlott and Matthew Neuhaus both put this down to royal diplomacy, 70 but 
there have been a number of notable instances where we might describe the 
relationship between the Queen and a small number of Commonwealth heads of 
government - particularly those in Africa - in more affective terms.71 One such 
example is the past relationship between the Queen and the Ghanaian President, 
Kwame Nkrumah. While taking something of an anti-British stance, during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Robert Hardman, Our Queen. 
69 It is difficult to speculate about how other international organisations view the Queen’s 
role in the Commonwealth, or whether they view the Commonwealth at all, there is, 
however, good reason to suppose that an international organisation, such as the 
Commonwealth, which has attempted to take on a more cosmopolitan outlook in the past 
two decades, might wish to play down the fact that at the head of its organisational family 
sits one of the richest women in the world and whose royal status and privilege are built 
on a foundation of hierarchy and inequality.  
70 Matthew Neuhaus, former deputy Secretary-General to Don McKinnon shares this 
opinion, as he puts it one ‘unique aspect of the Commonwealth is its symbolic headship, 
held by Queen Elizabeth II for historic reasons - and the Commonwealth respects its 
history.’ See Matthew Neuhaus, ‘Renewing the Commonwealth - A reform agenda for a 
new Secretary General’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International 
Affairs 104, no. 5 (2015): 547; Ben Pimlott, ‘Some thoughts on the Queen and 
Commonwealth’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 
87, no. 347 (1998): 304. 
71 Observing the affective relationship between the Queen and a number of African leaders 
led John Holmes of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs to note, in 1962, that 
‘Africans seem to have a fondness for Queens.’ See John Holmes, ‘The impact on the 
Commonwealth of the emergence of Africa’, International Organisation 16, no. 2 (1962): 
291-302. 
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1960s, in attempts to dilute British control of the Commonwealth,72 Nkrumah is 
said to have taken pains to save the Queen from any difficulty or embarrassment 
that might have arisen from his actions.73 In a similar vein, while displaying open 
hostility to the British government, the Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, 
has gone out of his way to not criticise or attack the British Monarch,74 and has 
been reported, on occasion, to become emotional when discussing his past 
encounters with the Queen. As Heidi Holland recalls, when interviewing Mugabe 
he, ‘nearly cried when I mentioned the British royal family… the Queen and how 
she had stayed with him at State House.’75  
 
Commentators have offered a variety of interpretations for these various displays 
of attentiveness. Some, such as David Birmingham, writing on Nkrumah, describe 
the relationship as a kind of a love affair, particularly given the level of loyalty and 
affection shown by Nkrumah, who frequently referred to the Queen as ‘his fairy 
godmother.’76 Others, like William Heseltine, describe these relationships using 
more familial discourse. As Heseltine observes:  
 
From the very beginning, when the Queen made her way round the 
Commonwealth, she got to know some of those African leaders…they 
grew up together and had a relationship which was, in some cases, 
quite affectionate…I think they began to regard her as a mother figure 
in the Commonwealth.77  
 
This point is taken up by Philip Murphy, who has attempted to push the mother 
analogy further by suggesting that the female figure of the Queen, in the nurturing 
role of the mother, makes it easier for the Commonwealth to be portrayed as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 I refer here to Nkrumah taking the lead on pushing for a Commonwealth Secretariat and 
on sanctions against the South African apartheid regime. For more on Nkrumah’s role in 
these events see Stuart Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma: The role of the Commonwealth 
Secretary-General’, in The Contemporary Commonwealth: An Assessment, 1965-2009, 
ed. James Mayall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 65-82. 
73 David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and Tragedy (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 
2007), 200. 
74 Stephen Chan points out in his biography of Mugabe, during the 1991 Commonwealth 
Summit in Harare, there were many photographs of Mugabe meeting the Queen and 
looking proud. See Stephen Chan, Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence (London 
and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 68. 
75 Heidi Holland interview with Kevin Harris from the documentary ‘Zimbabwe: Past the 
Post on a Dark Horse.’ Interview clip available at: http://www.zimeye.net/mugabe-has-a-
deep-love-for-the-british-journalist/.  
76 Certainly the Queen was of a similar age, if not younger, than Nkrumah and other 
African leaders when she became the Monarch, which suggests a certain eroticism rather 
than a mother figure. See Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah, 129. 
77 Heseltine cited in Hardman, Our Queen, 301.  
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family.78 Murphy’s observation comes at the suggestion of Dorothy Thompson’s 
groundbreaking research on gender, power, and Queen Victoria, which argues 
that the fact that Queen Victoria was a woman effectively put her above politics in 
the collective public consciousness.79 It is worth remembering that, as I noted in 
section 2.1, in spite of the broadening definition of family, during Victoria’s reign, 
as diverse, flexible, and able to stretch across distances and disjuncture of all 
kinds, there remained, as Thompson aptly points out, a tension between Victoria’s 
public functions as sovereign and the need to conform to the contemporary notion 
of ‘separate spheres,’ in which the woman’s role was expected to be within the 
family.80 The current presence of a female monarchy under Elizabeth II has, 
likewise, troubled the way in which the monarchy has presented itself both 
domestically and internationally.81  The consistent reference, by the Queen, to the 
Commonwealth as a family, therefore, goes some way to reconciling the public 
and the private spheres.  
 
The point I am trying to make here is that the Queen is, in many ways, responsible 
for the continued blurring of the lines between personal and political, domestic 
and international. While this point is, in itself, significant for the key claim in the 
thesis that the Commonwealth complicates the seemingly sacrosanct border 
between the domestic and the international sphere in normative IR theory, what 
makes the above observations even more interesting is that the notion of the 
Queen, as head of the Commonwealth and mother figure over the wider 
Commonwealth family, stands in sharp contrast to the tradition of the family in 
many African states, which works on the assumption of patriarchy and gender 
inequality.  
 
It would not be an over-generalisation to argue that patriarchal practices are 
deeply ingrained in most African societies.82 This observation is borne out in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Murphy maintains that a common feature of the recollections of those closest to the 
Queen is the tendency to factor in the fact that she is a woman, when discussing her 
success as an effective figurehead. See Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire, 12-13. 
79 Dorothy Thompson, Queen Victoria: Gender and Power (London: Virago, 1990), 139-
40. 
80 Thompson, Queen Victoria, 141-3. It is also worth remembering, as Thompson points 
out, that Victoria was the first monarch  in history who combined the role of the public 
head of state with that of wife and mother.  
81 Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire, 12. 
82 Mojubaolu Okome, ‘What women, whose development? A critical analysis of reformist 
feminist evangelism on African women’, in African Women and Feminism: Reflecting on 
the Politics of Sisterhood, ed. Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 
2003), 71.  
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growing body of research that focuses on gender and power in African politics.83 
One example from this, Schatzberg’s careful empirical work on the political 
legitimacy of the metaphor in African politics and society, discussed in the 
introduction chapter of the thesis, reveals that paternal metaphors permeate all 
areas of social life in Africa.84 In his account of African politics through metaphors 
of fathers, family, and food, Schatzberg observes that the head of state - usually 
male - is frequently portrayed in speeches, in images, and in the media, as the 
father of the nation who administers discipline and punishment as well as 
forgiveness.85 To illustrate this point, Schatzberg draws on a speech by Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo who gives an account of this from a Nigerian perspective. As 
Awolowo sees it: 
 
The FAMILY has an unwritten constitution which is essentially the 
same for any family in any part of the world…Here in Nigeria, it is the 
paterfamilias, advised and assisted by the materfamilias and the other 
adult members of the family, who keeps the reins of the family in his 
firm control. He combines in himself legislative, executive, judicial, 
and administrative functions. Because of his inherent affection for 
them, the paterfamilias does everything in his power to cater to the 
nurture, welfare, and happiness of all members of the family without 
discrimination.86 
 
Awolowo’s description of familial hierarchy, with the patriarch at the head, 
straddles both the private sphere of the family and the political domain. Further, 
as Awolowo’s description shows, this tradition affords very little, if any, power to 
women. Where they are afforded a voice or a place at the political table, more 
often than not, women are confined to the role of counsellor, where ‘father-
chiefs…heed their advice, and treat them…with respect.’87  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 For discussion and analysis of patriarchal practices see, among others, Gerda Lerner, 
The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Oyèrónkẹ́ 
Oyěwùmí, The Invention of Woman: Making an African Sense of Western Gender 
Discourses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Regina Smith Oboler, 
Women, Power, and Economic Change: The Nandi of Kenya (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1985); Sharon Stichter and Jane Parpart, eds., Patriarchy and Class: 
African Women in the Home and the Workforce (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); 
Horace Campbell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of 
Liberation (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003); Horace Campbell and Rudo B. 
Gaidzanwa, ‘Grappling with Mugabe’s masculinist politics in Zimbabwe: A gender 
perspective’, in Mugabeism?: History, Politics, and Power in Zimbabwe, ed. Sabele J. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 157-80. 
84 Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa, 19.  
85 Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa, 23-31. 
86 Obafemi Awolowo cited in Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa, 23-4. 
Italics in original.  
87 Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa, 174.  
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Schatzberg’s findings, along with Awolowo’s description of the African family, 
raise a number of intriguing questions. If, as I argued earlier in this section, the 
Queen is held in high esteem by many heads of the African Commonwealth, might 
we simply ascribe the behaviour of heads of state to that of Schatzberg’s ‘father-
chiefs’ seeking counsel with the Queen in her gendered role of counsellor or 
advisor? While this explanation does have a certain cogency - it is entirely possible 
that heads of state view the Queen in an advisory role - the more persuasive 
explanation, I believe, lies in Murphy’s Queen-as-mother-figure analogy. This idea 
is reinforced by observations from some writers of the behaviour of heads of state 
during the Commonwealth’s biennial Heads of Government Meetings. As Martin 
Charteris remarked of the 1971 Singapore meeting, heads of government were 
‘really sour and bad tempered and that was because she couldn’t attend. If she’s 
there, you see, they behave. It’s like nanny being there. Or perhaps it’s Mummy.’88 
Does framing the Queen in the position of ‘mother’, then, make membership in 
the Commonwealth more endearing and therefore the Queen’s presence an 
enticing incentive for states to remain? 
 
Questions of this kind stretch the limits of political theory and seem to demand a 
more psychoanalytical way of thinking about families. While a psychoanalytical 
reading of the Queen’s relationship in the role as mother is beyond the scope of 
the thesis, there are certain psychological components which are key to 
understanding most familial relationships which also apply to the Commonwealth 
family. These are ideas of duty, loyalty, and reproduction that go hand-in-hand 
with the endurance of families. What is immediately noteworthy here is that the 
concepts of duty and loyalty apply both to member states, which have remained 
loyal to the Commonwealth family, and to the Queen herself, who, as McGuire 
points out, has often, through the years, spelled out quite clearly in her broadcasts 
to the Commonwealth, her loyalty and devotion to the wider family of nations.89 
 
So, where does this get us? The Queen, as I have already pointed out, is perhaps 
the most enthusiastic supporter of the family label, and is herself responsible to 
some extent for the legitimacy of the family metaphor, given that she repeatedly 
refers to the Commonwealth as family. But, she has also taken her role as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Martin Charteris cited in Robert Lacey, Royal: Her Royal Majesty Queen Elizabeth II 
(London: Little Brown, 2002), 256.  
89 McGuire, ‘Til death do us part?’. 
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symbolic head further, as Pimlott writes, ‘on several occasions the significance of 
the Monarch has been more than merely symbolic.’ 90  The Queen’s known 
sympathy for the plight of black South Africans not only helped bring about the 
Lancaster Accord, which saw the independence of Zimbabwe, but also encouraged 
Nelson Mandela to take the new South Africa back to the Commonwealth as one 
of his first acts as President.91 As Pimlott sees this: ‘The Queen has actively helped 
to see the association through the period in which its survival seemed most in 
danger, to the point where a new generation has grown up that lacks the early 
post-imperial resentment and sees no particular reason to discard the set of 
relationships it provides.’92 This picture of the Queen as supportive mother figure 
might go some way to helping us to understand why the Commonwealth has 
endured long after many of its keenest observers, and greatest critics, had 
sounded its death knell.  	  
2.5 Conclusions 
 
I outlined in the previous chapter, my discord with much of the contemporary 
literature on the Commonwealth, that is alarmingly congenial to both the 
Commonwealth and its family label. I have shown in this chapter that if we look 
behind the sanguine rhetoric that the Commonwealth is a family of nations all 
equal in status, to the roots and development of the family metaphor, we find a 
rather different picture combining familial discord with silent harmony and 
negativity with affection, which both stretch and break across distances and 
disjuncture of all kinds. By elaborating on some of the ways in which the family 
metaphor has been manipulated by the British, since the mid-nineteenth century, 
I have attempted to flesh out a picture of the Commonwealth, which shows a 
somewhat more complex, troubled, and messier idea of the organisation as a 
family. This is because, behind the concept of family - in the way that the 
Commonwealth uses the term - there lies a complex history of inequality, violence, 
and hierarchy, which stem from the very real fact that the British Empire - the 
antecedent of the Commonwealth family - was founded and maintained for more 
than two centuries on ‘bloodshed, violence, brutality, conquest and war.’ 93  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Pimlott, ‘Some thoughts on the Queen and Commonwealth’: 303.  
91 Hardman, Our Queen. 
92 Pimlott, ‘Some thoughts on the Queen and the Commonwealth’: 305.  
93 Richard Gott, Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt (London: Verso, 
2011), 2. 
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And yet, the Commonwealth continues to endure without any real discussion 
about its past. We might put this down to an idea that a number of post-colonial 
theorists have referred to as British imperial amnesia.94 This is the description 
given to the British tendency to view the Empire as benevolent. While there is a 
growing body of empirical evidence that documents the brutality of the British 
colonial administration - for example, the migrated archives, which the British 
government was forced, in 2012, by a high court ruling, to disclose95 - the idea that 
the Empire was a benevolent civilising mission remains deep rooted in the 
collective British psyche and acts as a kind of screen blocking other memories.96  
 
The Commonwealth’s faithfulness to the family label, alongside the steady stream 
of familial discourse, might suggest that the family is the sin qua non of 
Commonwealth endurance, but in order to understand the organisation more 
fully, we need to do more than simply examine the history of the family label’s 
usage. With this in mind, having provided a sense of the history of the roots and 
development of the Commonwealth family metaphor, I want now to begin my 
deeper engagement with the theoretical side of the thesis. Over the next two 
chapters, following loosely along a chronological framework, and using 
communitarian and cosmopolitan theory as critical tools, I am going to probe the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Among those who have used this or similar terms are Paul Gilroy, After Empire: 
Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004); John Darwin, ‘Memory 
of Empire in Britain: A preliminary view’, in Memories of Post-Imperial Nations: The 
Aftermath of Decolonisation, 1945-2013, ed. Dietmar Rothermund (New Delhi: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 18-37; Andrew Thompson and Meaghan Kowalsky, 
‘Social life and cultural representation: Empire in the public imagination’, in Britain’s 
Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 251-97. 
95 For information on the discovery of the migrated archive see Mandy Banton, ‘Destroy? 
‘Migrate’? Conceal? British strategies for the disposal of sensitive records of colonial 
administrations at independence’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
40, no. 2 (2012): 321-335; Caroline Elkins, ‘Alchemy of evidence: Mau Mau, the British 
Empire, and the High Court of Justice’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
39, no. 5 (2011): 731-48; Philip Murphy, ‘Censorship, declassification and the history of 
end of Empire in Central Africa’, African Research and Documentation 92 (2003): 3-26; 
Timothy Lovering, ‘Expatriate archives’, Archives 34, no. 121 (2009): 1-5.  
96 The notion of the screen, or screen memory, is the creation of Freud, who applied the 
concept of the screen in his attempts to understand why some memories from childhood 
are preserved while others are not. In particular, he found that memory works through 
displacement and substitution, moreover we often we use the banal memory of our 
everyday lives as a screen through which we can displace more disturbing or painful 
memories from our consciousness. The concept of the screen has spawned a vast 
literature, most of which, in history and political research, has focused on memory and the 
Holocaust; but recently a number of theorists have begun to apply the concept of the 
screen to the memory and trauma of colonialism. For an overview of screen memory and 
its different interpretations see Michael Lambek and Paul Antze, ‘Introduction: 
Forecasting Memory’, in Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory, eds. 
Michael Lambek and Paul Antze (London: Routledge, 1996), xi. 
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political legitimacy behind the family label and along the way build up a picture of 
two ways in which we might theoretically understand the Commonwealth as a 
family, beginning with communitarianism in Chapter 3.  	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The Commonwealth is certainly a form of free, uncommitted and non-binding 
association with the spirit of peaceful co-existence, a link or bridge which helps in 
bringing together nations for the purpose of co-operation and consolidation. Such 
associations are preferable to the more binding kinds of alliance or blocs. We, of 
course, consider the problem of our association with the Commonwealth in terms 
of independent nations coming together without any military or other 
commitments. There are no conditions attached except this desire to co-operate 
so far as it is consistent with the independence and sovereignty of each nation. 
One important factor about the Commonwealth association is that it reverses the 
other process of military or economic blocking together for what might be called 
the purposes of the 'cold war'. It has a certain warmth of approach about it 
regardless of the problems that beset any such association. There may be 
differences. There are. Nevertheless the overall approach to such controversies is 
a friendly one which helps to tone down friction and difficulties. That, I think, is 
all to the good and a development worthy to be followed in other spheres, larger 
spheres, also. 
 
- Jawaharlal Nehru (1960). 
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3 
 
 
‘Mystical unions’ and ‘invisible bonds’: 
The Commonwealth family through the lens of 
communitarianism 
 
 
 
The last chapter took a largely historical approach to exploring the roots and 
development of the family metaphor, laying down some foundations for 
understanding how the idea of the family in the nineteenth century moved from 
the private to the domestic and the domestic to the international as it came to 
describe the wider British Empire. This, and the following chapter, begin the more 
theoretical endeavour at the heart of the thesis, which is to explore how the 
Commonwealth appears when viewed through the lens of communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism respectively.  
 
This chapter focuses on the communitarian half of the dynamic. As I explained in 
Chapter 1, from a communitarian perspective, our identities are always bounded 
in space and time. 1  This boundedness, communitarians claim, shapes and 
constrains the way we interact and the obligations we have to each other.2 As 
communitarians see it, the strongest loyalties are those we have for our families, 
tribes, communities, and nations, and it is within these groups that ideas of justice 
are embodied within particular shared traditions.3 I argue, in this chapter, that 
there are certain key features, streams of ideas, and shared traditions that unite 
Commonwealth states - these are traditions that the British Empire left as its 
legacy, as W. David McIntyre points out, ‘language and education, agricultural 
and technical cooperation, and in some cases defence, law and citizenship.’4 These 
shared traditions, coupled with collective notions of solidarity and familial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robyn Eckersley, ‘Communitarianism’, in Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, 
eds. Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 93. 
2 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
3 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1988); 
Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987). 
4 McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, 9. 
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identity,5 work together to give a sense that relations between Commonwealth 
members can be described in a language which is more akin with domestic rather 
than international relations. 6  Using these ideas as a springboard alongside 
communitarian theory, the chapter explores the extent to which we might argue 
that the Commonwealth, as a family, exhibits communitarian traits.  
 
My point of entry into this discussion will be a consideration of the main ideas 
behind the ways in which communitarian theorists understand and theorise the 
idea of the community at the heart of their thesis. One of the key criticisms that 
has been levelled at communitarians is that they are typically, perhaps 
deliberately, vague when it comes to understanding what is meant by 
‘community.’ This observation is intriguing, as not being confined by precise 
definition has allowed communitarians something of a free reign to play around 
with the idea of community and use it to mean whatever they want it to mean.7 
Frustrated by the lack of clarity in the communitarian debate, the chapter traces 
certain key features and streams of ideas running through the work of most 
communitarian theorists that, when taken together, give us an understanding of 
the general features of what communitarians have in mind when they talk about 
community. This will provide the lens through which to weigh up the 
Commonwealth’s communitarianism.  
 
My aim, in this chapter, is to explore the extent to which the Commonwealth 
family might be viewed as communitarian, while also thinking about how viewing 
the organisation in this way problematises certain taken-for-granted notions that 
undergird some aspects of communitarian thinking. Specifically, the chapter 
challenges the claims by many communitarian theorists who fetishise identity and 
ethical responsibility within state borders, and instead puts forward the idea that 
we can perceive a thicker conception of identity and belonging between 
Commonwealth member states. The chapter attempts to do three things. First, it 
begins by thinking about the ways in which communitarians understand and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Other areas of collective identity within the organisation overlap and strengthen the idea 
of family; these are pan Africanism or kith and kin relations between white Dominions. 
6 Maria Escudero argues that it is domestic, rather than international norms, which apply 
to the relations between post-colonial families of states. See Maria Escudero, ‘The image of 
Latin America disseminated in Spain by the Franco regime’, unpublished dissertation, 
History (San Diego, CA: University of California, 1994), 300. On solidarity between 
African states see Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics 
of Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Particularly chapter 5.  
7 The argument from many critics is that there is no consistency in the literature as to what 
communitarianism or the term ‘community’ means. See, for example, Frazer, The 
Problems of Communitarian Politics, 60. 
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theorise the community, partly to lay down some conceptual foundations of the 
main ideas of communitarianism, and partly to challenge the idea, put forward by 
many critics, that there is no shared understanding among communitarians as to 
what the idea of ‘community’ entails. The effort here is to ground communitarian 
theory in order to provide a more tangible set of criteria against which to measure 
the Commonwealth. While communitarianism has been criticised for being 
deliberately vague about the idea of community, I argue that there are at least 
three elements which run through communitarian theory that help to ground 
communitarianism: inheritance, shared values, and solidarity. The second part of 
the chapter relates these practices to the Commonwealth drawing on a range of 
events and descriptions around the beginning of the organisation’s history which 
gave the Commonwealth the appearance of being communitarian. Building on the 
argument that there is a darker, messier side to inheritance, shared history, and 
solidarity, in the final section, I discuss the ways in which the Commonwealth 
family problematises communitarianism and offer a more nuanced view of the 
community and communitarianism.  
 
3.1 Communitarianism: The idea of community  
 
As I noted in the previous section, one of the main frustrations vented by critics of 
communitarianism is the confusion surrounding what communitarians mean 
when they talk about ‘community.’8 But, while most communitarian theorists 
dodge the question of precisely what they have in mind when they refer to the 
concept,9 I want to argue in this chapter that while there is no fixed definition 
advanced by communitarian theorists as to what we ought to understand 
community to be, within the corpus of communitarian thinking, there are at least 
three concepts that frequently appear in the literature.10 Tacitly, as I see it, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Katerina Dalacoura has observed that the confusion surrounding the communitarian 
meanings of community is deliberate because of the difficulty of definitions. See Katerina 
Dalacoura, ‘A critique of communitarianism with reference to post-revolutionary Iran’, 
Review of International Studies 28, no. 1 (2002): 75-92. A number of theorists have 
alluded to the elusive nature of the community understood by communitarians. This is 
testified to the number of books on the subject which are themed around searching for the 
community. For instance, Robert Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and 
the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); Paul 
Lichterman. The Search for Political Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order 
and Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). 
9 Frazer has criticised communitarians for using the term ‘community’ to mean whatever 
they want it to mean. Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics, 60. 
10 In their study of the history of community in the United States, Robert Bellah and his 
associates go further than most communitarians in that they do offer something of a 
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breakdown of what seems to be an unwritten understanding of the concept of 
community generally rests on three presuppositions, which I have identified as: 
inheritance, common values, and solidarity.11 All three elements are interrelated 
and inseparable from each other. Comprehending them necessitates an 
understanding of the fact that inherent in all three is subscription to two powerful 
ideological claims and long-standing assumptions: that, the human race is 
inherently ‘tribal,’ 12 and that substantive moral considerations are anchored in a 
politics of the common good, where the interests of society and the state take 
precedent over the interest of individuals.13 All three of these ideas, as I will show 
later in the chapter, resonate, to a large extent, with the Commonwealth’s 
description of itself as a family.  
 
Beginning with the idea of inheritance: communitarians begin by emphasising a 
need to experience our lives as bound up with the good of the communities out of 
which our identity has been constituted. In international relations terms, this 
refers to nationality and the identity one inherits at birth,14 as Michael Sandel puts 
this, the relationships that we find ourselves in ‘to begin with.’15 Sandel, when 
writing on the link between identity and inheritance, notes that:  
 
We cannot regard ourselves as independent…without great cost to 
those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the 
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
definition of community; though this is never expanded on. As they see it, community is: 
‘a group of people who are socially independent, who participate together in discussion 
and decision making, and who share certain practices…that both define the community 
and are nurtured by it. Such a community is not quickly formed. It almost always had a 
history and so is also a community of memory, defined in part by its past and its memory 
of its past.’ Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swindler and Steven 
Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1985), 333. Italics in original.  
11 Although these are my own categories, a number of theorists have attempted to pin 
down communitarian thought in this area. See, for instance, Selznick, The Moral 
Commonwealth. Selznick defines community through seven primary elements: 
historiocity, identity, mutuality, plurality, autonomy, participation, and integration. John 
Rawls formulates the notion of community as a collection of pre-figured and pre-
constituted individuals who share final ends. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).  
12 Walzer, Thick and Thin. 
13 Amitai Etzioni, ed., Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian Perspective 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).  
14 David Miller discusses the issue of chosen versus inherited identity. While he concludes 
that identity ought to be freely chosen, in reality this is not the case and the very idea of 
choosing one’s identity opens up a number of improbable decisions and questions. David 
Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).  
15 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 152.  
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the particular persons we are - as members of this family, or 
community or nation or people, as bearers of this history…16  
 
For Sandel, for the members of a genuine community, that is, a community where 
membership is not voluntary but inherited, attachment is ‘not merely an attribute 
but a constituent of their identity.’ 17  Theorists, such as Sandel, Alasdair 
MacIntyre,18 and Charles Taylor,19 who ground their defence of collective identity 
in the community, posit there are deeper, more meaningful connections between 
citizens in inherited communities. These stronger, more meaningful, attachments 
have been described as: ‘thick descriptions,’ by Clifford Geertz.20 For Geertz thick 
descriptions are based on the idea that culture is symbolic and meaningful. As he 
puts this, ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance.’21 Where we come 
from, what our identity is, tends to be defined by various communal attachments 
that we have inherited. It is in this sense that inherited membership creates a ‘far 
stronger and more meaningful sense of attachment than does the sort of 
membership based on voluntary choice.’22 
 
Those who adhere to this interpretation of identity often claim, by way of 
supporting evidence, that the concept requires the existence of an external ‘Other’ 
in order to define itself. This has a resonance that can be heard distinctly in the 
work of Chantal Mouffe who advances this idea when she argues that ‘collective 
identities can only be established on the mode of an us/them.’23 The modern 
conceptions of sovereignty and nation contribute to the idea of collective identity 
and solidarity. As Alexander Wendt explains it, ‘there is no sovereignty without an 
other.’24 If, as communitarians suggest, democracy inherently depends on the 
identification of an enemy, adversary and above all other, then it also acts as 
solidarity. The community in this case is defined by its values against other 
entities - groups, individuals, communities - that do not share its values.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 179. 
17 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 150. 
18 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?  
19 In his work Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor notes the importance of defining the 
community, but he, himself, does not offer a definition. See Taylor, Sources of the Self.  
20 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures.  
21 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 5. 
22 Derek Phillips, Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 14. 
23 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 213.  
24 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 412.  
25 J. Peter Burgess, ‘The discourse of justice in political, legal and moral community’, in 
Spheres of Global Justice, Volume 1: Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy, Political 
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Accordingly, we can view memory as playing a large role in the establishment of 
collective identity that serves the needs of nation building. The concepts of 
identity and memory are typically yoked together throughout history. Indeed, as 
Sharon Macdonald points out, ‘Like ‘memory,’ the English word ‘history’ is 
ambiguous, referring both to the past - what happened - as well as to accounts of 
that past and study of it.’26 We need not stray far to find examples of this, as many 
forms of contemporary identity politics take their lead from an idea that Laura 
Otis describes as ‘organic memory.’ Organic memory, Otis observes, is an idea that 
has its roots in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century theorising. It is 
an idea that proposes memory and heredity as essentially the same - just as one 
inherits physical attributes from one’s ancestors it follows that one also inherits 
memories from one’s ancestors.27 As Otis points out, organic memory operates 
both at the individual and collective levels: it articulates a cultural form of 
memory, which is then passed on to subsequent generations through individual 
family members. In this way, memory is an important way for nations to 
internalise norms, as national history in the form of ‘organic memory’ is handed 
down from one generation to the next.28  
 
Framing identity around collective memory creates a sense of solidarity around 
the imagined community that has a shared history stretching back through several 
generations. Maurice Halbwachs’ work has been particularly significant in honing 
the concept of collective memory. For Halbwachs, the dissemination of memory is 
wholly dependent on ‘frameworks of social memory,’29 in particular, the family, 
religion, and social class. Halbwachs is careful to point out that these social 
frameworks are not created after the fact, but are a means through which 
dominant groups can reconstruct the past through the constant retelling of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Participation, Minorities and Migrants, ed. Jean-Christophe Merle (Heidelberg, New 
York and London: Springer, 2013), 508.  
26 Sharon Macdonald, Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013), 13. 
27 Laura Otis, Organic Memory: History and the Body in the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 2.  
28 There have been recent studies which have found that the memory of severe trauma, 
such as that experienced by Holocaust survivors, is passed down genetically and inter-
generationally. For example, see Rachel Yehuda, James Schmeidler, Milton Wainberg, 
Karen Binder-Brynes, Tamar Duvdevani,, ‘Vulnerability to posttraumatic stress disorder 
in adult offspring of Holocaust survivors’, American Journal of Psychiatry 155 (1998): 
1163–71; Amy Bombay, Kim Matheson and Hymie Ainsman, ‘The intergenerational effects 
of Indian Residential Schools: Implications for the concept of historical trauma’, 
Transcultural Psychiatry 51, no. 3 (2014): 320-38. 
29 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 182. 
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constitutive narratives.30 The social frameworks of memory, then, often serve the 
purpose of social cohesion: in this way, memory becomes a kind of glue, holding 
identity together over time.31 At the level of the state, this creates what Pierre Nora 
calls, a ‘memory-nation.’32  
 
While collective memory forms create social solidarity, there is, however, another, 
darker side to social memory construction that some theorists have referred to as 
a memory competition.33 According to collective memory theory, different social 
groups - or collective memory agents - often compete with each other (both in 
national and international arenas) to establish a ‘master frame’ of the past.34 
These contests are not only about what is being remembered but also about the 
why and how of remembrance.35 In this contest, collective memories often become 
strategically manipulated by political actors to alter the balance of power between 
groups.36 It follows that the group with the most power constructs the memory 
that suits their rational interests or needs.  
 
Along with memory, language is given special importance by communitarians for 
creating a common identity. Perhaps the clearest defence of linguistic 
membership from a communitarian perspective is that put forward by Charles 
Taylor. For Taylor, there can be no individual sense of identity in the absence of 
other speakers, if people lose their identification with the moral or spiritual 
background they have gained through their communities or nations and the 
traditions in which they are imbued, then they will find themselves all at sea.37 For 
Taylor, the self is always culturally specific and language is the embodiment of 
community. As Taylor puts this:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory. 
31 For an overview and analysis of collective memory literature, see Jeffrey Olick and Joyce 
Robbins, ‘Social memory studies: From ‘collective memory’ to the historical sociology of 
mnemonic practices’, Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 105-40.  
32 Pierre Nora, ‘Between memory and history: Les lieux de mémoire’, Representations 26 
(1989): 7-25. 
33 Walter Benn Michaels, ‘Plots against America: Neoliberalism and Antiracism’, 
American Literary History (2006): 288-302; Walter Benn Michaels, The Trouble with 
Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality (New York: 
Metropolitan, 2006); Walter Benn Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End 
of History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
34 Ronald Berger, Holocaust, Religion and the Politics of Collective Memory: Beyond 
Sociology (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012), 22. 
35 Barry Schwartz, ‘Social change and collective memory: The democratisation of George 
Washington’, American Sociology Review 56 (1991): 225-7.  
36 Ronald Berger, Fathoming the Holocaust: A Social Problems Approach (New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter, 2002). 
37 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 29.
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I define myself by defining where I speak from – in my family tree, in 
social space, in geography of social statuses and functions, in intimate 
responses to the ones I love and also crucially in the space of moral and 
spiritual orientation within which my most important defining 
relations are lived out.38  
 
There is no stronger way of showing our embedded-ness in the common history 
and values of a community for Taylor than being initiated into the ongoing 
conversation of the moral and the spiritual through the language of one’s 
ancestors. While a common language might be seen as conveying a set of 
understandings, as Wa Thiong’o Ngugi notes ‘European languages were seen as 
having a capacity to unite African peoples against divisive tendencies inherent in 
the multiplicity of African languages within the same geographic state,’39 the idea 
of a common language across the Commonwealth also, historically, has negative 
connotations. Later in the chapter, I will discuss the more negative side to a 
common language, and Ngugi’s work in this area, here I only want to point out 
that while English may be the official language of the Commonwealth, it is 
certainly not the mother tongue of all Commonwealth member states.  
 
Communitarians are keen to point out that a true community requires that the 
bonds between the members rest on their mutual recognition of the ‘we-feeling’ or 
a belonging together. Sandel provides a glimpse of this when he emphasises that 
community involves ‘fraternal sentiments and fellow feeling.’40 The element of 
solidarity here concerns the extent and direction of people’s fellow feeling and 
mutual concern for their fellow persons. The idea of the ‘we-feeling’ emerges in 
sharper focus in Durkheim’s description of community solidarity as ‘a pleasure in 
saying ‘we,’ rather than ‘I,’ because anyone in the position to say ‘we’ feels behind 
him a support, a force on which he can count, a force that is much more intense 
than that upon which isolated individuals can rely.’41 Durkheim’s quote offers a 
reminder of the communitarian emphasis on the individual as rooted. And 
membership is important because members of a political community owe special 
obligations to one another that they do not owe to anyone else, or at least anyone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 35. 
39 Wa Thiong’o Ngugi, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African 
Literature (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1987), 6-7. 
40 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 150.  
41 Emile Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the 
Sociology of Education (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 240.  
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else to the same degree.42 Loyalty to the group is also a factor, as Rahel Jaeggi 
points out, ‘loyalty…means favouring the interests of members of the group at the 
expense of outsiders in certain circumstances.’43 
 
One clear example of the circumstances to which Jaeggi refers is the idea of 
distributive justice. So far in this section, we have seen the ways in which 
inheritance, values, and solidarity work together through ideas of collective 
identity, memory, and language to meet the needs of nation building. But how do 
these elements affect the way we understand our moral commitments to others? 
Communitarians argue that distributive justice exists only to those within the 
inclusionary side of the normative dichotomy. For Taylor, understanding ‘who are 
we/who am I?’ is logically prior to asking ‘what ought we/I to do?’ These 
questions can only be answered by locating people in particular communities, 
assigning them meaning, roles and relationships; only then can we fix our moral 
horizons.44 For David Miller, nations are ethical communities. As he puts it, ‘In 
acknowledging a national identity, I am also acknowledging that I owe special 
obligations to fellow members of my nation, which I do not owe to other human 
beings.’45 Such a view, argues Miller, may appear heartless, but it is underscored 
by respect for the autonomy of other states.46 
 
The purpose of this section has been to provide an outline of the main ideas 
running through communitarian theory in order to lay down some kind of 
criterion against which to measure the Commonwealth’s communitarianism. Now 
that we have a sense of the main idea of community, as communitarians view the 
concept, this would be the appropriate juncture to begin to examine the 
Commonwealth under its lens. In the sections that follow, I am going to look at 
how the ideas of inheritance, common history and values, and solidarity have 
shaped the Commonwealth, and how these different ideas feed into forms of 
communitarianism. I want to stress from the outset that the three propositions 
are linked together in such a way that is it difficult to feel the force of any one of 
them without acknowledging the others. It is not hard to see how inheritance and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Michael Walzer, ‘Welfare, Membership and Need’, in Liberalism and its Critics, ed. 
Michael Sandel (New York University Press. 1984), 200. 
43 Rahel Jaeggi, ‘Solidarity and indifference’, in Solidarity in Health and Social Care in 
Europe, eds. Rudd Ter Meulen, Wil Arts and Ruud Muffels (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: 
Kluwer, 2001), 290-91.  
44 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992).  
45 Miller, On Nationality, 49.  
46 Miller, On Nationality, 108.  
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common values both underscore the idea of solidarity, but what is more subtle - 
and I will bring this out as I go along - is the way in which heads of state and other 
keen observers describe the Commonwealth in the language of unity. This 
observation is significant, as it is no secret that the Commonwealth has been far 
from unified around key moments in the organisation’s history.47 And yet, since 
the organisation began, the language of unity has permeated the discourse of 
Commonwealth heads of state. We might simply put this down to the 
organisation’s tendency to exaggerate its uniqueness. However, when we look 
behind the narrative we begin to see how, through the complex interplay of the 
elements above, the Commonwealth appears to be communitarian and this 
troubles the conventional understanding of communitarianism in IR. 
 
3.2 The Commonwealth through the communitarian lens 
 
Before exploring the extent to which we might argue that the Commonwealth 
family is communitarian, it would be useful to recall, briefly, the political context 
within which the official Commonwealth was formed.48 I do not want to go deeply 
into the legal and constitutional dimensions of Commonwealth membership, 
valuable work has already been done in this area,49 however, we saw, in the 
previous chapter, something of the progression and changes in the ideology of the 
family from Empire to decolonisation, it would be useful, therefore, for the reader 
to understand how the Commonwealth began as a political organisation or, to put 
it another way, how the imperial family became the Commonwealth family. We 
have already seen in Chapter 2 how the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 I refer here in particularly to the Suez crisis, the Rhodesia UDI, the issue of sanctions on 
South Africa, and the issue of Britain joining the EEC.  
48 There is a disagreement within the Commonwealth literature as to whether we ought to 
apply the adjectival marker of ‘official’ to the post-war 1949 Commonwealth, which the 
London Declaration officially legitimised, or the 1965 Commonwealth, which began to 
move towards a more official international organisation status with the opening of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. For a discussion of these issues see William Dale, ‘Is the 
Commonwealth an international organisation?’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 31, no.3 (1982): 451-73; Margaret Doxy, ‘The Commonwealth Secretariat’, in 
The Commonwealth in the 1980s: Challenges and Opportunities, eds. A. J. R. Groom and 
Paul Taylor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 15-39. For the purposes of this, and the 
following chapters, any reference to the ‘official’ Commonwealth should be taken to mean 
the Commonwealth that was brought into being with the 1949 London Declaration.  
49 For a detailed overview of the years of transition from colonies into Commonwealth see 
McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth; Percival Griffiths, Empire into Commonwealth 
(London: Benn, 1969); Clement Attlee, Empire into Commonwealth: The Chichele 
Lectures Delivered at Oxford in May 1960 on 'Changes in the Conception and Structure 
of the British Empire During the Last Half Century' (London: Oxford University Press, 
1961); L. J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London and 
New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002); Martin Kitchen, The British Empire and Commonwealth: 
A Short History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).  
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used the language of family and the rather extravagant utopian comparison, in the 
epigraph of Chapter 2, of the British Royal Family to the Holy Christian Family. 
These things both underscore a distinct temporal change as Britain’s relationship 
with her colonies, or former colonies, changed, so too did the way in which 
familial discourse was employed to describe post-colonial relationships. The 
British had once utilised the family metaphor to bolster the idea of a united 
national consciousness across the settler-colonies and the mother-country, while 
simultaneously using a more aggressive and racialised language of family - 
parents and children - to keep the non-Anglo Saxon peoples of the Empire in their 
subordinated place. They now needed to adjust the familial discourse to account 
for a change in what the British state needed the family to do. In short, as I noted 
in the previous chapter, Britain now needed to retain ties with India in order to 
fan the embers of the waning Empire and hold on to what semblance of unity with 
its former colonies. As Srinivasan puts this, ‘the British government had an 
agenda for the Commonwealth. It felt that Britain could only match its two other 
big partners in world affairs by creating a Commonwealth third force.’50 
 
The political story of the Commonwealth family began with India and Jawaharlal 
Nehru in 1949, when the British changed membership in the organisation from 
one based on common allegiance to the British Crown, to one based on acceptance 
of the British Monarch as the symbol of free association at the head of the 
organisation.51 This move was essential to the Commonwealth’s survival as it 
allowed India to remain a member of the Commonwealth family after becoming a 
republic.52 While the British had originally attempted to hold on to the traditional 
principle of alliance to the Crown, keeping India in the Commonwealth became a 
more important issue as Britain feared an India outside the Commonwealth might 
move toward an anti-Western community of Asian states.53  
 
In a bid to persuade Nehru that Commonwealth membership would be beneficial, 
Attlee, as we have seen, couched Commonwealth relations in the language of 
family. Compounding the Holy Family description, and likewise appealing to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth, 6. 
51 It is interesting that the issue of the Crown should be the defining feature of why the 
Commonwealth continued especially when I have argued in this thesis that the Queen is 
one of the reasons, or at least a major draw card, for the Commonwealth’s endurance.  
52 W. David McIntyre, ‘A formula might have to be found: Ireland, India and the headship 
of the Commonwealth’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International 
Affairs  91, no. 365 (2002): 391-413. 
53 Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline, and Future of the British Commonwealth, 10. 
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Nehru’s philosophical approach to promoting world peace, Attlee assured Nehru 
that joining the Commonwealth would mean adherence to certain values, 
democratic institutions, the rule of law and toleration, which all worked towards a 
‘way of life’, and, despite differences between states gave a sense of community 
and family.54 To Britain’s relief, in spite of recurrent tensions between India and 
Pakistan, both states, as republics, chose to remain in the Commonwealth. But, 
what is of interest here for the purposes of my interrogation of the Commonwealth 
as a family, is less the question of concessions made on behalf of India and more 
the fact that, by remaining in the Commonwealth, India’s accession provided the 
lynch-pin for many states to follow.55  
 
The accession of independent India to the Commonwealth family opened the 
doors, first to Asian states, creating what many Commonwealth observers refer to 
as Nehru’s Commonwealth,56 and later to independent African nations, beginning 
with Ghana. Ghana’s accession marked a decisive turning point as the first black 
African state to enter the Commonwealth family.57 But what is interesting is that 
Ghana’s accession was the catalyst for the withdrawal of South Africa on racial 
grounds. South Africa’s protest dominated the Commonwealth family for the next 
three decades, but what is particularly noteworthy, and a point to which I will 
return in Chapter 5 of the thesis, is that although the minority white South African 
government withdrew from the Commonwealth, a large number of black South 
Africans claim that they were still in it.58   
 
This observation is intriguing as it helps to underscore the bonds between 
Commonwealth members. While India paved the way for the Commonwealth to 
develop into an international organisation of independent states, the familial ties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Judith Brown, Nehru: A Political Way of Life (New Haven, CT and London: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 252. 
55 Mayall, ‘Introduction’, 3-20.  
56 Srinivasan devotes a third of his study on Commonwealth history and relations to what 
he refers to as three different Commonwealths: Firstly, the Nehru Commonwealth - largely 
because of the accession of India and India’s profound influence on the way the 
organisation would be run; Secondly, the African Commonwealth - because of the African 
issues and dominance of Commonwealth heads of Government meetings and 
Commonwealth relations from the 1960s to the 1990s; Thirdly, Nobody’s Commonwealth 
- Srinivasan argues that the Commonwealth appears to be drifting and Britain should once 
again consider taking the helm. Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline, and Future of the British 
Commonwealth. 
57 Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth, 1.  
58 This is an observation made by Oliver Tambo. See Shridath Ramphal interviewed in 
Gugulethu Moyo and Mark Ashurst, ‘Sleights of hand at Lancaster House’, in The Day 
After Mugabe: Prospects for Change in Zimbabwe, eds. Gugulethu Moyo and Mark 
Ashurst (London: Africa Research Institute, 2007), 163. 
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between these states appeared to remain relatively strong, despite periods of 
fighting and frustration. Surveying how far the Commonwealth had developed in 
1960, the editor of The Round Table aptly noted that, the ‘children have grown 
into adult nations, preserving family ties without family discipline.’59 It is these 
family ties which underlie the overarching point of the thesis that the 
Commonwealth offers a thicker view of relations between post-colonial states, but 
in what other ways does the Commonwealth appear communitarian? This is the 
focus of the rest of this section.  
 
3.2.1 Continuity and distinctiveness   
 
The starting point for my deeper exploration of the Commonwealth’s 
communitarianism lies in an observation by W. David McIntyre that the 
Commonwealth has survived largely because it has given a sense of ‘continuity 
and distinctiveness’60 to its member countries. While McIntyre gives little in the 
way of expansion on this analysis, underneath his observation lies an 
understanding that states remain attached to the Commonwealth, and, by proxy, 
to Britain, through a series of continuous practices that give the organisation a 
sense of continuity and unity against external otherness.61 This represents a 
central theme in the history of the Commonwealth; the idea that the organisation 
is ‘a continuation of the past but in a different sense’62 permeates the discourse of 
heads of state and Secretary-Generals.63 This understanding of the continuity of 
ideas linked to a common origin runs parallel to the conception of the 
organisation as a family and marks one aspect, I suggest, of inheritance, which 
helps to build a picture of the Commonwealth’s communitarianism.  
 
If continuity, then, is the link to the Commonwealth’s communitarianism, through 
the idea of inherited bonds, then there are at least two ideas that provide the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Editorial, ‘The Commonwealth: A United Kingdom view’, The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 50, no. 200 (1960): 339. 
60 McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations, 333. 
61 This is an argument also put forth by Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz in their study on 
post-colonial families of nations. See Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz, ‘After Empire’. 
62 Sharma, ‘The global value of the Commonwealth’.  
63 As I discussed earlier in the thesis, this is an idea that has its roots in the British Empire 
but began to be applied to the Commonwealth by the British Monarch and Clement Attlee. 
Now, the idea that the Commonwealth is a family permeates the discourse coming out of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat, who, as I noted earlier, produced a short documentary in 
2010 explaining what it means to be in the Commonwealth family. See The 
Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘The Commonwealth Family’ (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2010). Available at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CaXHtF0OdTU. 
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scaffolding to this link. These are the organisation’s shared history and the 
organisation’s shared values, which go some way towards giving the perception of 
a shared identity among Commonwealth states. Beginning with the idea of 
history: as we saw in section 3.1, shared history is important for the sense of ‘we-
feeling’ that communitarians posit is the shared good in the community. The 
Commonwealth’s shared history, as I have noted in the previous chapters, is an 
idea that features heavily in the organisation’s discourse, yet, where 
communitarians largely paint a positive view of this shared history and its link 
with memory, the Commonwealth goes against this grain with a shared history 
that is build on a foundation of colonialism, violence, and inequality. As I argued 
earlier in the thesis, it is no secret that the Commonwealth family has a violent 
past, nevertheless, in spite of this, many post-colonial states retained their ties 
with the organisation following independence. Thus, while communitarians argue 
that the communal attachments that we inherit are more meaningful than those 
we join voluntarily, the Commonwealth muddies this idea as many states have 
remained, voluntarily, in the family that began as a family by force. Further 
muddying the neat communitarian idea of shared history, A. J. R. Groom points 
out, in spite of many of the darker aspects of the Commonwealth’s past, ‘shared 
assets and values grew out of the relationship.’ 64 
 
One important asset and value to which Groom refers is a ‘working knowledge of 
English.’ 65  In the standard communitarian thesis, language is a staple of 
legitimate shared meanings, values, and ways of life.66 As we saw in the previous 
section, for communitarians, such as Taylor, language functions as a nodal point 
around which identities are fixed, knowledge is produced, and a sense of unity is 
developed.67 A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor shed light on the way in which 
language underscores unity among Commonwealth states, pointing out that with 
shared language comes a sense of familiarity, informality, and co-operative 
spirit.68 The Commonwealth has rooted its idea of collective identity in its shared 
history and from that history came the widespread use of English as a common 
unifying language. While language is not the sole defining feature of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 A. J. R. Groom, ‘The Commonwealth as an international organisation’, in The 
Commonwealth in the 1980s: Challenges and Opportunities, eds. A. J. R. Groom and Paul 
Taylor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 295. 
65 Groom, ‘The Commonwealth as an international organisation’, 295. 
66 Walzer, Thick and Thin. 
67 Taylor, Sources of the Self. 
68 A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor, ‘The continuing Commonwealth: Its origins and 
characteristics’, in The Commonwealth in the 1980s: Challenges and Opportunities, eds. 
A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 9. 
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organisation, as we might argue French language and culture is for the 
Francophonie,69 many Commonwealth observers have noted, following Groom 
and Taylor, that ‘The role of English is important because language constitutes a 
paradigm which is shared and which has subtle but pervasive influence that 
facilitates bridge-building.’70 The idea of a common language unites all member 
states under the Anglophone label and defines the way in which heads of state 
communicate with each other. But, if language is a proxy for unity and identity 
then, as I will show later in the chapter, the fact that the British enforced English 
upon their colonies casts something of a shadow over the communitarian idea that 
language and identity form a harmonious relationship as well as throwing into 
question the certainty with which Benedict Anderson claims that, ‘few things seem 
as historically deep-rooted as languages, for which no dated origins can ever be 
given.’71 
 
So far in this section, I have discussed history, memory, and language as examples 
of the inheritance and shared values, which go some way towards explaining how 
the idea of the Commonwealth as a family resonates with the communitarian 
thesis. But, as I outlined at the end of the previous section, in addition to the 
seemingly more tangible features of history, memory, and language, that all point 
towards a certain amount of solidarity and a ‘we-feeling’ among Commonwealth 
states, there is also something in the way that certain key figures have described 
the Commonwealth over the years, since 1949, which suggests that the 
communitarian-like features of the Commonwealth are not simply observations in 
the literature, or platitudes of an ageing monarch, but are something very much 
recognised by member states themselves. One such observation is that 
relationships between states are often characterised by what Julius Nyerere 
described as, ‘friendship and likemindedness… Stronger than ties and treaties.’72 
Expanding on Nyerere’s description, Alfred Kamanda, former High Commissioner 
of Sierra Leone, has suggested that, through the inter se doctrine of the 
Commonwealth association, member states do not consider each other as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 R. J. Harrison argues that the difference between the emphasis on the French language 
and culture across the Francophonie is that French language dominance creates a 
‘dominance-dependence’ relationship rather than the looser link that English provides. 
See R. J. Harrison, ‘By way of comparison: French relations with former colonies’, in The 
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foreign.73 Kamanda’s observation is particularly noteworthy as it echoes a similar 
observation by Nehru that ties between Commonwealth states are ‘un-foreign.’74 
Kamanda bases his observation on the idea that the Commonwealth is a 
community of states in which the absence of any rigid legal basis of association is 
compensated by the bonds of common origin.75  
 
Compounding the idea that the Commonwealth offers a more nuanced 
understanding of relations between states, then, is the repeated reference to ties 
between member states in language which is familial - which undergirds the 
Commonwealth’s view of itself as a family - or, alternatively, but nevertheless 
connected, ties between states have become so natural and so ‘tenacious,’76 that 
they are believed to defy easy explanation. Reflecting on the way in which heads of 
state and Commonwealth officials describe their relations with other states, John 
Conway has described the image invoked as often ‘mystical’ or ‘invisible.’77 These 
descriptions appeal to the notion of unity, to a sense that relations between 
Commonwealth members have an air of mystery which cannot be explained.78 
References to the organisation’s invisible bonds and mystical unions have 
embedded themselves deep in the Commonwealth’s familial rhetoric and are 
frequently repeated by the Secretariat and heads of state. But while we might 
point to descriptions such as these as propping up what I described in Chapter 1 
as some observer’s overinflated understandings of the Commonwealth’s 
uniqueness, there is one description that the Commonwealth’s keenest observers 
argue has contributed the most towards Commonwealth unity and endurance, 
and this is the description of the Commonwealth family offering newly 
independent states ‘independence plus.’79  	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‘Independence plus,’ is the description that Nehru gave to membership in the 
Commonwealth as India’s newly formed independent government weighed up the 
value of retaining ties with Britain and other former colonies. 80  Nehru’s 
observation is credited as perhaps one of the defining moments in modern 
Commonwealth history as it implied that there was something more, something 
perhaps unique in Commonwealth membership, which encouraged other fledgling 
states to remain attached to the Commonwealth family.81 Juxtaposed with what he 
referred to as ‘independence minus,’82 Nehru’s image added not only a sense of 
legitimacy to the Commonwealth, but also showed states that remaining close to 
the family would offer them the support, and recognition if needed, against the 
problems and ‘aggression’ of the wider world. 83  Opting to remain in the 
Commonwealth offered the sort of loving care that the newly independent states, 
like children, needed to survive and become socialised into meanings and 
responsibilities beyond the family.84  
 
I do not want to push the unity argument too far, as it is clear from the disputes 
between members such as India and Pakistan, and South Africa and other 
Commonwealth members that the Commonwealth has been far from unified 
throughout recent history. Nevertheless, beyond the rhetoric of mystical bonds, 
invisible unions, and unforeignness, there are examples of solidarity which are 
illustrated by the willingness of member states to remain in the Commonwealth 
following serious political disagreements with other member states.85 Perhaps the 
idea of unity is best summed up as Groom and Taylor point out as a unique blend 
of ‘unity and diversity.’86 This appears to be a better fit for an organisation which 
stretches across fifty-three states and two billion people with vast cultural and 	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deep historical differences, and, as Shridath Ramphal points out, ‘is a 
commingling of great human variety - of race, of religion, of language, of political 
philosophy and forms of government.’87  
 
We are now in a better position to understand how the Commonwealth appears to 
be communitarian. However, while the notion of unity sits well with 
communitarian ideas of solidarity, diversity is not as welcome in the conventional 
understanding of the communitarian thesis. And yet, the Commonwealth appears 
to make these juxtaposing ideas work. The communitarian notion of solidarity 
does not accommodate this sort of tension. However, I suggest communitarians 
are wrong to ignore the realities and complexities of communities in praxis. Thus 
while we are now in a better place to see in what sense we might claim that the 
Commonwealth is communitarian, what the Commonwealth shows with its notion 
of unity and diversity is the idea that communities are not places of harmony 
where norms are settled and conflict rarely happens, but places of disagreement 
where norms are contested.  
 
What this means for the way we understand communitarianism is discussed in the 
next section of the chapter, where I return to the three constituent elements of 
communitarianism and draw out some of the more troubling issues around the 
idea of Commonwealth unity, in order to trouble perceived understandings of 
communitarianism in IR. My aim here is to examine more closely the three 
propositions that underscore what I believe are the key communitarian 
understandings of community, and at the same time assess the main criticisms 
that can be brought against them. 
 
3.3 Troubling communitarianism, troubling the Commonwealth 
 
At first sight, then, as I have attempted to show above, there would seem to be 
little contradiction between notions of inheritance, values, and solidarity shared 
by states that make up the collective Commonwealth family, and the way in which 
communitarian theorists outline and describe the core constituent elements of 
community at the heart of the communitarian thesis. All Commonwealth states, 
with the exception of Rwanda and Mozambique, share a history of British 
colonialism and, as such, all Commonwealth states, at independence, inherited a 	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number of systems and practices - such as English language, the rule of law, and 
compatible administrative methods88 - which effectively give the impression, both 
theoretically and empirically, of a certain amount of solidarity between 
Commonwealth members. A thicker identity among Commonwealth member 
states was clearly visible during the decades after the Commonwealth was formed, 
as more and more states gained independence and opted to join the organisation, 
however, these collective affirmations of communitarianism notwithstanding, it 
would be inaccurate to conclude that the Commonwealth is communitarian 
without some consideration of the darker, messier history behind these 
constituent elements. I have briefly discussed this messier and more violent side 
of the family in the previous chapter. I now want to consider the messier side in 
more detail as a way of demonstrating how the Commonwealth further troubles 
the idea of communitarianism at the heart of normative IR theory.  
 
I want to take as my starting point into this discussion one of the most 
fundamental criticisms of communitarianism, which is the tendency by many 
communitarian theorists to paint a picture of the community as a place where 
norms are essentially settled, rather than the subject of an ongoing contest.89 This 
neatly packaged idea of community, where shared history, language, and memory 
all form the foundations of a ‘we-feeling’, fails to capture the idea that, in reality, 
the communitarian notion of inherited community which, paraphrasing Alasdair 
MacIntyre, is one’s family, tribe, or nation, 90  is rarely the homogenous, 
harmonious place where all members share the same memories, history, and 
language, but often a more multicultural place where members come and go, and 
exclusion and difference also reside. Like a real family, the Commonwealth is 
emphatically not without skeletons in its closet. Moreover, these skeletons divulge 
a violent family history which complicates the notion put forward by Attlee, 
Nehru, Nyerere, and others, of a happy family where bonds between member 
states are ‘mystical.’ While this observation might make the conception of the 
Commonwealth as a family seem more authentic and genuinely more family-like, 
the question that arises is: how, exactly, does this trouble the communitarian 
thesis?  
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To answer this question, we first need to return to Sandel’s idea, outlined in 
section 3.1, that our identities are inseparable from the situation that we inherited 
at birth, 91 and Geertz’s accompanying notion that inherited attachments are far 
stronger and more meaningful. 92  At first sight there would seem to be no 
contradiction here, and certainly one’s attachment to one’s family, community, 
nation, and so on, need not be questioned, yet this picture conceals the reality that 
inherited communities can often be less than harmonious; we need only think of 
cycles of abuse passed down through families as an example of a less than 
harmonious inheritance. 93  Additionally, Geertz’s argument that inherited 
attachments are far more meaningful ignores the fact that, as Andrew Vincent 
points out, ‘the self is constituted by often diverse, overlapping and conflicting 
groups, loyalties and associations.’94  
 
The force of this point lies in the fact that, although the Commonwealth is a family 
of nations that all share history and values, many, if not all, of its member states 
are members of other regional, trans-, or international organisations, which, as I 
pointed out earlier in the thesis, in the case of the Francophonie and the United 
Nations, for example, also refer to themselves as families. At times, as I will show 
in Chapter 6 with the case of Rwanda, a state is forced to choose between one or 
another membership in these organisations, on the whole, however, these 
overlapping memberships have not been seen to cause any real problems vis-à-vis 
identity for the member states in question. 95  This line of argument is a 
paradigmatic illustration of how communities can conform to the communitarian 
notion of community without the need for homogeneity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.  
92 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures.  
93 On intergenerational abuse, see, for example, Juste Abramovaite, Sigghartha 
Bandyopadhyay and Louise Dixon, ‘The dynamics of intergenerational family abuse: A 
focus on child maltreatment and violence and abuse in intimate relationships’, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Economics 27, no. 2 (2015): 160-74. Bending the intergenerational cycle 
of abuse argument to our purposes, we might argue that there are a number of 
Commonwealth states, Zimbabwe in particular, which have, in an intergenerational sense, 
carried on aspects of colonial violence. For a discussion on this subject see, Tendayi 
Sithole, ‘A Fanonian reading of Robert Gabriel Mugabe as colonial subject’, in 
Mugabeism: History, Politics, and Power in Zimbabwe, ed. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 217-36. 
94 Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 155.  
95 An argument could be made that Britain’s membership in the European Union appeared 
to be problematic, following this logic, however, the related issues and problems raised by 
this relationship are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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Building on similar arguments, problems manifest when we return to the idea of 
memory and look beyond the tendency in Commonwealth literature to ignore the 
violent foundations on which the Commonwealth has built its family. While most 
Commonwealth scholars pay lip service to the fact that the organisation is the 
successor to the British Empire, there has been little or no discussion of the 
silence among Commonwealth states around the issue of colonial memory.96 
Contrary to the communitarian view put forward by Halbwachs that memory is 
the glue that holds the community together, memory theorists have since argued 
that memory is unstable, changing, and predictable. 97  Scholars of collective 
memory have taken note of what is missing, or what has been silenced, in 
representations of the past and this has manifested in an emerging scholarly 
literature on silence, omission, and exclusion.98 Notwithstanding the obvious fact 
that, as Eviatar Zerubavel has pointed out, it is difficult to study those things 
about which individuals, families, or communities keep silent,99 memory research 
has discerned that through memory contests, commanded amnesia, 
manipulation, and blocked memory, certain group memories or histories, have 
been permanently sidelined, forgotten, or denied altogether.100 This appears to be 
the case with the Commonwealth and the memory of colonialism. And yet, the 
organisation appears to thrive.  
 
Why the Commonwealth endures given the lack of attention to its colonial past is 
an interesting question. One suggested answer was put forward by the former 
Commonwealth Secretary-General Arnold Smith, in 1966, who surmised that for 
newly independent governments, the economic benefits of joining the 
Commonwealth outweighed any lingering ‘unpleasant memories and resentments’ 	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Barringer, ‘Editorial: Memory Matters’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs 104, no. 5 (2015): 527-30. 
97 Barbie Zelizer, ‘Reading the past against the grain: The shape of memory studies’, 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12, no.2 (1995): 214-39. 
98 On collective forgetting see for example, Vera Zolberg, ‘Contested remembrance: The 
Hiroshima exhibit controversy’, Theory and Society 24, no. 4 (1998): 565-90; James 
Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meanings (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1993); Robin Wagner-Pacifici and Barry Schwartz, ‘The Vietnam 
veterans memorial: Commemorating a difficult past’, American Journal of Sociology 97, 
no. 2 (1991): 376-420; Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger, ‘Unpacking the 
unspoken: Silence in collective memory and forgetting’, Social Forces 88, no. 3 (2010): 
1103-22. 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
100 Joanne Garde-Hansen, Media and Memory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2005), 25. 
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around the recent colonial past and, therefore, when faced with the choice of 
remembering or forgetting, heads of state opted in favour of forgetting. 101 Smith’s 
explanation might appear to be rather cavalier in its reduction of the brutalities of 
years of colonial rule to the term ‘unpleasant memories,’ yet, the lack of attention 
to the Commonwealth’s violent history, both empirically and in the literature, 
suggests that there might at least be a grain of truth in Smith’s reasoning.  
 
This notwithstanding, a closer perusal of the power balance within the 
Commonwealth family throws up an alternative suggestion for the lack of 
attention to memory. This is the idea I touched upon in the conclusion to the 
previous chapter, the view that there exists a kind of imperial amnesia in Britain 
around the true nature of the colonial project.102 As theorists who work on 
imperial memory see it, deeply embedded in the collective British psyche is the 
belief that the Empire was a benevolent project underscored by,103 as Gordon 
Brown once described it, ‘tolerance, liberty, [and] civic duty.’104 This collective 
memory has been formulated in the media, education, in the heritage industry, 
and in the language of politics effectively repackaging the British ‘civilising 
mission’ into a phenomenon steeped in altruistic intention, which effectively 
ignores the ‘gory cruelties of the Empire’105 in favour of a much more anodyne 
version.106  
 
In this sense, the narration of certain memories and silencing of others can be 
conceptualised as attempts by those who hold the most power within the 
Commonwealth family to set the boundaries on what is allowed to be remembered 
from the past. 107 Thinking about memory this way unsettles our understanding of 
memory prescribed by communitarians as a tool of unity and solidarity. The point 	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Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/dec/13/labour.uk.  
105 Maria Misra, ‘Heart of smugness’, The Guardian, 23 July 2003. Available at: 
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106 Studies such as Niall Ferguson’s Empire, together with its accompanying television 
programme, have helped to reiterate the image of the benevolent Empire. See Niall 
Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2004). 
107 The idea of imperial amnesia is remains deeply discomforting particularly given the 
recent discoveries of colonial documents detailing systemic violence, including torture and 
internment, carried out by the British particularly during the independence struggles in 
Kenya. For discussion see Banton, ‘Destroy? ‘Migrate’? Conceal?’. 
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I am trying to make here is that the Commonwealth complicates the 
communitarian idea of memory in a number of overlapping ways which, when 
taken together, ultimately show that although collective memories help cement a 
‘we-feeling’ among groups, there is evidence that communities remain together 
even when their members hold different memories.  
 
There is a further ambivalence in the Commonwealth’s perceived 
communitarianism when read alongside communitarianism’s understanding of 
the link between language, identity, and solidarity. While English is undoubtedly 
the language of business and progress in the contemporary globalising world, it 
was used as a tool by the British colonial administration to unite the colonised 
against divisive tendencies. For Farina Mir, it was often through the enforcing of 
language upon colonised that the British colonial officials believed that they could 
effect change.108 Elizabeth Buettner has made similar claims around colonial 
administrations and language arguing that under colonial rule, English was often 
used to ‘strengthen the bonds of loyalty.’109But, this was a practice which had a 
corrosive effect on a colonial relationships and also on native culture. Writing on 
this issue in the early years of African independence, Dan Jacobson observed:  
 
most Africans who want to write want to do so in English or French, 
rather than in their native languages. Could there be, for a writer, a 
more dramatic sign of willed severance from the past than his adoption 
of a language other than the one spoken by his people in their own 
past?110  
 
Ngugi agrees with this logic, as he sees it, cultural decolonisation must, for the 
African writer, ultimately mean writing in African languages.111For Ngugi, the 
negative practices pointed out by Mir and Buettner above were important vehicles 
through which the colonial administration could effect control over their subjects. 
In this way, as Ngugi sees it, ‘language was the most important vehicle through 
which that power fascinated and held the soul prisoner…Language was the means 
of the spiritual subjugation.’ 112  Implicit in Ngugi’s critique is the idea that 
language itself is a form of colonialism. 
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The case of English, then, tells a double story. As Ngugi informs us: ‘it is both a 
means of communication and a carrier of culture.’113 Shared language, following 
Taylor,114 might point to solidarity and unity, but when viewed through a more 
historical lens, and in the context of European colonialism, it changes personality 
and erases the original culture of the colonised. Franz Fanon’s work further 
sensitizes us to a different view of language as a symbol of unity and solidarity. 
For Fanon, like Ngugi, colonial language is less a tool for unity than for division 
and domination. In Black Skin, White Masks Fanon asserts that language ‘means 
above all assuming a culture and bearing the weight of civilisation.’115 The use of 
English was a requirement for social mobility in the colonial hierarchy for the 
native populations.116 This is evident in Fanon’s observation that, ‘Historically, it 
must be understood that the Negro wants to speak French because it is the key 
that can open doors which were still barred to him fifty years ago. Mastery of 
language affords remarkable power.’117 Rather than help cement a ‘we-feeling’ and 
sense of self, that Taylor pointed out earlier in the chapter, language, for the 
colonised then was something that had very much the opposite effect.  
 
I have presented, in this section, an examination of the darker, more messier side 
of inheritance, shared values, and solidarity. These ideas give a rather less 
homogenous account of the shared elements that I identified earlier in the chapter 
as running through most communitarian theorists’ understanding of community. 
Much of this section has been discussing the over-simplification, appropriation 
and distortions of cultural homogeneity within communities, to which 
communitarian theorists turn a blind eye, but this raises the question of why 
communitarian theorists accept this over-simplification of cultural homogeneity 
despite the obviously damaging implications for communitarianism as a theory to 
be taken seriously. The acceptance, it seems, is the result not so much of a 
disrespect for difference and diversity, but of a particularly narrow vision of the 
real world and relations between states.  
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Shared notions of inheritance, history, and solidarity wrapped in a discourse of 
unity and ties make the Commonwealth appear communitarian, but this 
communitarianism is less settled than the picture of settled norms and stability 
put forward by communitarians. The Commonwealth’s communitarianism is 
different from one of shared identity, it is messier, built on diversity, inequality 
and hierarchy, and above all fraught with ambiguity. The messiness between 
Commonwealth states bears a striking resemblance to real families, which, as 
many sociologists, feminists, and psychoanalysts argue, can be dysfunctional 
places in which cruelty as well as nurturing drives relationships.118  It might 
therefore be said to resonate well with Hegel’s understanding of the family as the 
place where the individual is molded into a moral citizen, and equally well with 
descriptions of less nurturing families as messy, thick, dysfunctional spaces which 
breed inequality and where relationships can be fractious and cruel. Such a 
finding contradicts and complicates many of the assertions by communitarians, 
discussed earlier in this chapter, that communities are neat, homogenous places.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
I began this chapter with the idea that there are certain key features and streams 
of ideas in the history of the formation of the Commonwealth to which we might 
point with confidence and state that, despite the fact that its membership is made 
up of fifty-three sovereign independent states, the shared inheritance of 
colonialism and the constituent elements which accompany this - language, 
memory, culture - give the appearance that the Commonwealth conforms to an 
idea of community put forward by communitarian theorists, with thicker ties 
between its states. As we saw in section 3.2, this position has not been difficult to 
defend: the British government, particularly in the early years of Indian 
independence, liberally applied familial discourse to encourage states to retain 
ties with Britain, and, likewise, described the wider grouping as a family of 
nations, going beyond conventional descriptions of the everyday workings of an 
international organisation to couch historical ties between states in the language 
of mystery, mystique, and magic.  
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This idea, pushed by Attlee, and, still now, carried forward by the Queen and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, that the Commonwealth was a family of nations, 
which, to some extent shared not only history but also identity and values, helped 
paint a picture of thicker ties, in Geertz’s sense of the word, between 
Commonwealth members, and was helped, in no small part, by Nehru’s insistence 
that membership in the family did not infringe on the sovereignty of newly 
independent states, but added an extra level of ‘something’ which, although never 
fully defined by Nehru himself, can be viewed along the lines of security or 
recognition: membership in the Commonwealth as an anchor against the trials of 
independence.  
 
These more nuanced conceptions of relations between Commonwealth states, 
which spring from the idea of shared inheritance, shared history, and shared 
values, challenge the neatness and boundedness of the notion of community 
sketched out by communitarian IR theorists, as we saw in section 3.1; but even 
though ties between Commonwealth states appear to be somewhat more familial, 
we cannot dismiss the fact that, in as far as they pertain to the Commonwealth, 
behind what many communitarian theorists see as the glue that holds the 
community together - that is the aforementioned ideas of inheritance, shared 
history, language, memory, and identity - lies a violence which casts a shadow 
over communitarian ideals of homogeny and unity. This violence, as I discussed in 
the previous chapter, is undeniable, but while it might tarnish the somewhat 
utopian way in which the Commonwealth describes itself, it also offers a much 
more realistic lens through which to critique the more harmonious and static view 
of community advocated by many communitarian IR theorists.  
 
Thinking about the community in a messier, more ambiguous and complex way 
unsettles the idea of the community as a place where sharing language, memory, 
and culture appear to effortlessly create a ‘we-feeling’ between all members of the 
community. The idea of the community and communitarianism, then, in the way I 
understand these concepts, is not the stable pooling of identity, language, and 
culture suggested by Taylor, Sandel, MacIntyre, and others, who insist that the 
community is bounded within the domestic sphere, but involves a far less static 
and uniform idea. The case of the Commonwealth, understood in familial terms, 
fits the definition of communitarianism. However, this communitarianism is 
different from the largely harmonious picture of inheritance, shared values, and 
solidarity put forward by many communitarian theorists earlier in the chapter. It 
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is messier, involving both sameness and difference, unity and diversity, 
remembering as well as forgetting. Relationships between post-colonial 
Commonwealth states neither look nor operate like standard international 
relations. In later chapters of the thesis, I will show how the Commonwealth’s 
messy communitarianism looks through the case of Zimbabwe. In the next 
chapter, however, I want to explore the Commonwealth from the other side of the 
normative dichotomy - through a discussion of the Commonwealth’s turn to 
cosmopolitanism. 
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I have often thought that a visitor from another planet would marvel at 
the fragmentation of Earth’s people, and would understand at once 
how important it is, in this age of proliferating atoms and threatened 
ecology, that we should work at building a global community. I believe 
that he would also see that not to use the Commonwealth as one of the 
instruments for this purpose would be monumental folly. To him it 
would not appear in terms of the past, but as an instrument of great 
potential use in the development of habits of consultation and 
cooperation that transcend the limits of race, region, and economic 
level. 
 
- Arnold Smith, Stitches in Time (1981) 
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4 
 
 
 ‘Intimations of a desirable future’:1  
The Commonwealth’s cosmopolitan turn 
 
If the previous chapter showed how the Commonwealth offers a more nuanced 
understanding of relations between states with a discussion of the organisation 
through a communitarian lens, then this chapter gives a view of the organisation 
when we apply a cosmopolitan lens. The chapter explores the ways in which the 
Commonwealth attempted to move away from the communitarian-like family of 
the previous chapter towards a more cosmopolitan outlook. This largely took 
place from 1991 onwards when the organisation adopted a set of normative 
human rights principles at its Heads of Government Meeting in Harare, 
Zimbabwe. 2  The principles, known as the ‘Harare Declaration,’ became the 
defining guidelines of Commonwealth conduct and have since been worked into 
the organisation’s new membership criteria.3 They were accompanied four years 
later by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), which acts as the 
overseer of the Harare Declaration.4 While there is nothing particularly striking, 
or unique, about the Harare Declaration and CMAG themselves, as most 
international organisations have some kind of guiding principles or declaration,5 	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what is particularly noteworthy for the question of Commonwealth endurance at 
the heart of this thesis is that, with the end of apartheid, as I noted in the 
introduction chapter, the Commonwealth had all but lost its purpose.6 The Harare 
Declaration and its accompanying CMAG mechanism, gave the Commonwealth 
the chance to reinvent itself from a messy family into a cosmopolitan organisation 
and pull itself in line with other international organisations. 
 
The messiness of the years since Nehru had made his famous ‘sovereignty plus’ 
observation had seen Commonwealth states - formerly British colonies - attempt 
to neutralise the power of the parental state with the establishment of a 
Secretariat. While this was relatively successful, the messiness of familial relations 
did not stop there. During the years from the establishment of the Secretariat to 
the end of apartheid the issues of Rhodesia and South Africa dominated the 
Commonwealth agenda. These were accompanied by infighting between 
Commonwealth states, as Britain, under the Thatcher government, was reluctant 
to support sanctions against the white South African regime.7 When apartheid 
finally showed signs of coming to an end, the Commonwealth family emerged 
bruised but triumphant.8 But having survived the messy, volatile family feuds of 
the past three decades, the Commonwealth found itself with no real purpose. With 
apartheid ending and Zimbabwe independent, the last days of colonialism and 
decolonisation were coming to an end. What the Commonwealth needed was a 
new moral cause around which to reinvent itself. This came with a turn to 
cosmopolitanism.  
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In this chapter, I am going to examine this cosmopolitan turn by thinking about 
how the Commonwealth appears when viewed through the lens of cosmopolitan 
theory. I do this because with its human rights mechanisms the Commonwealth 
appears to have fallen largely, or perhaps loosely, in line with other international 
organisations,9 which claim to uphold the central tenets of the cosmopolitan 
thesis.10 And yet in spite of appearing to be cosmopolitan, with a more inclusive 
membership criteria and a focus on distributive justice, the Commonwealth’s 
cosmopolitanism, I argue, is more of a veneer. This is because, while in theory, 
cosmopolitanism with its promise to safeguard the rights of all two billion 
Commonwealth citizens, was an attractive prospect for Commonwealth states, 
particularly those in Africa, in the 1990s,11 in praxis it has been much more 
difficult to implement. This has largely been due to the intensification of autocracy 
in a number of African states, along with the Commonwealth’s reluctance to 
address anything more serious than a military coup in any of its member states.12  
 
This is not to say that the Commonwealth has not had success in guiding new or 
interim governments towards the path of democracy, however military coups are 
only one among several other serious violations that have been flagged by the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) as being carried out across the 
fifty-three states in the Commonwealth;13 many of which the CMAG has ignored. 
As a result of this inaction and loss of collective political will,14 I argue that, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Dale, ‘Is the Commonwealth an international organisation?’. 
10 The exemplar organisation is perhaps the European Union that has attempted to bring 
in a collective culture and identity across Europe. For discussion of the European Union’s 
cosmopolitanism see Chris Rumford, Cosmopolitan Spaces: Europe, Globalisation, 
Theory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking 
Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanisation (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2005); Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). 
11 These states had witnessed Zimbabweans and South Africans suffer at the hands of the 
malignant communitarianism of their respective white minority governments, 
cosmopolitanism, in contrast, was an attractive alternative. For an interesting discussion 
on post-apartheid cosmopolitanism see Rosemary Nagy, ‘Postapartheid justice: Can 
cosmopolitanism and nation-building be reconciled?’, Law and Society Review 40, no. 3 
(2006): 623-52. 
12 Akinrinade, ‘Africa’, 219. For a discussion of the Commonwealth’s record with coups see 
Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa; John Hatchard and Tunde Ogowewo, 
Tackling the Unconstitutional Overthrow of Democracies: Emerging Trends in the 
Commonwealth (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003).  
13 The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative are a human rights group that monitors 
the behaviour of Commonwealth states. Chapter 6, with its exploration of Rwanda gives 
more of an overview into what the human rights group does.  
14 Tom Porteous’ scathing attack on the Commonwealth argues that the organisation’s 
political will has completely evaporated. See Tom Porteous, ‘The Commonwealth is a 
jamboree of repression’, The Guardian, 24 November 2009. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/24/commonwealth-jamboree-
of-repression. 
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despite the Commonwealth member states’ declarative commitment to 
cosmopolitanism through promotion, standard-setting, and norm-creation,15 the 
organisation’s lack of real attention to human rights issues, has effectively reduced 
the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism to little more than a utopian ideal.  
 
My point of entry into the discussion of the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism is 
a brief and broad overview of the volatile family years between 1965 and 1991. I do 
this in order provide some insight into how the Commonwealth, from the early 
1960s after the admission of Ghana, attempted to move towards international 
organisation status and leave the messiness of family behind. The Commonwealth 
Secretariat was established as a way of neutralising British patriarchal power and 
moving states onto a more equal footing. While this was not cosmopolitan in 
itself, it was a move in the direction of transforming the Commonwealth from a 
family of nations into an international, intergovernmental organisation.  
 
Following this historical overview, the second section looks in more detail at how 
the Commonwealth appears to be cosmopolitan viewing it alongside cosmopolitan 
theory. The section argues that the adoption of the Harare Declaration, the re-
definition of the Commonwealth as an organisation of peoples as well as states, 
and the adoption of new membership criteria, which has opened up the 
organisation to a more inclusive membership all point towards a picture of the 
Commonwealth as cosmopolitan. 16  In this transformation, shared values - 
perceived as pure and universal17 - usurp the privileged place of shared history 
which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is steeped in the messiness of human 
relationships.18 But, as I noted above, the Commonwealth has largely failed to 
realise its cosmopolitanism, being much more skilled at norm-setting than norm 
compliance, and yet this has not stopped the Commonwealth, and its vast body of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Alison Duxbury points out that, broadly speaking, an international human rights system 
should include elements of both norm creation, standard setting, and implementation. 
Norm-creation without implementation is not enough. See Alison Duxbury, ‘The 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the implementation of human rights’, The Round Table: 
The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 95, no. 385 (2006): 425-40; Alison 
Duxbury, ‘Rejuvenating the Commonwealth - the human rights remedy’, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 344 (1997): 344-77; Alison Duxbury, ‘Reviewing the 
Commonwealth’s rights record: From recognition to realisation’, South African Journal 
on Human Rights 19, no. 636 (2003): 636-62.  
16 John Nagle, Multiculturalism's Double-Bind: Creating Inclusivity, Cosmopolitanism 
and Difference (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).  
17 Here I am referring to the notion of cosmopolitanism that Chris Brown observers grows 
out of the idealist approach and combines pure altruism with enlightened self interest. See 
Brown, International Relations Theory. 
18 I paraphrase here from Michael Walzer’s description of thick norms imbued in 
‘qualification, compromise, complexity and disagreement’. See Walzer, Thick and Thin, 6. 
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literature, as I pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, from describing the 
organisation as a unique family with the potential to unite the world with its 
healing powers.19 We can see this in the exaggerated claims by Smith in the 
epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, or the claims by Ramphal that the 
Commonwealth is ‘truly a global phenomenon.’20  
 
4.1 Foundations of a cosmopolitan future 
 
The roots of transformation of the Commonwealth family from the loose 
association of states kept together by mystical bonds and invisible unions, to 
something different, began to tentatively take shape in 1965. As the organisation 
had witnessed before, there was a distinct temporal change in the ideology of what 
the Commonwealth family was, as well as a change in what the family did, how it 
behaved, and what individual members got from membership. As decolonisation 
proceeded apace and time put distance between colony and independent state, the 
ideology of the Commonwealth family changed from the more intimate family, 
whose children required parental assistance to help facilitate their struggle for 
recognition, into a family with grown and independent children, who were 
becoming less dependent on Britain, for their recognition, survival and 
wellbeing.21  
 
By 1965, an increasing sense of disquiet had begun to take place in the family 
ranks among Commonwealth members who no longer felt the need or the desire 
to be shackled to the disciplinary power of patriarchal Britain.22 One cause of this 
disquiet was the British government’s continued control of Commonwealth 
administration through the Commonwealth Relations Office. For newer 
Commonwealth members, as Stuart Mole points out, this ‘seemed like an 
increasingly unacceptable form of primus inter pares.’ 23  How could the 
Commonwealth claim to be built on a framework of equality when one family 
member continued to play the de facto role of parent? To make matters worse, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is Nehru’s claim, often repeated by Ramphal, that the Commonwealth ‘brings a 
touch of healing to the world.’ See Groom and Taylor, ‘The continuing Commonwealth: Its 
origins and characteristics’, 1.  
20 Ramphal, ‘The Commonwealth in the global neighbourhood’: 176. 
21 Margaret Doxey, ‘The Commonwealth Secretary-General: Limits of Leadership’, 
Internal Affairs 55, no. 1 (1979): 67-83. 
22 Stuart Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma: The role of the Commonwealth Secretary-
General’, in The Contemporary Commonwealth: An Assessment, 1965-2009, ed. James 
Mayall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 43-64. 
23 Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma: The role of the Commonwealth Secretary-General’, 45. 
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parent in question was beginning to show increasing contempt for fellow family 
members with an increasing sense of selfishness and what seemed like a mislaid 
ethic of care.  
 
This manifested in a number of ways: first, in 1962, when Britain tightened 
regulations on immigration from Commonwealth countries (controlling 
movement of the family);24 and again, in 1963, when Britain turned its focus away 
from the Commonwealth towards membership of the EEC (ignoring the family 
interests).25 Both actions provoked growing animosity among Commonwealth 
states, throwing into question the mystical ties and the closer union between 
Commonwealth members. What the Commonwealth needed was something that 
would neutralise the power of the parent state. The solution, put forward by the 
Ghanaian leader, Nkrumah, and backed by a number of African states,26 was to 
remove Britain from the role of administrator and parent, and replace it with a 
more neutral caretaker, in the form of a Secretariat and Secretary-General, who 
would preside over administrative matters.27 
 
The Secretariat represented the first break from the old communitarian-like 
family that we saw in the previous chapter. In Foucauldian terms, it replaced the 
disciplinary power of ‘backward-looking rituals’ with something aimed more 
towards a future-oriented organisation.28 For Foucault, writing on the Victorian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The ‘Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962’ (as well as a number of amendments over 
the following years) no longer gave citizens of British Commonwealth countries the right 
to migrate to the UK.  
25 Britain’s application for membership in the European Economic Community signaled a 
realignment of UK trade away from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth sought 
arrangements to compensate members for the loss of privileged access to the British 
market. For a discussion of the arrangements made for Commonwealth members when 
Britain joined the European Economic Community see Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and 
Persuasion (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973); Yusuf Bangura, Britain and 
Commonwealth Africa: The Politics of Economic Relations, 1951-75 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1983); Alex May, Britain, The Commonwealth and Europe: 
The Commonwealth and Britain's Applications to Join the European Communities 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2001).  
26 In addition to African members, Nkrumah was also supported by Pakistan and Trinidad 
and Tobago.  
27 The proposed remit of the Secretariat was little more than to help with the organisation 
of Commonwealth meetings and distribute papers of common good. As the Agreed 
Memorandum put it, the Secretariat was strongly advised to not ‘touch upon the internal 
affairs of a member country or disputes or serious difference between two or more 
member countries.’ See Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Agreed Memorandum on the 
Commonwealth Secretariat’, The Commonwealth at the Summit: Communiqués of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, 1944-1986 (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1987), 105.  
28 As Chloe Taylor points out, Foucault, in Psychic Power, gives a complicated account of 
familial power as sovereign. This sovereign power is grounded either in blood right or 
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family, the disciplinary power of the father maintained its hold on the family 
through backward-looking rituals of blood, birth, and shared history.29 When 
viewed in a Commonwealth context, this account illustrates the shifting ideas 
among Commonwealth Heads of Government and the dichotomous relationship 
between shared history and shared values. The Commonwealth had begun to look 
towards the future, first by neutralising the father’s sovereign power over the 
family, and then further by replacing this power with a neutral arbitrator of 
values.30 The idea of a Secretariat was attractive both for its role in the official 
institutionalisation of the Commonwealth, and because, as Mole has suggested, its 
official Memorandum was enshrined with the liberal idea that conflict could be 
resolved through reason, arbitration, and the ‘spirit of cooperation.’31  
 
Although highly restricted in its remit at first, the Secretariat reflected the growing 
independence and equality of Commonwealth members.32 This was the first sign 
that the old familial idea of shared history was beginning to lose its grip on its 
member’s imagination; as Nkrumah put this, the Commonwealth ‘was no longer 
an association of like-minded countries deriving their institutions from Britain: 
the main bond was respect for each other’s independence and if it was to have any 
future strength its members needed to accept new obligations.’33 Nkrumah’s 
suggestion might be said to be a nod in the direction of cosmopolitanism, but 
there was no harmony of interests here; from the establishment of the Secretariat 
until 1991, Commonwealth states continued to exhibit the messiness of family.  
 
New obligations soon arrived in the shape of the Rhodesia. The Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) proclaimed by the minority white-led 
government of Southern Rhodesia, on 11 November 1965, proved a major source 
of discord for almost fifteen years. While Rhodesia was a matter of decolonisation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conquest. Sovereign power regularly re-inscribes its power through rituals which refer 
back to this original event of bloodshed or blood right. In contrast disciplinary power is 
future-oriented, replacing backward-looking rituals with exercises aimed at a future-
oriented state. See Chloe Taylor, ‘Foucault and familial power’, Hypatia 27, no. 1 (2012): 
201-18. 
29 Taylor, ‘Foucault and familial power’. 
30 The British were worried that the Secretariat would establish a power-base of its own 
and therefore developed plans to keep the Secretariat’s activities ‘within prescribed limits’ 
in order to prevent it from ‘becoming a political pressure group.’ See W. David McIntyre, 
‘Britain and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 28, no. 1 (2000): 135-58. 
31 Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma’, 46. 
32 For a short but thorough analysis of the role of the Secretariat in its first two decades of 
existence see Doxey ‘The Commonwealth Secretariat’. 
33 Nkrumah quoted in Smith, Stitches in Time, 4.  
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South Africa presented a different problem of enfranchisement and 
emancipation.34 This was followed by the divisive issue of South Africa’s relations 
with the Commonwealth, which, as I noted in the previous section, sparked an 
internal crisis as heads of government were forced to deal with the issue of how a 
non-member would change its internal policy of discrimination against its own 
citizens. The question of how to deal with South Africa fuelled the efforts to 
develop the Commonwealth’s first attempt at a declaration of democratic common 
principles. As Olusola Akinrinade points out: ‘it became necessary to affirm what 
the members of the association stood for and establish what its goals in certain 
areas were.’35 The Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, in 1971, 
was the first real definition of what the Commonwealth was, outside of the widely 
repeated assertion that it was a family. As the Declaration put it, the 
Commonwealth was a ‘voluntary association of independent states, each 
responsible for its own policies, consulting and cooperating in the common 
interest of their peoples.’36 
 
By 1991, the Commonwealth had successfully midwifed Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 
and fought something of a relatively united campaign against a minority racist 
regime in South Africa. The dismantling of the apartheid regime saw the end of 
the Commonwealth’s grand vision: to successfully bring colonialism to an end. It 
also signaled a threat to the Commonwealth’s existence. To survive, what the 
Commonwealth needed was a change in outlook. The decades leading up to the 
end of apartheid had been plagued with messiness, squabbling, and in-fighting. 
The change, when it came in 1991, was rooted in the idea that the messiness of 
family could be transcended. The moral triumph over apartheid and racism in 
Southern Africa, a success story in which the Commonwealth had played a part, 
shaped the move towards a different kind of organisation; one where shared 
values would come to fight shared history in the battle over Commonwealth 
endurance.  
 
The re-focused Commonwealth of the 1990s found a ready-made consensus in the 
international arena coinciding, as it did, with a number of international events 
and trends. Two events in particular formed the backdrop of the Commonwealth’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline, and Future of the British Commonwealth, 51.  
35 Akinrinade, ‘Africa’, 214.  
36 The Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘The  Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth 
Principles 1971’. Available at: http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/history-
items/documents/Singapore%20Declaration.pdf  
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turn to cosmopolitanism: the end of the Cold War and the release of Nelson 
Mandela, which pre-empted the dismantling of the apartheid regime.37 These 
events were particularly significant because they meet a need for a new moral 
project around which the Commonwealth could collect itself.38 The end of the 
Cold War brought a deepening perception of globalisation eroding the idea of the 
state as the centre of politics. This was accompanied by economic 
interdependence - aided by the removal of barriers to free trade - and a shrinking 
of distances with the help of new technologies.  
 
The stage was set for a deepening of globalisation and governments adapted 
nationally to take advantage of these changes. 39 With the balance of power politics 
over, the talk of a new world order began to clear the way for what George H. W. 
Bush described as: ‘A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a 
home among all nations.’40 Part of the background of this historic shift, as I have 
already noted, was the weariness of the international community with the 
presence of autocratic governments. As a result of the weariness, in domestic 
affairs, states were now expected to adhere to the norm of democracy and good 
governance.41 As the move towards democratisation in many parts of Africa, and 
the wider world, built up momentum, the moral triumph of a free South Africa, a 
success story in which the Commonwealth had played a role, provided the will to 
take this forward. The Commonwealth had taken a cosmopolitan turn and cast its 
gaze towards a future where the onus was on shared values, rather than shared 
history, but how would this reconcile with the deeply embedded norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention as well as the thicker, messier Commonwealth 
family we saw in Chapter 3? To answer this question, we need to look at what 
being cosmopolitanism involves and how this differs to the communitarianism 
discussed in the previous chapters. This will provide some theoretical context for a 
deeper engagement with the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Akinrinade, ‘Africa’, 217. See also, Francis Njubi Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions: African 
Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2004). 
38 Mayall, ‘Introduction’, 18.  
39 Nicholas Bayne, ‘The Commonwealth and the international economy’, in The 
Contemporary Commonwealth: An Assessment, 1965-2009, ed. James Mayall 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 107.  
40 George H. W. Bush, ‘Speech to Congress, 6 March 1991’, Available at: 
http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/america7_brief/content/multimedia/ch36/re
search_01d.htm. 
41 Akinrinade, ‘Africa’.  
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4.2 The Commonwealth’s Cosmopolitanism: A sketch of the arguments 
 
I want to begin this discussion of cosmopolitanism by drawing a couple of 
distinctions. The first noteworthy point, acknowledged widely among those who 
have thought seriously about the subject, is that running through the literature on 
cosmopolitanism are three core themes that can be described as: individualism, 
universality, and egalitarianism.42 These three themes form the basis of a larger 
set of moral and normative commitments, which are based on ‘the 
acknowledgement of some notion of common humanity that translates ethically 
into an idea of shared or common moral duties towards others by virtue of this 
humanity.’43  
 
To get a grip on the issues here, it is worth reminding ourselves upfront that the 
debate between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is one about the scope 
of distributive justice. At its core is the question: ‘to whom is justice owed?’44 For 
communitarians, and the basis of my discussion in Chapter 3, the scope of justice 
is specific to the communities in which we find ourselves embedded to begin with. 
But, as cosmopolitans see it, these binding forces of political and social grounding, 
so clearly fetishised by communitarians - ancestry, place of birth, citizenship, and 
state borders - are morally arbitrary and, therefore, should not limit the way in 
which we distribute benefits and burdens among persons.45 For cosmopolitans, 
the scope of justice is believed to be universal and, as such, individuals are the 
ultimate repositories of moral worth in political life. In this regard, through the 
cosmopolitan gaze, ‘every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of 
moral concern.’46   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This typology is accredited largely to Thomas Pogge. See Thomas Pogge, 
‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, Ethics 103, no. 1 (1992): 48-49; Thomas Pogge, World 
Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002).  
43 Catherine Lu, ‘The one and many faces of cosmopolitanism’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy  8, No. 2 (2000): 245. On the same theme, see also Catherine Lu, Just and 
Unjust Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006).  
44 Onora O'Neill, Justice Across Boundaries: Whose Obligations? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016); Onora O’Neill, 'Transnational justice: Permeable boundaries and 
multiple identities', in Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays, ed. Preston 
King (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 291-302. 
45 Jones, Global Justice. See also, Philippe Van Parijs, ‘International distributive justice’, 
in A Companion to Political Philosophy, eds. Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas 
Pogge (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 638-52; Simon Caney, ‘Review article: 
International distributive justice’, Political Studies 49, no. 5 (2001): 974-97.  
46 Charles Beitz, ‘International liberalism and distributive justice: A survey of recent 
thought’, World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 287. 
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It is here that we find the key difference between the view of the Commonwealth 
in Chapter 3, and the view of the Commonwealth in this chapter. Where, I have 
argued that the Commonwealth exhibits many of the main tenets of 
communitarianism, as well as being described as a family, with many heads of 
state adding their own nuance to describe ties between states, in this chapter I 
want to argue that, with its turn to cosmopolitanism, the Commonwealth 
attempted to embrace the idea that it is an organisation where every member’s 
rights are as important as the group’s wellbeing. Thus, for the more 
communitarian-looking Commonwealth, outlined in Chapter 3, the scope of 
justice is rather more specific to the state, but, for the post-1991 Commonwealth, 
the scope of justice (at least potentially) becomes universal and individual 
members of the Commonwealth family are, as I pointed out earlier, the ultimate 
units of moral worth.47  
 
While this might sound like an unrealistic agreement - after all, how is it possible 
to meet the needs of two billion family members individually?48 - this reshaping of 
the Commonwealth attempted to place the organisation on a similar footing to 
other international organisations, which can perhaps be understood as 
cosmopolitan through Mary Kaldor’s definition as maintaining, ‘a layer of 
governance that constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty of states and yet does 
not itself constitute a state…[which] would override states in certain clearly 
defined spheres of activity.’49 Kaldor’s argument is similar to one put forward by 
Daniele Archibugi in his work on cosmopolitan democracy. For Archibugi, like 
Kaldor, cosmopolitan democracy is ‘a project that aims to develop democracy 
within nations, among states and at the global level, assuming that the three 
levels, although highly interdependent, should and can be pursued 
simultaneously.’50 This means that, while the cosmopolitan project calls for the 
rights of every human being to be respected, Kaldor and Archibugi realistically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Beitz, ‘International liberalism and distributive justice: A survey of recent thought’: 287. 
48 For debate and discussion on whether institutions can have ‘responsibilities’ see Toni 
Erskine, ed., Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
49 Mary Kaldor  ‘Proposal to the Economic and Social Research Council for a seminar on 
cosmopolitan democracy’, cited in Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler, 
eds., Reimagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford, 
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democracy see Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward 
Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008).  
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argue that this respect begins at the level of the state and is monitored, for all 
intents and purposes, by international organisations with the mandate to override 
state sovereignty in situations, for example, where it is agreed that military force 
is needed to protect human beings.51  
 
Bending Kaldor and Archibugi’s arguments to our purposes, we can see that the 
Commonwealth’s attempted cosmopolitanism is analogous with the idea that the 
state takes care of its citizens, and the Commonwealth fellow family members, 
through the observational and disciplinary mechanism CMAG, as well as through 
the Good Offices of the Commonwealth Secretariat,52 help member states that are 
considered to be going off the rails of democracy and the rule of law.53 In Chapter 
5, I will discuss how the case of Zimbabwe problematised this way of thinking, but 
for the present purposes it is enough to simply state that by the mid 1990s the 
Commonwealth, through the Harare Principles and CMAG, had, to employ John 
Major’s phraseology, begun to ride the tidal wave of human rights rather than be 
swept along by the stream.54 
 
In the cosmopolitan doctrine, one practice in particular in the post-Cold war era 
has come to be seen as emblematic of the turn to cosmopolitanism; this is the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 55  The idea of obligations or 
responsibility often translate into duties of global distributive justice, which often 
pursue the protection of universal human rights or the reform of unjust 
international systems in order to bring them in-line with cosmopolitan moral 
principles.56 Charles Jones has described distributive justice as: ‘best conceived in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also, Ken Gude, 
‘Case studies in collective response’, in Protecting Democracy: International Responses, 
eds. Morton Halperin and Mirna Galic (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 63-100. 
52 The Commonwealth Secretary-General in the past has used his ‘good offices’ (senior 
Secretariat officials or envoys) to attempt quiet diplomacy with heads of state to deal with 
non-violent conflict or political difficulties within states. See The Commonwealth 
Network, ‘Good offices for peace’. Available at: 
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth-in-action/good-offices-for-
peace/. 
53 Colvile, ‘A place to stand: The problems and potential of the Commonwealth ministerial 
action group’. 
54 ‘John Major’s Speech in Harare to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting’, 
17 October 1991. Available at: http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page978.html. 
55 Rosemary Foot has linked the ending of the Cold War to the impact of human rights 
ideas. See Rosemary Foot, ‘The Cold War and human rights’, in The Cambridge History of 
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terms of human rights, from which it follows...that nation-state borders lack any 
fundamental ethical standing.’57 Following similar lines of thinking, Robert Plant 
has noted that the cosmopolitan character of the human rights approach is 
obvious, as he puts it: ‘the whole thrust of human rights theories is that 
boundaries of nations are not the boundaries of moral concern.’58 This view has 
potential for a study of the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism in that it prompts 
us to remember that during the first decades of its official existence, the 
Commonwealth had a strict policy of non-interference in the domestic policies of 
each member state.59 Nevertheless, on the back of the moral triumph against 
apartheid, it was possible to discern a concerted effort by Commonwealth states to 
sustain (at least to begin with) and reinforce the norms that would make the shift 
to cosmopolitanism possible - the human right to life, liberty, equality, and 
prosperity.60  
 
The attempt to transform the Commonwealth away from the messy squabbling 
family of the previous decades into a more progressive liberal forward-looking 
organisation in 1991, was exemplified, then, by a focus on human rights and 
democracy which were a reaction to the apartheid regime. This was one of the 
central themes in the Harare Declaration, which set a new agenda for the 
Commonwealth that included the commitment to work towards: 
 
strengthen[ing] and enrich[ing] the value and importance of the 
Commonwealth as an institution which can and should strengthen and 
enrich the lives not only of its own members and their peoples but also 
the wider community of peoples which they are a part.61  
 
On the back of post-Cold War sentiment and the collapse of apartheid in South 
Africa, the Harare Declaration ushered in a new-look Commonwealth that 	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59 Krishnan Srinivasan, ‘Principles and practice: Human rights, the Harare Declaration 
and the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)’, in The Contemporary 
Commonwealth: An Assessment, 1965-2009, ed. James Mayall (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010), 65-82. 
60 We can see this in the Commonwealth’s suspension of Nigeria and the Abacha regime 
following the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa. For an overview and analysis of the Abacha 
regime see Bamidele Ojo, ed., Problems and Prospects of Sustaining Democracy in 
Nigeria (New York: Nova, 2001); Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi and Shadrack Wanjala 
Nasong’o, eds., Regime Change and Succession Politics in Africa: Five Decades of Misrule 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).  
61 The Commonwealth Secretariat’, ‘The Harare Commonwealth Declaration 1991’. 
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appeared to be loosening its bond with the shared history and messiness of the 
past and casting its gaze towards a more idealised future. Promoting human rights 
became a practice whereby the Commonwealth re-presented itself as an 
international organisation ready to evolve beyond what had previously been 
understood as a family of nations with an onus on non-interference. Notable in 
this respect is the description of the Commonwealth in 2008 by the former 
Secretary-General Don McKinnon who points out that key to the strength of 
Commonwealth values is the, ‘Respect for human rights - indivisible and non-
negotiable.’62  
 
But, to truly make the change from an association of states bound by shared 
history to a relevant international organisation, whose members adhered to the 
norms of liberalism and democratisation, the ideology of the Commonwealth 
family needed to undergo a change in definition. The issue of how the 
Commonwealth defines itself has important implications for the way we 
understand the concept of cosmopolitanism.63 For Richard Bourne, what appears 
to some as a people’s organisation, is for others, very much a state driven and 
dominated family.64 As he writes, ‘for many throughout the Commonwealth the 
individual and community come first, any government second, and the definition 
of democracy must be that of plural democracy with minority rights and 
individual freedom.’65 This observation is particularly noteworthy because, as Paul 
Taylor points out: ‘There has…been some controversy about whether the 
Commonwealth was concerned as much with the interests and rights of peoples as 
with those of states.’66  
 
This question was cleared up, at least conceptually, in 2007, when the 
Commonwealth Secretariat confirmed that the Commonwealth: ‘is an association 
of peoples as well as states.’ 67  Outlining the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Don McKinnon, ‘A Commonwealth of Values; a Commonwealth of incomparable value: 
Reflections of a Secretary-General 2000-2008’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 97, no. 394 (2008): 24.  
63 This is because the cosmopolitan thesis ‘favours individual rights.’ See Stan Van Hooft, 
Cosmopolitanism: A Philosophy for Global Ethics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).  
64 Richard Bourne, ‘The Commonwealth and civil society’, The Contemporary 
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65 Bourne, ‘The Commonwealth and civil society’, 135.   
66 Paul Taylor, ‘The Commonwealth and the European Union’, in The Contemporary 
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outlook, McKinnon noted, ‘Commonwealth societies are the people of the 
Commonwealth in villages, towns and cities. And therefore protecting and 
promoting fundamental human rights of individuals…is central to the 
Commonwealth’s work.’68 Taking on something of the Commonwealth’s tendency 
for exaggeration, Karmalesh Sharma, the out-going Commonwealth Secretary-
General, couched McKinnon’s observation in more global terms when he noted:  
 
the Commonwealth became global…immediately took into account 
that the human community, the global community has to consist 
equally in terms of rights…and then saw that the way of the future has 
to be a participatory one in which it has to be a people’s 
Commonwealth.69  
 
For Sharma, the theme of globalisation and human rights helped the 
Commonwealth to evolve into a more universal world-wide global family. 70  
 
The Commonwealth’s attempts to redefine what was meant by the 
Commonwealth family appeared to be in-line with the change in definition, in late 
twentieth century international normative discourse, as Martha Finnemore points 
out, of ‘who qualifies as human and therefore deserving of humanitarian 
protection by foreign governments.’ 71  But in addition to redefining its 
membership, the Commonwealth also took a more progressive move away from 
its shared history, with a new criteria for membership that effectively diluted the 
shared history requirement and opened up the family to a much more inclusive, 
and therefore potentially cosmopolitan, membership. This was the membership 
criteria that was produced after the accession to the organisation of Mozambique. 
Having been referred to as a Commonwealth ‘cousin’ for its assistance during the 
bush war in Rhodesia, Mozambique, at the insistence of Nelson Mandela, was 
admitted to the Commonwealth in 1995.72 Following Mozambique’s membership, 
the Commonwealth produced, for the first time in its history, an official 	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membership criteria, which noted that states with some connection to other 
Commonwealth members, rather than a constitutional and historical connection 
to Britain, could seek Commonwealth membership.73  
 
This last point is telling, the question of who qualified as a member of the 
Commonwealth family had always been defined by the organisation’s shared 
history of colonialism and their constitutional connections to Britain, but, with the 
organisation’s attempted cosmopolitan outlook, the idea of who qualified 
underwent something of a radical change. This was a move away from the 
organisation’s shared past which, in the eyes of the Commonwealth Secretariat 
and much of the Commonwealth literature, make it so unique. This change has 
given the Commonwealth scope for a much more inclusive future and, in a 
cosmopolitan sense, has opened up a space where inheritance, memory, and 
solidarity are no longer the binding forces which dictate the scope of ethical ties.74 
From this perspective, the cosmopolitan Commonwealth can be understood as 
cultivating more of a sense of global justice beyond the fifty-three Commonwealth 
member states, effectively helping the organisation to recognise the existential 
worth of individuals, beyond the binding forces of ethnicity, culture, and 
nationality that are bound up with inheritance.  
 
But, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, while it was possible to discern a 
concerted effort to promote a human rights agenda on the back of anti-apartheid 
sentiment in the 1990s, the presence of human rights norms across the 
Commonwealth has not dictated norm compliance.75 This is largely because, 
Commonwealth heads of state and foreign ministers, who make up the collective 
body of CMAG, have shied away from intrusion into the internal affairs of their 
fellow Commonwealth family members and largely turned a blind eye to many 
human rights violations committed by Commonwealth states against their 
citizens.76  The Harare Declaration and its monitoring mechanism contributed to 
the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitan outlook, both by establishing codified 	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requirements and actualising their enforcement. Nevertheless, the lack of real 
attention to human rights issues across Commonwealth states has effectively 
reduced the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism to little more than a signifier, 
empty or otherwise, which has no real analytical purchase or empirical content, 
and is restricted to descriptive value. It would not be an over-generalisation, then, 
to suggest that as far as human rights protection goes, the Commonwealth has 
failed to live up to its cosmopolitan aspirations based on the failure of norm 
compliance.77 
 
4.3 Conclusions: Looking forward/looking back  
 
What I have attempted here and in the previous chapter is to open up to scrutiny 
two ways of looking at the Commonwealth. First, the communitarian view with a 
top-down, state-centred picture of a realm where the state as father administers 
the discipline and the organisation is held together through what Foucault calls 
backward-looking rituals of blood and birthright. 78  And second, the more 
horizontal idea of the distribution of rights and responsibilities where the family is 
transformed into an international organisation, the Secretariat acts as neutral 
arbitrator, and every citizen’s rights are taken into account. The cosmopolitan 
Commonwealth, though not fully realised, is a sense of looking to the future, 
whereas the Commonwealth family, in the communitarian sense of the concept, is 
looking to the past. These two ways of looking at the organisation are essential to 
understanding the how we might view the Commonwealth as both cosmopolitan 
and communitarian.  
 
From the exploration over the past two chapters, the Commonwealth appears to 
be both communitarian and cosmopolitan but can it really be both? Here, in the 
final paragraphs of this chapter, I want to sketch out how the chapters in the 
empirical part of the thesis are going to help flesh out the concept of the 
communitarian and cosmopolitan understandings of the Commonwealth in more 
detail. These ideas divide into two broad types, which we might understand, as I 
have outlined above, as backward-looking and forward-looking analogies. The 
backward-looking approach stems from the communitarian tradition that Chris 
Brown argues grows partially out of the realist tradition that he traces back to 
anti-Enlightenment thinkers, who maintained that human failings could not be 	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overcome.79 It is this view of the family, which administers the discipline but also 
offers us a home through our struggle for recognition. The backward-looking 
approach is the mother of communitarianism in that it carries assumptions about 
the social order. It is predicated on the notion that ethics are specific to 
communities with a shared history, shared values, and a sense of solidarity, and 
can be found in the case of Zimbabwe, which is the subject of Chapter 5.   
 
The forward-looking approach, by contrast, is a far more idealistic way of looking 
at what the family is capable of doing and can achieve. This approach is pushing 
against forces seeking to write-off the Commonwealth, and attempts to recreate it 
as a potential force of utilitarianism. This approach was espoused, as I have 
outlined in this chapter, by Commonwealth heads of government at the beginning 
of the 1990s, and flavoured by the spirit of the united collective front that had 
fought against the dark forces of racism in Southern Africa. The forward-looking 
approach is the mother of cosmopolitanism and, as it pertains to the 
Commonwealth’s understanding, is informed by two beliefs: first, that the 
adoption of the Harare Principles and CMAG on the back of post-Cold War 
optimism and the dismantling of apartheid would bring both moral and social 
improvement by advancing the rights and interests of each and every individual 
member; and second, that the later opening up of Commonwealth membership, 
which shifted the emphasis from shared history to shared values, would help to 
realise this. It is predicated on the assumption that Commonwealth member 
states will, at least in theory, allow a certain amount of intrusion in each other’s 
internal affairs in the event of ‘an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically 
elected government’ and ‘serious or persistent violations of the principles’ of 
human rights,80 and can be found in the case of Rwanda, which I explore in 
Chapter 6. 
 
It is no coincidence that the cases in the empirical chapters that follow take place 
in Africa. As I outlined in the introduction chapter of this thesis, Africa is the place 
where the Commonwealth’s attempt to be cosmopolitan has faced the biggest 
challenges and witnessed the most inconsistencies. It is therefore only fitting that 
the cases I have selected to test my arguments both come from the 
Commonwealth in Africa. The cases in Chapters 5 and 6 are informed by 
interviews carried out in Zimbabwe and Rwanda, they give a much-needed voice 	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to the African side of the Commonwealth in a literature that is dominated by 
Western voices. The following two chapters should therefore be understood as an 
exercise in listening to family members with a view to further complicating 
theoretical understandings of the Commonwealth family by allowing praxis to 
speak back to theory.  
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It’s a family because of the historical ties between these 
countries…family cannot be wished away you can’t do without family. 
You can quarrel and say ok I don’t want to see you for the next five 
years but that doesn’t make you not a member of the family. Even if 
you say I don’t want family, I’m not part of this family and, what-have-
you, you are still part of this family. 
 
- Zimbabwean Academic (3 March 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The British colonisation of Africa was like consensual rape. It happens 
and you have a couple of children as a result and then you think, well I 
might as well make the most of this family situation now.   
 
- Zimbabwean Politician (Zanu-PF) (11 March 2015) 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Zimbabwe and the family ties that bind 
 
 
I discussed two ways in which we might understand the Commonwealth as a 
family in Chapters 3 and 4 - through shared history where ideas of inheritance, 
identity, and solidarity work together to create thicker ties - in Geertz sense of the 
word - between member states, or through shared values, where the individual 
rights of every single family member matter as the organisation fixes its eyes on 
the future in an attempt to find a purpose. Both ways of understanding the 
organisation have found expression in the Commonwealth’s ambition to be a 
cosmopolitan organisation and its failure to fully realise this goal. These two ways 
of understanding the Commonwealth, I argue, constantly pull the organisation in 
two different directions and this has kept the Commonwealth in a threshold zone 
between its communitarian past and its cosmopolitan future. There are many 
ways in which we might substantiate this, but over the next two chapters I will 
explore what I believe are two very strong individual cases - Zimbabwe and 
Rwanda - that help to shed substantial light on this claim. I have already 
explained the rationale behind the choice of these cases in Chapter 1. By steering 
the discussion towards these individual cases, and away from the Commonwealth 
as a whole, I consider how states, which make up the collective Commonwealth 
family, have both contributed to, and also helped to problematise, the two 
different ways of viewing the organisation.  
 
It should be evident by now that, when it comes to viewing the Commonwealth 
either through a communitarian or a cosmopolitan lens, I am interested in the 
dysfunction, dissonance, and disavowed relations which member states bring to 
the Commonwealth family. Perhaps no other case personifies the messiness of 
family, nor the conflict between shared history and shared values at the heart of 
the Commonwealth, better than the events surrounding the lead up to the 
withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in 2003.1 While there is a vast 
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body of literature which analyses the dramatic upheavals and events that led 
Zimbabwe out of the Commonwealth,2 little attention has been paid to how 
Zimbabweans themselves feel about leaving the Commonwealth. The aim of this 
chapter is therefore to explore how we might understand how the Commonwealth 
troubles the idea of family through the voices and opinions of Zimbabwean elites. 
 
Zimbabwe is a particularly interesting case, because of the history between the 
Southern African state and the Commonwealth. During the 1960s until the late 
1970s, Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, dominated the agenda of Commonwealth 
meetings as Ian Smith and his minority white government attempted to wrestle 
power from Westminster in a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).3 
Smith’s regime came to an end with the assistance of the Commonwealth, which 
arbitrated the Lancaster House Conference, helped produce the Lancaster House 
Accords, the documents and agreement that facilitated Zimbabwe’s 
independence, 4 and elevated Robert Mugabe to the position of head of the 
Zimbabwean state. Twenty-two years after independence, Zimbabwe, once again, 
dominated the agenda of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings as 
Mugabe and the Zanu-PF ruling party, amidst what a host of scholars regard as a 
period of political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, were seen to have abandoned 
the rule of law.5 Following a period of suspension in 2000, in October 2003, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
see ‘UK regrets the Gambia’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth’, BBC, 3 October 2013. 
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24376127.  
2 The literature on the Zimbabwean crisis is enormous, and what follows is just a sample of 
it: Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopolous and Stig Jensen, eds., Zimbabwe’s Unfinished 
Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis (Harare: Weaver 
Press, 2003); Richard Bourne, Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe? (London 
and New York: Zed Books, 2011); Primorac and Chan, eds., Zimbabwe in Crisis; Ian 
Phimister and Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Mugabe, Mbeki and the politics of anti-imperialism’, 
Review of African Political Economy 101 (2004): 127-43; Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence 
Ranger, The Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe 
(Harare: Zimbabwe University Publications, 2001); Sarah Chiumbu and Muchaparara 
Musemwa, Crisis! What Crisis?: The Multiple Dimensions of the Zimbabwean Crisis 
(Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2012); A. S. Mlambo, A History of 
Zimbabwe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
3 For an analysis of the history and policies of the Smith regime see Dickson Mungazi, The 
Last Defenders of the Laager: Ian D. Smith and F. W. de Klerk (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1988); J. R. T. Wood, So Far and No Further!: Rhodesia’s Bid for Independence During 
Her Retreat from Empire (Johannesburg: 30 South Publishers, 2005); David Moore, 
Norma J. Kriger and Brian Raftopoulos,'Progress' in Zimbabwe?: The Past and Present of 
a Concept and a Country (London: Routledge, 2013).  
4 For more on the Lancaster House Agreement and the transition to independence see: 
Stephen Chan, The Commonwealth Observer Group in Zimbabwe: A Personal Memoir 
(Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1985); Chan, Robert Mugabe; Jacob Chikuhwa, A 
Crisis of Governance: Zimbabwe (New York: Algora, 2004).  
5 Brian Raftopolous, ‘The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008’, in Becoming Zimbabwe: A 
History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopolous and A. S. Mlambo 
(Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 201-32. 
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Mugabe withdrew the now troubled state from the Commonwealth. Today, 
Zimbabwe has been out of the Commonwealth for more than a decade, and yet 
there has been a steady stream of discourse from the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and in the corpus of 
Commonwealth literature, about bringing Zimbabwe back to the fold.6 In spite of 
these continued efforts from the Commonwealth Secretariat and the FCO, the 
Zimbabwe government has not appeared interested in returning and publically 
declared, in 2005, that Zimbabwe would never again belong to the ‘useless body 
which has treated Zimbabwe in a dishonourable manner.’7  
 
Two things might be said in defence of the Zimbabwean government’s reaction 
here. First, the leader of the Zimbabwean political party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC-T), Morgan Tsvangirai, has publically stated that he 
wishes Zimbabwe to return to the Commonwealth. Tsvangirai has been repeatedly 
attacked by the Zimbabwean president and the Zanu-PF as a puppet for the West 
to manipulate - even re-colonise - Zimbabwe, therefore, this rhetoric is in fitting 
with the government line to paint the opposition party as a Western sympathiser. 
Second, there is evidence, although the Commonwealth has played down this 
angle, that Pakistan, at the time of Zimbabwe’s suspension, should also have been 
dealt with in a harsher way, and that, because of the strategic need for allies in the 
‘war on terror,’ Pakistan, and its domestic political issues, escaped the level of 
scrutiny that was applied to the Zimbabwean case.8  
 
This last claim is significant, while the fact that Zimbabwe failed to adhere to 
Commonwealth values is not in dispute here, what is immediately noteworthy for 
the purposes of my enquiry is the fact that, amongst others, Sri Lanka, with 
accusations of war crimes,9 and Uganda, with its threatened Anti-Homosexuality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to a report by the House of Commons, there are a number of Commonwealth 
Organisations that have come together in London to work with civil society organisations 
in Zimbabwe. See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Role and Future of 
the Commonwealth: Fourth Report of Session 2012-13 (London: House of Commons, 
2012). 
7 Editorial, ‘Mugabe attacks Blair and turns back on ‘useless’ Commonwealth’, The 
Scotsman, 3 July 2005. Available at: http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/mugabe-
attacks-blair-and-turns-back-on-useless-commonwealth-1-1391617.  
8 Don McKinnon gives a detailed account of his dealings with both President Musharraf 
and President Mugabe and the difference in treatment of both heads of state. See 
McKinnon, In the Ring.  
9 In spite of the ongoing war crimes investigations, the Sri Lankan government were 
selected as hosts for the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. While this 
was an issue that met with a number of boycotts from human rights groups and some 
Commonwealth leaders, the meeting, nevertheless, went ahead as scheduled. What is 
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act that threatens life imprisonment for homosexuals, 10  remain in the 
Commonwealth without threat of suspension. Drawing attention to differences in 
treatment, it is observations like these which help tease out the complexity and 
messiness of the Commonwealth family. What is especially pertinent about the 
Zimbabwean case, and I will bring this out in more detail as I go along in later 
sections of the chapter, is the level of involvement by the British government in 
the loss of the troubled state. 
 
But, these observations notwithstanding, the certainty of the statement that 
Zimbabwe will never return to the Commonwealth is intriguing. More than ten 
years after the withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the Zimbabwean government 
has slowly been showing signs of willingness to re-engage with the West, but, as 
far as the Zanu-PF are concerned, this does not include the Commonwealth.11 
What is curious about these observations is that, as I have discussed above, 
despite the Zimbabwean government’s open hostility towards the organisation, 
the Commonwealth has kept a constant vigil over the return of Zimbabwe. 
Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth (1975-1990) 
who oversaw the independence of Zimbabwe, has put this in simple terms. As he 
sees it: 
 
the people of Zimbabwe are basically what all this was about and I 
have a deep consciousness of the terrible plight of those people…I 
believe the Commonwealth has an ongoing responsibility to those 
people. Forget leaders and all that: it is a terrible human disaster in 
Zimbabwe. The Commonwealth cannot ever relinquish responsibility 
to those people. It was like Oliver Tambo telling me that black people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
noteworthy is that the Commonwealth Secretariat barely, if at all, mentions any failure by 
Sri Lanka to adhere to Commonwealth values. For an overview of opinion and analysis of 
the Sri Lanka Heads of Government Meeting decision see, for example: Brian 
Senewirante, ‘Sri Lanka hosting CHOGM2013: A serious problem’, Sri Lanka Guardian, 4 
November 2013. Available at: http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2013/11/sri-lanka-
hosting-chogm-2013-serious.html. 
10 For a thorough exploration of anti-homosexuality laws and across the Commonwealth 
see Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites, Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for Decriminalisation (London: Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, 2013).  
11 The Zimbabwean Foreign Minister said recently, ‘it is difficult to see any such review 
taking place in the foreseeable future. Therefore, any parliamentarians who lobby foreign 
parliamentarians for Zimbabwe to be allowed to join the Commonwealth must know that 
their efforts are at variance with the Government of Zimbabwe.’ Zvamaida Murwira, ‘Zim 
to stay out of C’wealth’, The Herald, 24 February 2016. Available at: 
http://www.herald.co.zw/zim-to-stay-out-of-cwealth/. 
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of South Africa never left the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth 
must take the position that it never left the people of Zimbabwe.12 
 
What is especially pertinent about Ramphal’s comment is that, on the one hand it 
enacts exactly with the scenario of inheritance, shared values, and solidarity put 
forward by the communitarian IR theorists I discussed in Chapter 3. Yet, on the 
other hand, it is precisely the complex history and shared inheritance of 
colonialism which complicate the Zimbabwean situation as the chapter will show.   
 
Intrigued by both the Commonwealth’s commitment and the Zimbabwean 
government’s animosity towards the Commonwealth, in February 2015, I 
travelled to Harare to get a feel for whether this was a widespread sentiment: did 
other Zimbabweans in positions of influence share this view? I wanted to 
understand how Zimbabweans viewed the Commonwealth, how they understood 
the story behind Mugabe’s withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the organisation, 
whether they had felt the effects of their government’s withdrawal, and finally 
what they thought about the Commonwealth’s obsession with bringing Zimbabwe 
back. I conducted approximately 20 semi-structured interviews with a range of 
elites mainly in the Zimbabwean capital city of Harare. These included journalists, 
civil society representatives from local and national Zimbabwean civil society 
organisations, politicians from both of the main political parties in Zimbabwe, and 
academics. Interviewees were mainly from similar ethnic Shona backgrounds and 
were politically aligned to one of the two main political parties in Zimbabwe. 
While some interviewees were young and had no real memory of Commonwealth 
history and its connection to Zimbabwean independence, others had firsthand 
experience of the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe and the role that the 
Commonwealth played. The information the elites passed on to me gave me a 
deeper insight - both beyond the academic library and beyond British and 
Zimbabwean media’s demonisation of Blair and Mugabe - into the political 
landscape in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwean reaction to leaving the Commonwealth, and 
any Zimbabwean relations with the Commonwealth since.13 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Shridath Ramphal interviewed in Moyo and Ashurst, ‘Sleights of hand at Lancaster 
House’, 163. 
13 In spite of leaving the Commonwealth, Zimbabwe is still loosely connected to certain 
Commonwealth professional associations such as the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities of which five Zimbabwean universities remain affiliated. For information on 
this see: The Association of Commonwealth Universities. Available at: 
https://www.acu.ac.uk/membership/acu-members/.  
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While elite interviews were my main source of data collection, information was 
also gained from observation, by studying Zimbabwean newspaper articles related 
to Zimbabwean-Commonwealth relations, and by informal discussion with 
ordinary Zimbabweans that I met on a daily basis in and around the 
neighbourhood in which I stayed during my fieldwork. 14  Some of these 
conversations proved to be instrumental to my access to elites, as on more than 
one occasion a conversation on a park bench in the gardens of the National 
Gallery, or a discussion at a neighbourhood barbecue, led me to the door of a 
political figure or activist that people were sure I should talk to. I was struck by 
the interest in the Commonwealth, and helpfulness on these occasions, on one 
level because of my own preconceptions about the reception I would receive as a 
British researcher in Zimbabwe, and on another level because it was in stark 
contrast to the reaction from the white Zimbabweans I had encountered in my 
first few days in the country. I will return to discuss this comment in more detail 
in the following section of the chapter, in which I address issues of positionality, 
suffice it to say that there was a general feeling from most white Zimbabweans, 
that I spoke to during my fieldwork, that the Commonwealth had no connection to 
their lives and was therefore not worth talking about.15  
 
In a variety of ways, this observation itself problematises the communitarian 
notion of shared identity as white Zimbabweans are often singled out by the Zanu-
PF as the kith and kin of the ‘British Anglo Saxon tribe.’16 This was a description 
that was used on more than one occasion in my interviews with Zimbabwean 
politicians. In this analogy, all white Zimbabweans are connected to the British 
through notions of shared inheritance, history, and identity. Given that these 
three elements also form the backbone of communitarianism, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, then theoretically, following Clifford Geertz, there ought to have been a 
‘we-feeling’ or strong sense of solidarity across the ‘Anglo Saxon tribe.’ And yet, 
this did not seem to be the case with white Zimbabweans that I met in Zimbabwe. 
When theory met praxis, these so called kith and kin turned their backs on family 
ties.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 While in Zimbabwe, I stayed in the suburb of Chisipite, north of Harare, and caught the 
local commuter buses into the city every day. The bus journeys provided a chance to talk 
to the local people and get something of an idea of how things were in the daily lives of 
Zimbabwean non-elites.   
15 Personal correspondence with the author, Harare, 16 February 2015. 
16 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 11 March 2015.  
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This observation is one of a number of ways in which the notion of family is 
problematised in the Zimbabwean case. In presenting my findings, I have tried to 
draw out the most significant examples to justify my argument that Zimbabwe 
troubles the normative landscape and while I draw on a variety of empirical 
evidence and observation, it is the interviews themselves which provided the most 
fruitful data. In each of my interviews, I began by asking my subjects two simple 
questions: why did Zimbabwe leave the Commonwealth? And, would it ever 
return? By asking these questions first, I had not necessarily yet indicated my 
interest in the topic of the Commonwealth as a family. And yet, one of the most 
striking things about the interviews was that, although I tended not to broach the 
subject of family right away, the discourse of family nevertheless permeated many 
of the answers given by my subjects.  
 
It is telling that the Commonwealth has been so affected by the loss of 
Zimbabwe.17 Given the multiple parties, the behind the scenes manipulation, and 
the lingering sense of loss in the face of Zimbabwe’s defiance, the Zimbabwean 
case resonates very closely with familial behaviour. A simple reading of the 
Zimbabwe situation does not adequately do justice to the complexity of characters 
and of family history between Britain, Zimbabwe, and the Commonwealth. By 
steering the discussion towards the ways in which we might envision the loss of 
Zimbabwe in familial terms, this chapter makes a unique contribution to both the 
literature on Zimbabwe and the literature on the Commonwealth, as well as 
grounding communitarianism by adding an empirical element with data derived 
from interviews. Rather than simply reiterate the story of Zimbabwe’s withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth, the chapter attempts to provide an understanding of 
Zimbabwe’s place in the Commonwealth’s communitarian narrative, and in doing 
so attempts to shed light on the reasons why the loss of Zimbabwe has had such 
an effect on the Commonwealth’s inability to get its cosmopolitanism off the 
ground.  
 
In order to explore the Zimbabwean case, the chapter proceeds in four parts. The 
first section provides some context for the loss of Zimbabwe outlining briefly some 
factors which contributed to the suspension and later withdrawal of the troubled 
state. The second section discusses some issues around positionality that arose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For an interesting analysis of the Zimbabwean withdrawal from the Commonwealth and 
the Commonwealth’s reaction, through the lens of international institutional law see 
Duxbury, ‘A fracture in the family’. 
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during the interview process. The third section deals with the ways in which 
Zimbabwean officials view the Commonwealth, how they conceive their 
government’s withdrawal from the organisation; and how they envision future 
Zimbabwean-Commonwealth relations. The final part of the chapter draws the 
points together and returns to the theoretical debate.  
 
5.1 Background: Family history 
 
I arrived in Zimbabwe to conduct interviews in February 2015, approximately a 
week before President Mugabe’s ninety-first birthday party, which was attracting 
a lot of criticism from the British, as well as the international, media.18 One 
particularly vocal critic, whose comments had attracted the attention of a small 
number of Zimbabwean politicians, was the former Mayor of London, Boris 
Johnson. In an article in the British broadsheet, The Telegraph, entitled: ‘Happy 
birthday, Mr Mugabe, with special love from Labour,’ Johnson, after criticising 
the extravagance of the birthday celebrations, turned his criticism towards Britain 
and proceeded to outline what he saw as the many ways in which Tony Blair and 
the Labour party, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, could be held responsible for 
the level of poverty, political violence, and poor standard of living in Zimbabwe 
today.19  
 
Johnson’s letter offers a useful starting point for my overview of the background 
and events which led to the withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in 
2003, as many of his comments echo the official Zimbabwean government line of 
anti-Blair and anti-British sentiment.20 While British-Zimbabwean relations have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The President’s birthday party had become an extravagant event over the past x years 
and attracted particular criticism for its openness to donations from Zimbabwean citizens. 
See, for example, Helen Nianias, ‘Robert Mugabe eats a zoo for ‘obscene’ 91st birthday 
party’, The Independent, 1 March, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/robert-mugabe-eats-a-zoo-for-obscene-
91st-birthday-party-10077805.html.  
19 Boris Johnson, ‘Happy birthday, Mr Mugabe, with special love from Labour’, The 
Telegraph, 22 February 2015. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/11428364/Happy-birthday-Mr-
Mugabe-with-special-love-from-Labour.html. See also the response by one Zimbabwean 
politician: Vince Musewe, ‘Educating Boris Johnson et al on Zimbabwe’, Nehanda Radio, 
2 March 2015. Available at: http://nehandaradio.com/2015/03/02/educating-boris-
johnson-et-al-on-zimbabwe/. 
20 Terence Ranger, Blessing-Miles Tendi, and Brian Raftopoulos with Ian Phimister have 
all written on the Zanu-PF’s attempts to fashion Zimbabwe’s history into a patriarchal 
narrative of Zimbabweans against the neo-colonial desires of the British government. 
Terence Ranger, ‘Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the 
nation: The struggle over the past in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies 30, 
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a long history of turbulence that predates Zimbabwean independence, as I briefly 
mentioned above, it is the animosity, which was largely provoked by the Labour 
party with a letter from Clare Short to the late Zimbabwean Agriculture Minister, 
Kumbirai Kangai, in 1997, that is argued by the Zanu-PF, as Johnson pointed out, 
to be the root cause of the breakdown in relations between Britain and Zimbabwe, 
and ultimately Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth.21  
 
The letter addressed the subject of British financial support for land reform, 
outlined in the Lancaster House Agreement,22  that would compensate white 
farmers who gave up their land on a ‘willing-buyer-willing-seller’ basis and thus, 
as Blessing-Miles Tendi observes, ‘resolve a colonial legacy of racially biased land 
distribution in Zimbabwe.’23 In the now infamous letter, Short wrote: 
 
At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting [October 1997], 
Tony Blair said that he looked forward to developing a new basis for 
relations with Commonwealth countries founded upon our 
government’s policies, not on the past. We will set out our agenda for 
international development in a White Paper…The central thrust of this 
will be the development of partnerships with developing countries 
which are committed to eradicate poverty…I should make it clear that 
we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the 
costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from 
diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own 
origins are Irish, and as you know, we were colonised, not colonisers…I 
am told Britain provided a package of assistance for resettlement in the 
period immediately following independence. This was, I gather, 
carefully planned and implemented, and met most of its targets. Again, 
I am told there were discussions in 1989 and 1996 to explore the 
possibility of further assistance. However, that is all in the past. 24 
 
By drawing a line under the past, Short attempted to shift the focus away from the 
shackles of an unwritten financial commitment, made by the Conservative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
no. 2 (2004): 215-34; Blessing-Miles Tendi, Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: 
Politics, Intellectuals and the Media (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010); Phimister and Raftopoulos, 
‘Mugabe, Mbeki and the politics of anti-imperialism’. See also: Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
and James Muzondidya, Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism?: Rethinking 
Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe (Oxford and New York: Peter Lang, 2011).  
21 Blessing-Miles Tendi, ‘The origins and functions of demonisation discourses in Britain-
Zimbabwe relations (2000-)’, Journal of Southern African Studies 40, no. 6 (2014): 1255. 
22 The Lancaster House Agreement was the political agreement that paved the way for 
Zimbabwean independence. 
23 Tendi, ‘The origins and functions of demonisation discourses in Britain-Zimbabwe 
relations (2000-)’: 1255.  
24 Clare Short, ‘Letter to Minister Kangai’, The Guardian. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/foi/images/0,9069,1015120,00.html.  
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government in 1979, towards the broader discourse of poverty reduction and good 
governance, that formed part of the newly elected Labour government’s ethical 
foreign policy.25  
 
I begin with Short’s letter, and the breakdown in relations between Britain and 
Zimbabwe, because most accounts in the literature on Zimbabwe’s withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth, echoing the claims of the Zanu-PF, take this as their 
starting point. While the extent to which Short’s letter was directly responsible is 
heavily debated by those who have done serious research on the subject,26 a point 
that is rarely disputed, however, is the claim, argued broadly across the literature, 
that the issue of land sits at the heart of the Zimbabwean crisis. This claim arises 
in large measure from the understanding that fundamental land reform and 
redistribution have been part of Zimbabwean government policy since 
independence in 1980.27 Up until Short’s letter, Britain had provided financial 
support for the redistribution policy, but, as Short pointed out, that financial 
commitment was about to end. As far as the Zanu-PF was concerned, Short’s 
letter laid the foundations for the violent seizure of white-owned commercial 
farms.28 It was largely these farm invasions, which gave way to violations of 
property rights and the rule of law,29 along with large scale political violence 
around the presidential elections in 2000 and 2002, as the Zanu-PF attempted to 
hold onto power, which soured British-Zimbabwean relations and marked the 
beginning of the end for Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Commonwealth.30  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Lloyd Sachikonye, Zimbabwe’s Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society 
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Charles Laurie, The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe’s 
Seizure Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Jocelyn Alexander, ‘’Squatters,’ 
veterans and the state in Zimbabwe’, in Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business, eds. Amanda 
Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003), 83-118; Rory 
Pilossof, The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmers’ Voices from Zimbabwe (Harare: 
Weaver Press, 2012); David Harold-Barry, Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future: Rethinking 
Land, State, and Nation in the Context of Crisis (Zimbabwe: Weaver Press, 2004); Chris 
Alden and Ward Anseeuw, Land, Liberation and Compromise in Southern Africa 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Joseph Hanlon, J. M. Manjengwa and Teresa 
Smart, Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2013).  
27 Heribert Weiland, ‘EU sanctions against Zimbabwe: A predictable own goal?’, in 
Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years, ed. Martin Holland (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 127-43. 
28 Tendi, ‘The origins and functions of demonisation discourses in Britain-Zimbabwe 
relations (2000-)’: 1255. 
29 Phimister and Raftopoulos, ‘Mugabe, Mbeki and the politics of anti-imperialism’: 386. 
30 Stephen Chan has described the British reaction to the farm invasions as ‘hysterical’ as 
it ‘obliterated all room for negotiation,’ effectively set in motion the push for a sanctions 
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But, while farm invasions, election tampering, and political violence provide the 
political back drop to Zimbabwe’s departure from the Commonwealth, it is the 
political figures who were involved in the suspension, and the various reactions by 
the Zimbabwean government, that are the real interest, as they suggest a more 
richly ambiguous picture of relationships in which Zimbabwe and the 
Commonwealth family are not so easily divisible. 31  By this I mean that 
Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Commonwealth, already an open sore by 2002, 
began to fester even more when, in addition to an Election Observer Group, the 
Commonwealth sent a Troika to Zimbabwe with the purpose of engaging with the 
government on ‘political reconciliation, electoral reform and land reform.’32 The 
Troika comprising the leaders of Australia (Howard), South Africa (Mbeki), and 
Nigeria (Obasanjo), was tasked with the responsibility of making the final decision 
on whether Zimbabwe would be suspended from the Commonwealth.33 But, while 
the Observer Group and the Troika found the results of the election to have been 
manipulated, the decision to suspend Zimbabwe became a political balancing act, 
largely because, as Heribert Weiland has pointed out, the observation delegations 
produced a number of assessments with differing conclusions before deciding that 
Zimbabwe ought to be suspended.’34  
 
To problematise the situation further, Howard was accused by the Zanu-PF of 
working with the British government in a bid to re-colonise Zimbabwe,35 while 
Obasanjo and Mbeki, who was accused by the West of not doing enough,36 had to 
deal with domestic conflicts, as the decisions they made in favour of suspension 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
policy that ‘caused tangible harm to the Zimbabwean economy and 
compounded…financial meltdown.’ See Stephen Chan, ‘Foreword’, in Charles Laurie, The 
Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe’s Land Seizure Era 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), vii. 
31 Don McKinnon’s memoir provides a thorough, and very personal account, of the 
personalities involved in the Zimbabwe case. See McKinnon, In the Ring, chapters 5 and 
6. 
32 John Howard, ‘As relevant as ever before’, in Commonwealth Minister’s Reference Book 
2003, ed. Cheryl Dorall (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004), 7. 
33 Miriam Prys, Redefining Regional Power in International Relations: Indian and South 
African Perspectives (Abingdon and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2012), 86. 
34 Weiland, ‘EU sanctions against Zimbabwe: A predictable own goal?’, 137. 
35 McKinnon, In the Ring. 
36 Mbeki, through his policy of quiet diplomacy, had been attempting to deal with the 
situation in Zimbabwe on a more regional scale. See Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Politics 
behind politics: African Union, Southern African Development Community and the Global 
Political Agreement in Zimbabwe’, in The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of 
Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement, ed. Brian Raftopoulos (Harare: Weaver Press, 
2013), 142-70. 
	   130	  
went against the wishes of some members of their own political establishments.37 
Additionally, both faced the pressure of supporting Mugabe in the spirit of 
brotherly solidarity. As Geoff Hill, describing Obasanjo’s relationship with the 
Zanu-PF points out, ‘the spirit of black solidarity that had marked African politics 
for forty years, Mugabe’s supporters doubtless expected that the Nigerian would 
at least be gentle in his criticism.’38  
 
Mbeki and Obasanjo were tasked with the job of brokering peace talks between 
the two main political parties in Zimbabwe, but to no avail. One year after the 
2002 suspension, when no agreement could be reached over what progress, if any, 
had been made, Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth was 
controversially extended, 39 an impasse, as Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopolous 
point out, that culminated in ‘Harare’s abrupt withdrawal from what it termed ‘a 
white racist club,’40 where it had been wrongly and unfairly treated by Nigeria, the 
‘white’ Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Secretary-General. 41  As he 
announced the withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, Mugabe 
compared it to Animal Farm, ‘where some members are more equal than 
others.’42 
 
Although the narrative around Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth 
is largely interpreted as Mugabe withdrawing Zimbabwe from the 
Commonwealth, ‘out of spite.’43 An observation that is less frequently made, but 
pertinent to my aims of problematising the family, is that, as one Zimbabwean 
politician told me in an interview, the decision to leave the Commonwealth ‘would 
not have been an easy decision for Mugabe to make.’44 This is an observation 
which came up in numerous interviews during my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, as 
some interviewees saw it Mugabe had an attachment to the Commonwealth and 
an affinity with all things British: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Jacob Zuma, for example, in his capacity as Vice President of South Africa announced 
the Zimbabwean elections ‘free and fair’. Zuma cited in Gareth Van Onselen, ‘Quiet 
diplomacy in so many words: How the ANC failed Zimbabwe’, Business Day, 1 August 
2013. Available at: http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/08/01/quiet-
diplomacy-in-so-many-words-how-the-anc-failed-zimbabwe.   
38 Geoff Hill, The Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 
2003), 179. 
39 Daniel Compagnon, A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of 
Zimbabwe (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 226. 
40 Phimister and Raftopoulos, ‘Mugabe, Mbeki and the politics of anti-imperialism’: 386. 
41 Hasu Patel cited in Chan and Patel, ‘Zimbabwe’s foreign policy: A conversation’, 9.  
42 Robert Mugabe cited in McKinnon, In the Ring, 1. 
43 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 20 March 2015. 
44 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 26 February 2015.  
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Mugabe is the only one who has cucumber sandwiches. Mugabe is the 
only one who goes on a field-day on a farm in a pin-stripped suit and 
tie, and Mugabe is the only one who says, ‘we love the Queen.’ So, he 
has that emotional, sentimental attachment to the Commonwealth.45   
 
This last point is interesting. What is immediately noteworthy is that, if we think 
of Mugabe’s past relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth, as well as his 
affection for the Queen, we see a complex figure who had received an honourary 
knighthood, and had been an active member of the Commonwealth family since 
joining the Commonwealth at independence.46 Thus where the complexity of the 
Zimbabwean case becomes particularly interesting - in respect of the idea of the 
family - is the observation, reiterated by many interviewees, that President 
Mugabe is perhaps the most British of all. This ties in with the observation I made 
in Chapter 2 regarding the Queen and her relationship with a number of African 
leaders. As one older Zimbabwean academic pointed out, ‘Even the outlook of the 
President is British, the way he speaks, the way he dresses, and that’s why we have 
this problem.’47 When I discussed the President’s ‘Britishness’ in a later interview, 
the academic I was speaking with, a much younger interviewee who taught politics 
and journalism, widened the description to include all Zimbabweans. As he saw it: 
 
if you look at our president and you look at Zimbabwean things, the 
way we dress and the way we do our things, the way our industry and 
the way we do everything is British. More British, Zimbabweans are 
more British than anyone else in the world…Education, dressing, 
whatever we do, it’s really, even schools, people, uniform, British way 
of doing things. That is why the bond is so strong and cannot be 
washed away.48 
 
This discussion of the Britishness of Zimbabweans points to the ways in which 
relations between Commonwealth states can both reinforce the idea of family 
identity and trouble it. If Zimbabweans, as my interviewees pointed out, are the 
most British of all members of the Commonwealth family, and yet are no longer 
officially in the Commonwealth family, then where does this leave our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare 20 March 2015. 
46 Mugabe played a role in the Commonwealth’s push for sanctions against the apartheid 
regime in South Africa, as well as playing host to the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in 1991 that saw the adoption of the Harare Principles. For an 
overview on Zimbabwe’s role see Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid 
Power in Southern Africa (London: James Currey, 1986).  
47 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 23 February 2015.  
48 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 3 March 2015. 
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understanding of the communitarian thesis? Moreover, as I will show in the 
empirical section of the chapter, many Zimbabweans believe that only Mugabe left 
the Commonwealth - the rest of the country remains in the organisation. While in 
reality this is an impossible observation, the fact that certain key figures such as 
Shridath Ramphal support such thinking makes Zimbabwe’s relationship with the 
Commonwealth all the more interesting. Observations such as these sit at the 
heart of the chapter. They take their place in the larger attempt by the thesis to 
trouble the normative dichotomy. Examining the case of Zimbabwe, which 
troubles the very idea of family, allows us to apprehend just how far the 
Commonwealth troubles the normative landscape and provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the thick, messy relations between post-colonial states.  
 
Having presented something of an overview of the events which led to Zimbabwe’s 
departure from the Commonwealth, along with some understanding of the more 
intriguing, fraught, and often unstable relationships that are complicated by the 
Zimbabwean case, I now want to begin my deeper engagement with the empirical 
part of the chapter. But before I do, I want to discuss some issues of positionality, 
which, as I will show, are important for the discussion and arguments that follow.  
 
5.2 Positionality: British-Zimbabwean relations 
 
The level of animosity between the British and Zimbabwean governments in 
recent years, raised a number of issues, during both the planning and the 
execution stages of my fieldwork, relating to questions of positionality. As Gustav 
Visser points out, the positionality and the manner in which the researcher is 
perceived during fieldwork and interviews inevitably influences the knowledge 
they produce.49 Adding more depth to Visser’s point, Brooke Ackerly and Jacqui 
True have written that the more thoughtful approach to research is one where the 
researcher considers and acknowledges her positionality, with regards to the 
research process.50 My interest in African politics, more specifically Zimbabwe, 
began, rather ironically, when I moved to Asia (Japan) in 2000. This coincided 
with an election and constitutional referendum in Zimbabwe which had yielded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Gustav Visser, ‘In other worlds: On the politics of research in a transforming South 
Africa’, Area 32 (2000): 234. 
50 Brooke Ackerly and Jacqui True, Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social 
Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 37. 
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less than favourable results for the President.51 Seeing the situation in Zimbabwe 
from a international/Japanese perspective, beyond the historical and, at times, 
hysterical, perspective of the British media was intriguing, and I returned to 
London in 2008 to write a master’s dissertation, which contrasted British-
Zimbabwean with Sino-Zimbabwean relations.  
 
Despite the fact that I have had a keen research interest in Zimbabwe for a 
number of years, the fieldwork for this research project was the first time that I 
had physically visited the country. Given my understanding of the track-record of 
British-Zimbabwe relations in recent decades, one of my key concerns was 
whether the fact that I was a British researcher asking questions about the 
Commonwealth could ever be separated from the larger political, historical, and 
social aspects that have informed British-Zimbabwean relations over the years. I 
was, also, acutely aware of the fact that, in a country whose government was 
hostile to the Commonwealth, there might be occasions when I too would be 
viewed as a representative of the Commonwealth, and therefore viewed with 
hostility.  
 
These concerns manifested themselves almost immediately on the very first day of 
my fieldwork in Zimbabwe. While in Zimbabwe, I stayed with an ex-pat Dutch-
Belgian surgeon and artist couple, who had made Zimbabwe their home for the 
past twenty-five years. As a friendly gesture, my hosts took me along to a small 
gathering of friends to welcome me to Zimbabwe, with the view of kick-starting 
my quest for interview contacts. The guests were mostly white Zimbabweans and 
a few European ex-pats who, when asked about my research, appeared interested 
in the description I gave and offered the names of potential interviewees. Only 
towards the end of the evening was I approached by a small group of guests, who 
were suspicious of what I was ‘really’ doing in Zimbabwe and questioned whether 
I was sent here by British intelligence agencies.52  
 
This observation was peculiar and rather unsettling, particularly as it happened 
on the first day of my fieldwork experience in Zimbabwe. I was unsure about the 
seriousness of the interrogation and unsettled by the possibility that people could, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For an overview of the referendum and the ensuing social and political turmoil, see 
Brian Kagoro, ‘Constitutional reform as social movement: A critical narrative of the 
constitution-making debate in Zimbabwe, 1997-2000’, in Zimbabwe: Injustice and 
Political Reconciliation, eds. Brian Raftopolous and Tyrone Savage (Cape Town: The 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), 236-56. 
52 Personal communication with the author, Harare, 17 February 2015.  
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or would, view me this way. Even more unsettling was the fact that it was white 
Zimbabweans, the supposed kith and kin of the British, who all appeared to 
affiliate politically with the Zimbabwean opposition party, the MDC. These white 
Zimbabweans are repeatedly described by the Zanu-PF as the ‘Anglo-Saxon tribe’ 
and therefore family of the British, who provoked such unsettling feelings. Many 
IR researchers have written on the unsettling, disturbing experience of doing 
fieldwork and the ability of the encounters one has in the field to put the 
researcher off-balance. Jason Rancatore has conceptualised this as: ‘the strange is 
made familiar, and the familiar is recognised as strange.’ 53  Rancatore’s 
observation resonated well with this situation. It was only when reflecting on this 
experience, and the feelings that came with it, much later in the research trip, did 
I come to understand the value of such interactions to my research project.54 As I 
outlined in detail in Chapter 1, I selected Zimbabwe as a case study because I 
believe it is an exemplary case for problematising the shared history/shared 
values dichotomy at the heart of the Commonwealth. What is striking, then, about 
the significance of this strange/familiar encounter is that it problematises the 
communitarian argument that shared history and inheritance provide a much 
thicker ethical dimension to relations within families, communities, and so on.55 
The Commonwealth, as a family of nations and people, has clearly a much more 
complex make up than communitarian theorists have accommodated for in their 
arguments.  
 
I had come to Zimbabwe with the intention of analysing the responses of 
Zimbabwean elites to questions regarding the Zimbabwean state’s relationship 
with the Commonwealth, and by proxy, Britain, and I had anticipated certain 
issues of positionality connected to the historical relationship between Britain and 
Zimbabwe. What I had failed to comprehend in its entirety in the planning stages 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Jason Rancatore, ‘It is strange’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 1 
(2010): 75. See also Michael Agar, ‘An ethnography by any other name’, Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung 7, no 4 (2006). Available at: 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/177; Michael Jackson, 
‘From anxiety to method in anthropological fieldwork: An appraisal of George Devereux’s 
enduring ideas’, in Emotions in the Field: The Psychology and Anthropology of Fieldwork 
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Press, 2010), 35-54. 
54 James Davies, ‘Introduction: Emotions in the field’, in Emotions in the Field: The 
Psychology and Anthropology of Fieldwork Experience, eds. James Davies and Dimitrina 
Spencer (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 1-34; Vincent Crapanzano, ‘At 
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of my fieldwork, was the explicit connection between my own identity and the 
questions at the heart of my research project. The anticipation of further 
encounters like this raised a number of interesting questions: Would all 
Zimbabweans view me with the same ‘suspicious’ lens? Would these ways of 
viewing me have an effect on the answers that interviewees provided? And, 
moreover, would I be able to get deep under the surface of Zimbabwe-
Commonwealth relations?  
 
It would be disingenuous to say these questions were completely Zimbabwe 
related. My concerns, in part, were also based on my experience of conducting 
interviews in Rwanda (the subject of Chapter 6). As I outline in some depth later 
in the thesis, conducting interviews in Rwanda, where I spent six weeks before 
heading to Zimbabwe, threw up a series of methodological difficulties. The most 
significant example being that many of the answers that individual interviewees 
gave to questions about Rwandan-Commonwealth relations appeared to be very 
similar to answers given by other interviewees. This raised questions about 
whether interview subjects were merely repeating government lines; particularly 
in a political climate such as Rwanda where the government is reportedly 
suspicious of researchers. 56  While the Zimbabwean government has a very 
definitive line on why President Mugabe withdrew from the Commonwealth, the 
answers given by my interviewees did not seem to be simply reiterating 
government opinion.  
 
My confidence in making this claim is borne out by the fact that the interview data 
that I collected from Zimbabwean elites was much more varied both in detail and, 
to a large extent, the depth of emotion that permeated responses. Had my 
interviews been conducted a few years earlier, perhaps closer to time of 
Zimbabwe’s actual withdrawal from the Commonwealth, it is possible that I would 
have received different answers as the withdrawal coincided with the imposition 
of a Western sanctions regime. But, in the current political climate with the level 
of political in-fighting in the Zanu-PF reportedly escalating,57 and political protest 
occurring on a much more frequent basis than had been the case in recent years, 
there seemed to be, as one academic I interviewed reiterated, small changes in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  As I explain in more detail in Chapter 6, there is a culture of surveillance around 
anything that might show the Rwandan government in a poor light. See Begley, 'The RPF 
control everything! fear and rumour under Rwanda's genocide ideology legislation', 70-83.  
57 For an overview of the current Zanu-PF infighting: ‘Analysts speak on ZANU-PF 
infighting’, The Financial Gazette, 2 June 2016. Available at: 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/analysts-speak-on-zanu-pf-infighting/. 
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political atmosphere as people watched the President grow older and older: ‘it’s 
just a question of time before Zimbabwe came back to the Commonwealth.’58  
 
The issue of return, although evident in all interviews, became especially 
noteworthy when interviewing local civil society organisations in Zimbabwe. 
Whereas politicians, journalists, and academics, to some extent, as I will show in 
later sections of the chapter, imbued their discourse with familial metaphors and 
discussion of shared history, representatives from civil society organisations were 
less philosophical and more practical, as one might expect. When asked, during a 
conversation about sanctions,59 whether she thought that Zimbabwe would return 
to the Commonwealth, one civil society interviewee, a young Shona woman, 
responded that, ‘the bigger issue is that we need to interrogate the mandate of the 
Commonwealth, why does Britain and the Commonwealth want Zimbabwe back 
in so badly when they are punishing Zimbabweans in other ways?’60 This was an 
excellent question, and one which I had not given serious thought to in the 
research project until now. Why did Britain want Zimbabwe back in the 
Commonwealth so badly when the British government, along with the European 
Union and the American government, was inadvertently punishing Zimbabweans 
through sanctions against their government? My interviewee continued: 
 
What are the benefits for Zimbabwe coming back? On an 
international scale, there is restoration of relations between states 
but… Commonwealth countries are not equal, it’s an alliance of 
unequal countries. The inequality is economical - there is a hierarchy 
because of the donor countries and the power relations between 
states. The memory of colonialism remains…Tying human rights to 
aid is good on paper, but this is against the Declaration of Human 
Rights. Withholding aid because of this is punishing the grass, not the 
elephant trampling on the grass.61 
 
Being confronted by this question destabilised the interview somewhat and left 
me feeling rather helpless. I have already discussed the concept of disturbing and 
destabilising encounters in the field and how they cut to the heart of my research 
puzzle; this is another example of such an encounter. Julia Gallagher, writing on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 23 February 2015.  
59 At the time of Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the EU and the USA 
had imposed what they referred to as ‘smart’ sanctions on Robert Mugabe, some Zanu-PF 
members, and a number of parastatals. For more information and analysis on these 
sanctions see Weiland, ‘EU sanctions against Zimbabwe: A predictable own goal?’. 
60 Interview with Zimbabwean Civil Society Operative, Harare, 12 March 2015a.  
61 Interview with Zimbabwean Civil Society Operative, Harare, 12 March 2015a.  
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her own experiences on positionality, while conducting interviews in Zimbabwe, 
has referred to these experiences, using Julia Kristeva’s notion of encounters with 
strangers, as ‘violent, catastrophic’ encounters.62 Gallagher notes, ‘Coming face to 
face with…uncontrolled reality shakes not only our feeling of understanding the 
world, but of understanding ourselves.’63 This last phrase is telling, not only did 
the response from my interviewee destabilise the flow of the interview, but, as 
Gallagher points out, it left me with a sense of powerlessness which, in turn, was 
coupled with a now deepening ambiguity around the dichotomy of inside/outside 
that Gallagher, among other researchers,64 has pointed out is always present in 
the field. To use Gallagher’s phraseology, my interviewee’s questions made the 
encounter more painful as they forced me into the position both of fielding 
answers and of thinking about whether my answers would be viewed as my own 
opinion or British opinion. All of these things, in turn, raised questions about the 
power dynamic in interviews.  
 
Debates regarding power relations between the positionalities of researchers and 
their subjects have tended to focus on the role of the interviewer as the one who 
holds the power,65 often a reflection of fieldwork conducted in poverty stricken 
areas with subordinated informants. Few debates have examined the power 
relations in elite interviews.66 The notion of power, which was firmly attached to 
relations of gender, weaved itself into my interviews in Zimbabwe. Most of the 
interviews I conducted, with the exception of the female civil society 
representative discussed above, were with male elites,67 which problematised the 
so called power element of the interviewer/interviewee relationship. Like many 
African states, as I discussed in Chapter 2, Zimbabwe is a predominantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Julia Gallagher, ‘Interviews as catastrophic encounters: An object relations 
methodology for IR research’, International Studies Perspectives (2015): 1-17.  
63 Gallagher, ‘Interviews as catastrophic encounters’: 2. 
64 Linda Archibald and Mary Crnkovich, ‘Intimate outsiders: Feminist research in a cross-
cultural environment’, in Changing Methods Feminist Transforming Practice, eds. 
Sandra Burt and Lorraine Code (Ontario: Broadview Press, 1995), 105-26; Beverley 
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cultural setting’, Geoforum 3o (1999): 337-50. 
65Daphne Patai, ‘U.S. academics and third world women: Is ethical research possible?’, 
Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History, eds. Sherna Berger Gluck and 
Daphne Patai (New York: Routledge, 1991), 137-54; James Sidaway, ‘In other words on the 
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and writing the text’, in Feminist dilemmas in Fieldwork, ed. Diane Wolf (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1996), 185-214. 
66 Mullings, ‘Insider or outsider, both or neither’. 
67 This was not planned, as I noted in my methodology discussion in Chapter 1, interviews 
were largely arranged through a process of snowballing.  
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patriarchal society. In an article that probes the issue of gender relations in 
research interviews, Andrew Herod has pointed out, that the positionality of the 
interviewer can, and does, change depending on physical and social 
characteristics of the interviewer, in particular, gender.68 In addition to the gender 
of the interviewer and interviewee influencing the research process, Herod points 
out, gendered assumptions may also influence the way we interpret  interview 
data, which, in turn, has implications for the sort of information and insights that 
interviews produce.69 What is of interest here, both for issues of positionality and 
for the concerns of troubling the idea of family at the heart of the thesis, is the 
difference in approach between female and male interviewees to answering my 
questions. While the female civil society representative, as I have discussed above, 
unsettled the interview process with her own counter questions, many of my male 
interviewees seemed to treat the interview as an opportunity to teach me about 
Zimbabwean politics. They seemed content to provide lengthy answers to my 
questions without hesitation, often contradicting themselves along the way.  
 
In focusing on issues of gender and power here I am not suggesting that the data 
from interviews where I appeared to weald less power as the interviewer was any 
less significant to the research, on the contrary such encounters formed the seed-
bed for the formulations of my deeper understanding of Zimbabwe’s place in the 
Commonwealth family. This was a relatively short visit and, as I have already 
noted, I was aware that it might be difficult to get deep under the surface of 
Zimbabwe-Commonwealth relations. But, there were a number of things going on 
politically in Zimbabwe, besides the Johnson Telegraph article and the 
President’s birthday that I discussed earlier in the section, that took the 
conversation in certain directions. One of these was the Vice President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa’s speech declaring it time for Zimbabwe to end more than a decade of 
isolation and re-engage with the West.70 Another, and also pertinent to my 
research project, was the Minister for Water, Savior Kasukuwere, publically 
thanking the British government for aid.71 All these things added to the messiness 
of family as what looked on the surface to be a clear cut case of Zimbabwe cutting 	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70 Emmerson Mnangagwa cited in Bernard Chiketo, ‘VP Mnangagwa contradicts Mugabe’, 
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ties to the Commonwealth, turned out to be much more complex than it seemed. 
In order to illustrate this point, the following section turns to a discussion of how 
my interviewees see the Commonwealth and how they understand the decision, 
made by the Zimbabwean President, to take Zimbabwe out of the organisation.       
 
5.3 Zimbabwe: In the family way 
 
While academic studies devoted to understanding the Zimbabwean crisis have 
rarely allocated anything more than a few pages, or a chapter section, to 
Zimbabwe’s rapidly declining relationship with the Commonwealth, very few, if 
any, have addressed the issue of how Zimbabweans view their country’s departure 
from the organisation; whether they feel that not being in the Commonwealth has 
affected Zimbabwe; and whether, in the future, they see Zimbabwe coming back. 
As I pointed out earlier in the chapter, the Commonwealth keeps constant vigil 
over Zimbabwe’s possible return to the organisation. One of the greatest advocates 
for this return is the former Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal, 
who noted in his recent memoirs that, ‘One day Zimbabwe will return to the 
Commonwealth - when it is recognised on all sides that Zimbabwe did not 
leave…Mugabe did.’ 72   This observation has a legacy in the Oliver Tambo’s 
statement, cited earlier in the chapter, that, during the apartheid era, many South 
Africans claimed that in spite of the decision of the South African government to 
withdraw from the Commonwealth, the South African people felt that they had 
never left the Commonwealth family.  
 
Tambo’s statement, at first glance, might be said to be merely a reflection on the 
Commonwealth’s collective efforts, along with other anti-apartheid groups, to 
bring down the apartheid government. A closer reading, however, reveals a strong 
family element that suggests that, no matter how far you go away from your roots, 
you can never really leave your family. In light of this understanding, Ramphal’s 
comment invites us to think about the status of Zimbabweans and how they viewed 
the Commonwealth; did they feel the same way too? Without explicitly mentioning 
Ramphal’s quote directly, or raising the subject of the family at this early stage, I 
wanted to explore what leaving the Commonwealth looked like to Zimbabweans. 
Central to my rationale was the assumption, borne out in the academic literature, 
that the departure of Zimbabwe had been a snap decision, which had caught both 
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the Commonwealth and the Zimbabwean population off guard. 73  I therefore 
wanted to get a feel for how that decision had been received in wider political 
circles. I wanted to try to get deeper under the surface of Zimbabwean-
Commonwealth relations in order to reflect back on how international 
relationships can be fraught and messy. With this in mind, I began my interviews 
with the simple, yet broad, question of why Zimbabwe had left the Commonwealth. 
 
5.3.1 ‘You can never really leave a family’74 
 
Broadly, I found that many interviewees agreed with Ramphal. And while some 
couched this in humour, as one older academic put it: ‘we often joke about this by 
saying: ‘oh no, no, we are still in it. There’s one person who left,’’75 others 
approached the question from more serious political and social angles. These were 
largely politicians, either from the MDC political party or former Zanu-PF foot 
soldiers who had since broken away from the ruling party, often in a bid to form 
their own, who drew particular attention to the lack of discussion or democratic 
process that went into the decision to withdraw Zimbabwe. Some stated this 
plainly and, rather dispassionately, noting, as one interviewee, a former supporter 
and senior advisor to key figures in the Zanu-PF did, that, ‘Mugabe left the 
Commonwealth, there was no national canvassing of it,’76 while others were more 
passionate and seemed unable to hold back the anger which leaked into their 
responses. This anger was largely rooted in a sense of powerlessness over the 
situation, which reverberated, not only around the issue of the Commonwealth, 
but also around all aspects of political life in Zimbabwe. All these things were 
evident in another senior and former Zanu-PF politician’s particularly vexed 
response to my opening question:  
 
No! I don’t think that that statement is correct. I think that the 
Zimbabwean government left the Commonwealth, and even within 
the Zimbabwean government two people - Robert Mugabe and Stan 
Mudenge - said we left the Commonwealth. The people of Zimbabwe 
never were involved…If you go out into the street and ask the 
majority of Zimbabweans if it was their decision, would they leave the 
Commonwealth, I would bet 90 plus per cent of them would say ‘no.’ 
So, there was no popular process to determine that we leave. Why did 	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75 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 23 February 2015.  
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we leave? Out of spite. But this is not the only important matter in 
which the people have not been involved. 77   
 
That Mugabe, and the Foreign Minister, had made the decision alone, without 
consulting others, even in their own party, was a bone of contention which 
recurred in discussion many times with interviewees. This was a particularly 
prickly point with the older, more seasoned politicians, many of whom had once 
been affiliated with or were senior members of Zanu-PF, and at least one of whom 
had had a behind the scenes role at Lancaster House in 1979.78  
 
This last point is interesting, as not only did interviewees express anger at Mugabe 
and Mudenge for taking the Zimbabwean people out of the Commonwealth 
without consultation, and thus away from the opportunities that membership 
afforded,79 but, for some, such as this interviewee, the anger came from a rawer, 
more intimate place. This intimacy of personal connection seemingly blurs the 
boundary between the personal and the political and makes the Commonwealth 
family label seem all the more pertinent. It is worth remembering that the 
Commonwealth Secretariat - with Ramphal at the helm - played a large role in 
Zimbabwean independence. 80  For this former Zanu-PF politician, who had 
likewise played a part in his behind the scenes role at Lancaster House, watching 
the Zimbabwean President simply walk away from the Commonwealth ‘out of 
spite’ was tantamount to ‘abandoning the family that brought you into the world 
when times became difficult.’81 As one younger academic put it, ‘even if you say, ‘I 
don’t want family, I’m not part of this family, and what have you,’ you are still part 
of the family.’82  
 
The notion that you never really leave a family permeated the discourse of many 
interviewees. The frequency with which this observation appeared alongside 
humour seemed to disguise a deeper anxiety around ideas of abandonment and 
isolation. Often among younger interviewees, this tended to follow two themes: the 
idea that the Commonwealth should have done more to keep Zimbabwe in its 	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78 As I noted previously, the Lancaster House talks led to the Lancaster House Agreement, 
which was the political document that paved the way to Zimbabwean independence.  
79 Many interviewees pointed out that the loss of Commonwealth educational scholarships 
has been particularly hard on Zimbabweans.   
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family; and the sense that Zimbabwe was missing out on many of the things its 
neighbours - who were all Commonwealth members - took for granted. Beginning 
with the former, in response to the question of whether the Commonwealth had 
done enough, one rather young journalist, two years into a career with what was 
claimed to be an independent newspaper, responded: 
 
We shouldn’t have been suspended. Probably these guys should have 
found a way of, you know, people always have families, you always 
have this naughty child but you don’t chuck them out. You try and 
find a way of reforming him so that he is reformed. I think that if we 
had not been suspended we wouldn’t be where we are today, I think 
we would have reformed.83  
 
The idea that a head of state, such as Mugabe could be put on a naughty step, the 
same leader who had variously been described by some interviewees as ‘proud,’ 
‘arrogant,’ ‘stubborn,’ and a ‘modern day dictator,’ seemed impossible. When I put 
the issue of reform to politicians, some of whom, at one time or another, had 
known Mugabe reasonably well, I was told, without hesitation, that there had not 
been much hope. As the interviewee who had formerly been a special advisor to 
senior Zanu-PF politicians put it, ‘I don’t think anybody could have helped 
Mugabe, he just wanted to cement his position as king here; king forever.’84 But 
even in the most seasonal of politician’s responses some sense of abandonment 
seeped through. Turning the conversation from the Zimbabwean President to the 
plight of the Zimbabwean people, the same politician continued, ‘the Secretariat 
made a big mistake, they should’ve kept contact with Zimbabweans instead of just 
cutting off everything.’85 This sense of abandonment seemed to echo the pleas of 
the young journalist cited earlier. Although both interviewees were from different 
generations, had vastly different attachments to the Commonwealth (personal and 
professional), and were from different professional backgrounds, the feeling was 
the same: when dealing with even the most dysfunctional of family members, ‘you 
don’t chuck them out.’86 Running adjacent to the idea that you can never really 
leave a family, then, was the notion that a family can not, or should not simply 
abandon its members.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Interview with Zimbabwean Journalist, Harare, 27 February 2015b. 
84 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare 12 March 2015.  
85 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare 12 March 2015.  
86 Interview with Zimbabwean Journalist, Harare, 27 February 2015b. 
	   143	  
Similar feelings of abandonment and helplessness appeared when interviewees 
discussed their anxiety over Zimbabwe’s isolation in the area, and the fear that 
they might be missing out. For some interviewees, this sense of missing out took 
on a more literal, personal significance as one journalist, a young man in his early 
thirties with what appeared, from our conversation, to be political leanings 
towards the MDC, told me:  
 
I applied to a Canadian university in 2005 and they accepted 
everything. I don’t know who was administering my application but 
he forgot that he was processing a Zimbabwean scholarship - it was 
full cover, air ticket, to and return. Then after being granted the place 
came this bombshell, I think after about two months: ‘We’re very 
sorry, we made a big blunder, we forgot to tell you that the 
scholarships were Commonwealth scholarships and we have realised 
that Zimbabwe is not part of the Commonwealth.’…in terms of 
scholarships, in terms of health, the Commonwealth was a lifesaver of 
Zimbabwe, but now…87 
 
While for other interviewees, this manifested in negative feelings about 
Commonwealth expansion, as two older interviewees put it, new Commonwealth 
member states such as Rwanda, Mozambique, and Namibia, were, ‘ruining the 
fabric of the organisation,’88 and ‘compromising its qualities.’89  
 
The rationale behind these observations was rooted firmly in communitarian 
discourse. As many interviewees saw it, if Zimbabweans, who had an inherent 
right to be in the Commonwealth, could not be there, then why should states with 
no constitutional connection to Britain take their place when they ‘were not 
traditional members, you know?’90 Interviewees who held these opinions were 
mainly those who had connections earlier in their careers to the Lancaster House 
talks or were former Zanu-PF politicians who had since left the party with plans 
for independent political careers. Such views resonate with David Miller’s 
description of the link between shared identity and solidarity. As Miller aptly puts 
it, ‘seeing myself as a member of a community, I see myself as participating in a 
particular way of life marked off from other communities by its distinctive 
characteristics.’91 But what was intriguing, and at times seemed to escape the 	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memories of these interviewees, was that Zimbabwe was no longer officially part 
of this community, yet my interviewees still felt they had a say in family decision-
making. While interviewees had issues with new members joining the 
Commonwealth family because of the damage this might do to the ‘we-feeling’ 
among states and the shared history of the organisation, at times they failed to 
comprehend that, although through no fault on their part, their own government 
had seemingly launched a similar attack on the organisation therefore weakening 
both the ‘we-feeling’ among Commonwealth family members as well as the 
organisation’s attempts to become cosmopolitan.  
 
For anyone left questioning how the departure of Zimbabwe from the 
Commonwealth helps to problematise communitarianism, it is factors such as 
these that expressly make the Zimbabwean case so complex and interesting. It may 
appear that the Zimbabwean government officially withdrew the troubled state 
from the Commonwealth, yet there are clear differences, as we have seen, between 
the way in which Zimbabweans, and the way in which their government, 
understand the idea of withdrawal. For some, withdrawal means the President 
only, and while, at first sight, this may appear to be suggesting that citizens of a 
state can be members of an international organisation when their government is 
not, on closer inspection, under scrutiny is the question of whether the notion of 
solidarity, and the ‘we-feeling’ that accompanies it, can remain when a member of 
a family walks away from its roots. For others, who have been more personally 
affected by the withdrawal from the Commonwealth, answers to this question are 
more forthcoming. Where family members might typically be expected to help 
each other out, in situations where, for example a scholarship has been granted for 
overseas’ study, what might once have been a sense of solidarity, a ‘we feeling’ 
between Zimbabweans and other Commonwealth member states, appears to have 
depleted. There is a sense, that comes through some interviewee answers, that 
where once there was a family atmosphere of taking care of each other, of 
providing support for Zimbabwe’s future generations, now Zimbabweans have 
been left to fend for themselves. This also conveys an ambivalence about the 
Commonwealth’s collective commitment to the Zimbabwean people. If, as 
communitarian theorists argue, shared history, shared values, and solidarity are 
the seed-bed of the family or community, then this section of the chapter has 
shown that the Zimbabwean case throws up more questions in praxis than the 
theory can answer.  
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One particularly pertinent question for the purposes of my enquiry concerns the 
more nuanced sense of relations between Commonwealth states. If Zimbabwe is 
no longer an official member of the Commonwealth family, yet continues to share 
the same history and, to some extent, elements of shared culture and shared 
identity, then can relationships between Zimbabwe and Commonwealth states still 
be described in familial terms? One way to find answers is to consider how 
Zimbabweans view their relationships with other Commonwealth members 
particularly those, such as Mbeki and Obasanjo, who played a key role in 
Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the organisation. 
 
5.3.2 Brotherly betrayals… 
 
While many of my interviewees directed their anger around the issue of 
Zimbabwe’s withdrawal towards the Zimbabwean President, equally strong 
feelings of aggression shaped understanding of relationships between Zimbabwe 
and other members of the Commonwealth, who were understood to have played 
key roles in Zimbabwe’s departure. The most noteworthy of these was, 
understandably, the British government. As one young journalist, from an 
independent newspaper critical of the Zimbabwean government, told me, while 
there were many factors which contributed to Zimbabwe’s withdrawal, the most 
important, for him, was the fact that, ‘the Labour party really let us down, they 
ganged up with the other guys, Nigeria, to suspend us. We were being unjustly 
treated by the Commonwealth and Blair.’92 While there was nothing particularly 
striking in this interviewee’s response at what was, by now,  a commonly directed 
anger at the British government, what did strike me rather forcibly, and prompted 
further exploration, was the fact that in this, and many other, interviewees’ 
responses, the working mechanisms of the Commonwealth (that is, the Secretariat 
and the Ministerial Action Group - the disciplinary arm of the organisation) and 
the British government appeared to be interchangeable.  
 
Evidence for this can be found in the way that interviewees found it impossible to 
talk about the Commonwealth as a family without permeating the discourse with 
terms such as ‘hierarchy,’ ‘fathers,’ or ‘power.’ When I questioned interviewees on 
the difference between the Commonwealth and Britain, one academic, a man in his 
late thirties with Zanu-PF leanings, noted that the two were deeply connected 
because: 	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[the Commonwealth], it’s a family of former British colonies and 
Britain being the coloniser. We might not talk about the father 
officially, but everyone knows that in every family member’s mind 
there is some sense of the father. And this father, naturally the name 
that will crop up is Britain. Because it was the coloniser and even, 
whatever they do, who is the biggest funder. Who gives more. If we 
say, ‘no we have no father, there is no father here we are all equal now 
because we are independent states who have come together because 
we have this shared history and so forth and so forth,’ then one 
person comes and says, ‘how did we come to have this shared 
history?’ We came to have this shared history because of this one who 
colonised all of us. And we are appearing like the same because of this 
one. And we can say, who is giving more to the others? So, the one 
who is giving more to the others becomes the bigger brother, or like 
the father. So, you can’t talk about the Commonwealth without 
talking about Britain as the leader of the Commonwealth.93  
 
Answers such as these were often delivered to questions around aid and human 
rights. As some interviewees saw this, what a government did with its money was 
its business to decide; as one white MDC politician noted, ‘I think that’s very 
important. If you put aid without conditions, I think you’re being stupid.’94 For 
other interviewees, however, such as the young female civil society operative 
discussed earlier the chapter, denying aid was ‘against the declaration of human 
rights.’95 At this point, in most interviews, the conversation often turned back to 
the land issue. When I asked interviewees whether they agreed with the young 
journalist cited earlier in this section, that  the British government had ‘ganged 
up on Zimbabwe,’ some were conflicted. At the heart of this confliction was the 
issue of the British government’s decision to cut off funding for land which was, 
as a much older, seasoned journalist, who was exiled in South Africa, told me, ‘a 
crushing of their [Britain’s] moral obligation.’96 This last phrase is interesting as 
the idea of a moral obligation speaks to a thicker sense of ethics between states 
and underscores the idea of the Commonwealth as communitarian.  
 
I raised the issue of moral obligations with the ex-senior Zanu-PF politician, who 
I interviewed on the final day before leaving Zimbabwe. Armed, by now, with 
what I believed was a better, deeper understanding of the messiness of 	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Zimbabwean politics, along with multiple viewpoints of how Zimbabweans 
viewed Zimbabwe’s position in regional and international relations, I began with 
the usual probing around the issue of Zimbabwe’s withdrawal. As the 
conversation headed in what had commonly, in other interviews at least, been the 
direction of the Labour government, the land issue, and obligations, the 
interviewee began talking of other factors. Slightly confused about why the 
conversation was going this way, I raised the subject of Clare Short and the 
infamous letter. I was surprised, and slightly taken aback, when my interviewee 
responded: ‘I want you to educate me, where in the Lancaster House Agreement 
did the UK make a commitment?’ 97  While, by now, I had become more 
accustomed to the frequency of ‘catastrophic encounters’ in interview situations, 
this was the first time an interviewee had defended the British government. 
 
The inconsistencies in my interviewees’ approach to the British role in 
Zimbabwe’s departure could be viewed as confusion around the separation of 
Britain and the workings of the Commonwealth Secretariat and its accompanying 
mechanisms. In the eyes of some interviewees, Britain is the father who, in the 
words of the academic interviewee cited above, suddenly stops ‘giving more to 
others,’98 while for others, Britain was merely a scapegoat for the Zimbabwean 
government’s problems. Opinions were mixed on the role of Britain, where some 
blamed the British, other interviewees were just as keen to detail the ways in 
which other members of the Commonwealth had betrayed Zimbabwe and, in 
some renditions of the story, even turned on each other. The two main figures in 
most interviewee responses, as in the academic literature, were Mbeki and 
Obasanjo. On Zimbabwe’s betrayal by Mbeki, the former senior advisor to Zanu-
PF politicians explained:  
 
National agendas came first, especially Mbeki, looking back now, 
Mbeki has been a disaster for Zimbabwe because he had a very 
curious, the idea of South African civil power is what drove his 
foreign policy, you know? In which case all others became secondary. 
And this is why he clashed with Obasanjo. who had the same idea. 
And, of course, the International Community, the Western countries 
in particular, tended to play one against the other.99 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 20 March 2015. 
98 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 3 March 2015. 
99 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 12 March 2015.  
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Views such as these seemed to betray a sense of loss, which related to the 
perception that a short time ago it was Zimbabwe that was in the position of 
strength, Zimbabwe that had the capacity, the power, and the political autonomy 
to assist South Africa which had been, as another former Zanu-PF politician 
described it, ‘completely wild.’100 Now Mbeki had been given the chance to repay 
South Africa’s neighbours, for this interviewee, his efforts were seen more as 
efforts to help South Africa.  
 
More overtly aggressive feelings are expressed towards Obasanjo, who, as the 
former Zanu-PF advisor explained, ‘put the knife in.’101 As he saw it Mbeki had 
tried to help Zimbabwe, it was Obasanjo who had ‘let down Zimbabwe.’ 102 When I 
probed for more detail to get a better insight into the idea that Obasanjo had 
betrayed his Zimbabwean ‘brothers,’ the young academic with MDC leanings told 
me:  
 
For Zimbabwean now, to be suspended then the interpretation was 
that Nigeria-Obasanjo is a traitor because he sided with Howard, 
because Mbeki could not do that to Zimbabwe. So, the gossip was that 
some African countries needed to be decolonised because they are 
siding with whites to fight other African countries. If you put two 
African countries and one country with white people and then they 
are supposed to preside over an African country and they suspend an 
African country it means it’s two votes and that vote I think it was for 
Obasanjo and Obasanjo became…was never liked, was demonised.103 
 
This was not the first time the idea of white member states ‘taking sides’ had come 
up in interviews. Both in my interviewee responses, and in the academic 
literature, the notion that white Commonwealth states stick together, is frequently 
noted. 104  By siding with the decision to suspend Zimbabwe, Obasanjo was 
effectively couched under the umbrella of the white states.  
 
When I put the issue of Obasanjo and Mbeki as traitors to the same former Zanu-
PF politician who had effectively let the British off the hook for the land 
compensation issue, he put what seemed to be his usual diplomatic spin on the 
issue when he explained, ‘I don’t see things that way, I certainly don’t believe they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 20 March 2015. 
101 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 12 March 2015. 
102 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 12 March 2015. 
103 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 4 March 2015.  
104 This is typically explained in terms of the ‘A, B, C ’ or Western states (Australia, Britain, 
Canada, New Zealand).  
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were betraying Zimbabwe.’105 This answer was in stark contrast to the previous 
descriptions by other interviewees of Obasanjo and Mbeki as back-stabbing 
traitors to the Zimbabwean cause. However, when I pointed out this contrast to 
the former Zanu-PF interviewee, I was surprised by the change in tone when he 
told me, ‘in a sense, I think it was because of their softly-softly approach to 
Mugabe that we ended up where we are.’106 This was an intriguing answer, while 
exonerating Obasanjo and Mbeki from the yoke of betrayal on the one hand, the 
interviewee then re-attached blame to the Nigerian and South African leaders for 
their inaction on the other. As he saw it, rather than take sides or put their own 
state’s interest first, the two African leaders had followed the tradition of 
respecting their elders actions, which had effectively let Mugabe off the hook.  
 
This discussion of Zimbabweans’ understanding of their treatment by other 
members of the Commonwealth gives a picture of relations between states that is 
far from formulaic. The sense of erraticism that permeated my interviewee 
answers around their opinion of who were the traitors and who were the good 
siblings is an integral part of what makes the Commonwealth intriguing. What is 
striking, especially in relation to both positive and negative views of the different 
political actors and governments involved in the suspension of Zimbabwe, is the 
extent to which my interviewees’ explanations and responses to questions about 
Zimbabwean-Commonwealth relations were grounded in analogies drawn from 
familial context. Such analogies, which have their roots in colonialism, as we saw 
in Chapter 2, as well as notions of pan-Africanism, provide interesting glimpses 
into how the Commonwealth as a family is seen from a non-Western angle.  
 
It is difficult to say with certainty whether the perceived betrayal of Zimbabwe by 
Britain, Nigeria, and South Africa has tarnished or diluted what I argue is a 
thicker sense of relations between international/Commonwealth post-colonial 
states. But the seemingly raw sense of betrayal that was conveyed through many 
of my interviewees’ responses speaks to a continued sense of thickness. Such a 
finding challenges the main tenets of communitarianism by providing a much 
messier and more nuanced understanding of international relations. It was with 
this messiness in mind, that I put the question of Zimbabwe’s return to the 
Commonwealth to my interviewees. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 20 March 2015. 
106 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 20 March 2015. 
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5.3.3 Returning to the fold? 
 
On the subject of Zimbabwe’s return to the family, with the exception of one 
Zanu-PF politician and prominent member of the War Veteran’s Association in 
Zimbabwe, responses seemed to support return. Nevertheless, all interviewees 
recognised that Zimbabwe could not return under Mugabe’s rule. The young 
journalist whose aspirations to study in Canada had fell through because of 
Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth, described how he saw the 
situation clearly: ‘When the President goes off into the sun-set, the 
Commonwealth is going to be one of the first doors that we knock at.’107 When I 
delicately raised the subject of Mugabe’s replacement, and what I had understood 
from the media to be past Zanu-PF animosity towards the Commonwealth, the 
former Zanu-PF politician told me:   
 
The people of Zimbabwe, including some high up people in the Zanu-
PF are aware of these benefits of the Commonwealth. I would bet my 
last dollar. At the earliest, Zimbabwe will rejoin the Commonwealth. 
If I am still around, that is one of the things I would agitate for quite 
strongly.108 
 
In support of this line of thinking and, likewise, weighing up the choices of 
Mugabe’s replacement, the white MDC politician noted, with confidence, that: ‘If 
Mnangagwa were to become president tomorrow, I’m almost certain he would 
take us back to the Commonwealth.’109 That both politicians could speak with 
such certainty went some way to addressing my confusion around the issue of 
why certain members of the Zanu-PF were taking tentative steps to reconnect 
with the West, but not the Commonwealth.110 The Commonwealth remained an 
open sore for the ‘proud,’ ‘stubborn’ Mugabe, who, as the same MDC politician 
put it, ‘would like to go back into the Commonwealth, but I think he understands 
that it’s simply not possible…there’s no chance while he’s alive of us joining the 
Commonwealth.’111 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Interview with Zimbabwean Journalist, Harare, 27 February 2015a. 
108 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 20 March 2015.  
109 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 26 February 2015. 
110 This was the contrast between reports that claimed Zimbabwe would never re-join the 
Commonwealth and reports that the Vice President and other members of the government 
had thanked the British for their financial assistance.  
111 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 26 February 2015. 
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In spite of the desire of many interviewees for Zimbabwe’s return, the notion of 
returning to the family was not a concept to which all interviewees gave happy 
assent. One notable interviewee, a war veteran and politician in the Zimbabwean 
Foreign Office, noted in response to my question, ‘the schism between Zimbabwe 
and the British is a reflection of those who want to go back to the past.’ 112 The 
same interviewee provided the ‘marital rape’ epigraph at the beginning of this 
chapter. His technique in making this statement essentially follows what 
Blessing-Miles Tendi, following Terence Ranger, calls ‘patriotic history.’113 This is 
the way in which Robert Mugabe has manipulated the historical narrative in 
Zimbabwe to cast Britain in the role of the neo-colonial aggressor attempting to 
re-colonise the Southern African state. As Mugabe frequently reiterates in his 
speeches and in the media, the British government wants to reclaim Zimbabwe as 
a British colony. A return to the Commonwealth, then, as my interviewee saw it, 
would be a return to the past of servitude when, ‘Zimbabwe is aspiring to a new 
future.’114  
 
But, if for some interviewees, such as the war veteran, returning to the past was a 
return to the dark side of colonial history, others had a much different 
understanding. It is difficult to do justice to the richness and difference in 
interviewee responses to what they perceived as the reasons behind Zimbabwe’s 
return, yet, when it came to specific details about why they thought Zimbabwe 
would return to the Commonwealth answers largely followed two lines of 
thinking. First, there were the responses which viewed a return to the 
Commonwealth as essential to Zimbabwe’s recovery. These were largely focused 
around economic recovery, cooperation, and interdependence, as one academic 
of international politics and journalism put it, ‘technical assistance is crucial 
because we lost a lot of experience through death and lack of continuity as people 
moved away.’115 Responses, such as these, were also accompanied by a discussion 
of shared values, as the journalist with aspirations to study in Canada pointed 
out, ‘with the Harare Declarations, Zimbabwe was supposed to be the anchor of 
human rights,’116 by returning to the Commonwealth interviewees believed that 
the organisation could provide the ‘checks and balances’ 117  needed to put 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 11 March 2015. 
113 Tendi, Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe; Ranger, ‘Nationalist historiography, 
patriotic history and the history of the nation’. 
114 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 11 March 2015. 
115 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 3 March 2015. 
116 Interview with Zimbabwean Journalist, Harare, 27 February 2015a. 
117 Interview with Zimbabwean Civil Society Operative, Harare, 12 March 2015b. 
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Zimbabwe back on track. But if my interviewees’ first line of thinking was 
practical, then all other answers largely fell into a more sentimental category. 
Time and again, interviewees described the return in terms of practical recovery, 
but what is intriguing was the discursive pattern these answers generally 
appeared to follow. What often began as a discussion of economic recovery and 
technical expertise quite often, in the case of many interviewees, ended with a 
discussion of shared history. The international relations and journalism 
academic from Harare Polytechnic, summed up the ideas of many, when he 
noted: 
 
In the Commonwealth we are talking about years and years of 
working together, linked together, education together, and whether 
it was exploitative on other people’s part or whether one was 
benefitting and one wasn’t benefitting, that experience is very 
important and cannot be washed away.’118 
 
Common to many interviewee responses was the underlying assumption that 
whatever had happened to take Zimbabwe out of the Commonwealth, shared 
history was important. Through the eyes of these interviewees, returning to the 
Commonwealth would be a return to the family they knew, the family they grew 
up with, and, as one politician put it, these things provided ‘continuity and 
stability’ to a state which had largely lost its way.119  
 
5.4 Conclusions: The trouble with family 
 
 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I drew upon three common strands, which run through 
the writing of most communitarian theorists: inheritance, shared values, and 
solidarity. These three elements, I argued, are understood to be the backbone of 
the communitarian thesis, which posits that answers to ethical questions about 
our identities and responsibilities are tied very much to questions of who we are 
and where we come from. From an IR perspective, communitarian theorists 
typically argue that our identities and responsibilities sit within the borders of the 
state. Nevertheless, as I have argued, the Commonwealth blurs the lines of 
communitarian understanding, firstly, with its discursive application of the family 
label, which, as we saw in Chapter 2, left the confines of the domestic in the 
middle of the nineteenth century and took on a more international perspective, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Interview with Zimbabwean Academic, Harare, 3 March 2015. 
119 Interview with Zimbabwean Politician (MDC), Harare, 26 February 2015. 
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thus presenting a thicker understanding of relations between states on an 
international level. And, secondly, by showing a messier, more troubled, and 
therefore more realistic, view of the family and the community than is typically 
put forward by many communitarian theorists, who often equate inheritance, 
shared values, and solidarity with harmony and homogeneity.  
  
In its examination of the case of Zimbabwe, this chapter has offered an amplified 
understanding of this messiness by showing how the different views of 
Zimbabwean elites, around questions of Zimbabwe-Commonwealth relations, 
help trouble the idea of family. What is immediately noteworthy, in this respect, is 
the somewhat schizophrenic way in which Zimbabweans describe themselves as 
both on the inside and on the outside of the Commonwealth family. The idea that 
you can never really leave a family, the positioning of Obasanjo and Mbeki 
simultaneously as brothers and traitors, and the claims that Zimbabweans are ‘the 
most British-like of all Africans,’ all go some way to explaining why Zimbabwe is 
an exemplary case for problematising the communitarian thesis. This is because 
Zimbabwe’s relationship with the Commonwealth illustrates the malleability of 
the family as a dense and unstable entity. Family, by this account, does not 
conform to the ‘haven in a heartless world’ as described by some 
communitarians, 120  but is more closely connected to something raw and 
emotional. Families can nurture, love, and protect, but they can also abuse, 
damage, and betray. This supports my argument that the Commonwealth 
problematises communitarian theory, and also opens up new ways of thinking 
about how the notion of the Commonwealth as a family is viewed from different 
regional perspectives across the family itself. 
 
Zimbabwe offers a picture of a contradiction that would no doubt be understood 
as troublesome to communitarian theorists. And yet, as I have shown here, 
Zimbabwe’s much thicker, messier, and complex relationship with the 
Commonwealth family is in fact much more typical of behaviour in inherited 
relationships. Families fight, they get angry with each other, do not speak for 
years, sometimes come back together, sometimes not. The Commonwealth has 
perhaps been brought through the case of Zimbabwe to a sharper intimation of 
the true nature of family than ever before. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New York and 
London: Norton and Company, 1995). 
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I think the Commonwealth is a family where there are many failings, 
and failings do not come from only one part of that family. Each family 
has its own failings, but when they come together then they share good 
practices to overcome those failings and that is why Rwanda sees it as 
very important to be part of the Commonwealth. There is a lot we are 
going to gain from it, there is also a lot we are going to contribute to 
the wellbeing of the Commonwealth. 
 
- Paul Kagame (Commonwealth Day Speech, 2010) 
 	  
Rwanda is starting afresh, like from zero…Rwanda is, I might say, now 
20 years old because everything is starting to catch up...molding 
Rwanda will be easier than molding Zimbabwe. 
 -­‐ Rwandan Civil Society Operative (23 January 2015) 
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6 
 
 
Rwanda and the cosmopolitan Commonwealth  
 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the views and opinions of 
Zimbabwean elites who, despite Zimbabwe’s withdrawal, continue to see 
themselves as members of the Commonwealth family, make Zimbabwe an 
exemplar case for problematising communitarianism and its tendency to package 
communities/the domestic arena as neat spaces where shared history, memory, 
language, and identity all point towards solidarity and a ‘we-feeling.’ In this 
chapter, I’m going to demonstrate why Rwanda is an exemplary case for 
problematising the Commonwealth’s attempts to rebrand itself as cosmopolitan 
by drawing on the views and opinions of Rwandan elites who see the 
Commonwealth as an attempt to leave behind their country’s own troubled 
francophone communitarian past. This, in itself, is potentially problematic as the 
Rwandan government has ushered in a number of laws regarding identity, as well 
as making English the official second language in Rwanda. All these things point 
to the fact that many francophone Rwandans are being left behind. With this in 
mind, we might question the extent to which Rwanda can actually help the 
Commonwealth to realise its cosmopolitanism. Is Rwanda the ideal member state 
that will rescue the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitan aspirations, or is it simply 
another addition to the family ‘jamboree’?1 
 
It has become something of a cliché for Commonwealth officials to respond to 
questions about the continued relevance of the organisation with the observation 
that a number of countries with no previous connection to the former colonial 
power, 2  such as Burundi and Madagascar, are evincing an interest in 
membership. 3  Each of these states has, in recent years, been accused by 
international human rights organisations of having more than questionable 
approaches to human rights promotion and protection, particularly in the areas of 
speech freedoms, freedom of association, unlawful killings, and the arbitrary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This refers to the Tom Porteous quote I have cited a number of times in the thesis, that 
the Commonwealth is a ‘jamboree of repression.’  
2 This also supports the claim that I have been making throughout the thesis that the  
Commonwealth has a tendency to exaggerate its uniqueness. 
3 Mayall, ‘Introduction’, 1; te Velde, The Commonwealth Brand. 
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arrest of opposition party members, civil society workers, and journalists. 4 
Although these states have yet to initiate any serious moves in the direction of 
official admission processes, there have been, in the past two decades, two 
successful membership bids from African states with no previous colonial links to 
Britain; these are Mozambique and Rwanda.5 While the inclusion of both states 
has had an effect on the identity of the Commonwealth, it is Rwanda’s 
membership that has had both the greatest effect on and the greatest 
repercussions for the future of the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism.6  
 
The aim of the chapter is to interrogate the claim that Rwanda is the poster-child 
for the Commonwealth’s continued attempts to realise its cosmopolitanism. It 
looks at the ways in which Rwandans view their status as the newest member of 
the Commonwealth, whether they think that joining the Commonwealth has had 
an effect on Rwanda, and conversely whether they think Rwanda’s membership 
has had an effect on the Commonwealth. To date, little attention has been paid to 
Rwanda in the corpus of Commonwealth literature,7 for a state which potentially 
has had a profound effect on the future direction of the Commonwealth’s 
membership and expansion, the lack of attention is puzzling.8  
 
This chapter makes an important corrective to this lack of attention, notably by 
the inclusion of empirical data, for the first time in the literature derived from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Human Rights Watch has produced a number of reports on the human rights failings of 
both of these states. The recent political turbulence in Burundi and the ensuing civil war 
along with the President’s threats to the African Union have, at least for the moment, 
sealed Burundi’s fate as a perpetual Commonwealth member-in-waiting. For the latest 
analysis of the situation in Burundi see: Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016. 
Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf. 
5 Cameroon also joined the organisation in 1995 but was considered a member of the 
family as it had been administered by Britain and France under a League of Nations, and 
then UN, mandate from 1922. For background on the relationship between Mozambique 
and the Commonwealth see: Olusola Akinrinade, ‘Mozambique and the Commonwealth: 
The anatomy of a relationship’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 38, no. 1 
(1992): 62-82. For an analysis on Mozambique’s accession to the Commonwealth see: te 
Velde, The Commonwealth Brand. 
6 As I outlined in Chapter 4, one of the greatest norm changes was the new membership 
criteria. Rwanda became the first country to join the organisation under the new rules.  
7 Jones, ‘Rwanda: The way forward’; Georgina Holmes, ‘Rwanda and the Commonwealth: 
The evolution of the BBC’s institutional narrative on the Rwandan genocide’, The Round 
Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 200, no. 416 (2011): 519-530 
and te Velde, The Commonwealth Brand, although all short pieces, have produced the 
only works to date which address Rwandan-Commonwealth issues.  
8 It is possible that Rwanda’s membership is simply too new for the usual Commonwealth 
observers to write about, or that the vast body of literature on Rwanda in the aftermath of 
genocide is large enough to accommodate or overlap with some concerns held by 
Commonwealth observers.  
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interviews with elites that I carried out in Rwanda in January and February 2015. 
I conducted approximately 10 semi-structured interviews with a range of elites 
mainly in the  capital city of Kigali. These included civil society representatives 
from national and international organisations, political activists, trade unionists, 
youth leaders, and academics. While most interviewees were Rwandan, one of 
these interviews was with the French Programme coordinator of an INGO, which 
was affiliated with the Commonwealth. Additional information was gathered 
through a meeting with the British High Commissioner in Kigali as well as 
through the connections of a German contact, who acted as gatekeeper to my 
gaining access to local Rwandan civil society organisations. The information 
gathered from elites enabled me to get a deeper insight into the political landscape 
in Rwanda, to understand Rwandan opinions on the government’s decision to join 
the Commonwealth, and to get a feel for any effects Commonwealth membership 
had ushered in. 
 
The decision to focus on elites was based on several elements. First, Rwanda’s 
decision to join the Commonwealth was entirely a top-down governmental 
decision and, as a result, to date, it is largely only the elites in Rwanda that know 
that the Commonwealth exists. A second benefit of interviewing elites was that 
many had been involved in, or had attended the few Commonwealth meetings 
that were set up by the Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit in Kigali to give 
Rwandans a better understanding of the Commonwealth.9 Therefore, as I outlined 
above, my group of respondents included mostly actors who belonged to various 
circles of interest and involvement. Some of my interviewees had a loose 
connection to the Commonwealth through working for large INGOs with 
Commonwealth observer status or as Commonwealth youth leaders, while others 
simply engaged in or observed Rwandan politics. Finally, my decision was also 
based on the nature of my research and the conditions on the ground. During my 
first week in Rwanda, I undertook a meeting with a contact from a Western INGO 
who agreed to act as gatekeeper to my contact with local Rwandan civil society 
organisations. Following a small focus group, in which we discovered that many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit - now the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau - is 
an independent think-tank and advisory service for the Commonwealth. One of the 
services provided by the Bureau is to offer ‘confidential and impartial advice to countries 
interested in applying to join the Commonwealth.’ For an overview from the point of view 
of the Rwandan English speaking state media of the Bureau’s pre-membership meeting in 
Kigali see Eddie Mukaaya, ‘Rwanda to be a trusted Commonwealth partner - Museminali’, 
The New Times, 6 August, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2008-08-06/44928/. 
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local civil society organisations knew next-to-nothing about the Commonwealth, I 
decided to rely primarily on elite interviews in Kigali. Given the fact that the 
Commonwealth is attempting to be cosmopolitan which means reaching each and 
every Commonwealth citizen in its so-called family, this discovery in itself was 
particularly noteworthy. That most local civil society organisations had never 
heard of the Commonwealth, in spite of the organisation’s civil society networks 
and technical assistance programmes, suggests that the organisation’s desire to be 
cosmopolitanism has rather a long way to go.  
 
While elite interviews were my main source of data collection, they were set 
against information I gained from reading INGO and Commonwealth reports, by 
studying local Rwandan media related to Rwanda’s application and accession to 
the Commonwealth, and by informal discussion with ordinary Rwandans that I 
met on a daily basis in and around the neighbourhood in which I stayed during 
my fieldwork. During my time in Kigali, I stayed at a hostel in the central 
government and business district of Kigali that was owned by the Aegis Trust, a 
British NGO which also helped to fund the Rwandan Genocide Memorial 
Museum. The hostel was a popular lunch venue for many of the businesses - 
banks, universities, embassies - in the area and provided a rich source of 
information and conversation around issues relating to my research. Additionally, 
I was able to gain insight into some of the more practical issues my interviewees 
conveyed to me, simply from close observation, as I moved in and around the 
capital city. Particularly interesting in this regard was the large amount of English 
in and around the capital city - on billboards which often gave important health 
information, and on road signs and street markings, in spite of the fact that few 
taxi or moto drivers spoke English. From these observations, it was clear that 
English was being quite aggressively pushed as the official second language.10  
 
As I had only limited time in Rwanda, I wanted to target Anglophone elites, which 
would cut out the need for a translator, as well as stay faithful to the idea of the 
Commonwealth as an Anglophone ‘family of nations.’ As I mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter, the change from French to English as the official second 
language is potentially problematic and has become a divisive issue in Rwanda. 
English is the language of the President and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a report and analysis on the change to English in Rwandan advertising see Tove 
Rosendal, ‘Linguistic markets in Rwanda: Language use in advertisements and on signs’, 
Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 30 (2009): 19-39. 
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government as well as the language of many returnees to Rwanda from 
neighbouring East African states, while French is regarded largely as the language 
of the perpetrators of the genocide in 1994. I will return to this idea of language 
and division at later stages in chapter. What is significant about this observation is 
that, had I selected Francophone interviewees to answer questions about the 
Commonwealth, it is likely that I would have received rather different answers to 
the questions that I asked. In interviewing Anglophone elites, then, I wanted to 
get a sense of how joining the Commonwealth had been received in a state that 
was still very fragile, and how Rwandans thought their experience and skills of 
reparation were beneficial to the Commonwealth. My discussions aimed to get 
answers to three main questions. First, what did they think drew Rwanda to the 
Commonwealth when it was already a part of the Francophonie? Second, what 
effect did they think Commonwealth membership had had on Rwanda? (What 
gains had the country received to date?) Third, how did they think that the 
Commonwealth had benefitted from Rwanda’s membership?11 
 
Spending time in Rwanda, and gaining some sense of how the change from 
French to English had been an attempt by the Rwandan government to ‘re-
imagine national identity’ and draw clear lines between victims and perpetrators 
in the wake of the 1994 genocide,12 I wanted to test two potential sources of 
disjuncture that had the potential to frustrate the Commonwealth’s understanding 
of Rwanda’s position as the poster-child of the ideal-utopian cosmopolitan 
Commonwealth. First, was Rwanda’s application anything more than one in a 
series of maneuvers to cut ties with the Francophonie and push the French-as-
perpetrators agenda?13 Was it a mutually beneficial point-scoring exercise by both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As I noted earlier in the chapter, I have supplemented interview data with quotes from 
political figures in Rwanda around the time of Rwanda’s application for membership. 
These are all from Anglophone sources.   
12 This is David Kiwuwa’s phrase. Since the genocide, the Rwandan government has 
passed a series of thought and speech crimes designed to outlaw divisionism. For further 
analysis on the laws and their affects on the Rwandan nation see: David Kiwuwa, Ethnic 
Politics and Democratic Transition in Rwanda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012); Andrea 
Purdeková, ‘Building a nation in Rwanda? De-ethnicisation and its discontents’, Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 8, no. 3 (2008): 502-23; Susanne Buckley-Zistel 
‘Remembering to forget: Chosen amnesia as a strategy for local coexistence in post-
genocidal Rwanda’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 76, no. 2 
(2006): 131-50. 
13 Rwanda has retained its ties with the French organisation despite the animosity. See  
Ruadhan Maccormaic, ‘Sarkozy visit to Rwanda a milestone in relations’, The Irish Times, 
25 February 2010. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/opinion/sarkozy-visit-to-rwanda-a-
milestone-in-relations-1.627505.  
	   160	  
Rwanda and Britain against old rivalries with the French government?14 And 
second, did this have any connection to the reasons why the Rwandan 
government’s increasingly draconian approach to human rights promotion and 
protection had been overlooked by Commonwealth heads of state during the 
application process; despite widespread opposition by NGOs? In effect, I wanted 
to interrogate a claim made by Will Jones, one of a very small number of critics to 
devote attention to Rwanda’s Commonwealth membership since its admission, 
that Rwanda was, ‘an important test case for the Commonwealth’s attempted 
transformation into a relevant international organisation animated by adherence 
to principles of liberalism and democracy.’ 15  My own suspicions were that 
Rwanda’s accession to the Commonwealth was more of a case of the continuation 
of the Rwandan government’s attempts to unite Rwandans behind the idea of one 
national identity, while also maintaining what had by now become President 
Kagame’s savvy dealings with the international donor community.16  
 
The chapter proceeds in four parts. In the first section, I provide some 
background to Rwanda’s application for Commonwealth membership. This was a 
process that took approximately fifteen years. I discuss the general consensus 
among Commonwealth Heads of Government around Rwanda joining the 
organisation in contrast with strict opposition by human rights groups that 
culminated in a eighty-one page document, outlining reasons against Rwanda’s 
membership, produced by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI).17 
In the second section, I examine the Rwandan government’s motivations for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Discussing the issue of Rwanda’s accession to the Commonwealth and the potential anti-
French agenda, one Zimbabwean Politician informed me that he believed that when the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) had first been set up there was an 
attempt, as he saw it, a suggestion by the British, to keep out Francophone states. 
Interview with Zimbabwean Politician, Harare, 12 March 2015. 
15 Jones, ‘Rwanda: The way forward’: 347. 
16 It is widely understood that Kagame is the darling of the international donor 
community. As I discuss briefly later in the chapter, Jonathan Fisher has suggested that 
Rwanda has proactively sought to emphasise the view of itself as a ‘development success 
story.’ See Jonathan Fisher, ‘Image management’ in East Africa: Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya 
and their donors’, in Images of Africa: Creation, Negation and Subversion, eds. Julia 
Gallagher and V. Y. Mudimbe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 63-85. 
See also: Rachel Hayman, ‘Rwanda: Milking the cow: Creating policy in spite of aid 
dependence’, in The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors, ed. 
Lindsay Whitfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 156-84; Patricia Crisafulli and 
Andrea Redmond, Rwanda, Inc.: How a Devastated Nation Became an Economic Model 
for the Developing World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
17 The CHRI is an independent, non-partisan, international non-governmental 
organisation, mandated to ensure the practical realisation of human rights in the countries 
of the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Rwanda’s 
Application for Membership of the Commonwealth: Report and Recommendations 
(London, New Delhi, and Accra: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2009). 
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joining the Commonwealth and discuss how interviewees describe the reasons for 
Rwanda’s accession, and the extent to which they believe that Commonwealth 
membership has had an effect on Rwanda. In the third section, I turn the question 
around and discuss the ways in which interviewees conceive the Commonwealth, 
in the context of what Rwanda’s membership brings to the Commonwealth. I 
examine their sense of Rwanda’s position as the newest member of the 
Commonwealth, and member with no historical connections to the rest of the 
group, and the ways in which they believe Rwanda’s experience of major loss and 
recovery can help heal the rifts in the Commonwealth family. In the concluding 
section, I return to the idea of the ideal, forward-looking, cosmopolitan 
organisation from Chapter 4, and discuss the ways in which Rwanda’s 
membership has been used as a tool for the Commonwealth to remain relevant, 
and the repercussions this might have on the organisation’s future. 
 
6.1. Background: Rwanda’s accession  
 
Rwanda joined the Commonwealth in 2009, following an official review of the 
organisation’s membership criteria, which had been formalised in 1997 after the 
accession of Mozambique. 18  While Mozambique’s application had been 
unanimously endorsed as a ‘unique and special case,’ given the country’s role in 
supporting anti-apartheid efforts and its unofficial status as a ‘cousin’ of the 
Commonwealth,19 Rwanda’s application, was potentially a more divisive matter. 
As a state with no constitutional connection to Britain and no connection of 
historical or familial worth, Rwanda’s application presented the Commonwealth 
with something of a dilemma: change the rules and allow a more open and 
inclusive Commonwealth, thus risking the dilution of one of the Commonwealth’s 
essential features - its unique family atmosphere; or, turn Rwanda away and 
relinquish the chance to grow its ailing cosmopolitanism by becoming a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Until the application of Mozambique, the Commonwealth had no official written 
application procedure or criteria. Since Mozambique was a special case it was reviewed 
without criteria, but following interest in the Commonwealth by a number of states, the 
organisation officially adopted membership criteria at the Heads of Government Meeting 
in Kampala in 2007. See Commonwealth Secretariat, Membership of the Commonwealth: 
Report of the Committee on Commonwealth Membership. For further discussion on 
expansion and membership criteria, see W. David McIntyre, ‘The expansion of the 
Commonwealth and the criteria for membership’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 97, no. 395 (2008): 273-85. 
19 te Velde, The Commonwealth Brand, 96.  
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universal organisation that could, for the first time, claim to put shared values 
above the uniqueness of shared history.20  
 
For many of the Commonwealth’s keenest observers, the state of Rwanda’s fragile 
recovery, following the 1994 genocide, made the decision to admit the troubled 
state risky.21 While on the one hand, evidence showed that Rwandans were more 
prosperous and safer, as far as health issues were concerned, than ever before, as 
Frederick Golooba-Mutebo and Valarie Chambers have pointed out, Rwandan 
women were less likely to die in childbirth, more children were in school, and 
there was a substantial decrease in malaria; 22 on the other hand, the RPF-led 
government in Rwanda practices a deft authoritarianism which it claims is a 
necessary measure to ensure that ethnic violence does not return to Rwanda.23 
The Rwandan government had initiated a number of policies which fit the 
contours of social engineering around a ‘uniform vision’ which outlawed ethnicity 
as a form of identity.24 For the CHRI, the decision to admit Rwanda would set a 
precedent for future applications, it was therefore critical that it was made with 
care and consideration for human rights and democracy. 25  Under the new 
Commonwealth membership criteria, states needed to be willing to commit 
themselves to support for peace, liberty, and international cooperation and stand 
out against racial discrimination, colonial domination, and wide disparities of 
wealth.26 They needed also to demonstrate a commitment to democracy and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I have shown in the previous chapter how some states - even those that are no longer 
officially Commonwealth members, such as Zimbabwe - think that new members of the 
Commonwealth, without the constitutional connection to Britain, are ruining the fabric of 
the organisation.  
21 Academics from the Institute for Commonwealth Studies in London and civil society 
organisations attached to the Commonwealth opposed Rwanda’s membership. There is an 
enormous literature on Rwanda post-genocide. See, for instance, Filip Reyntjens, 
‘Rwanda, Ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship’, African Affairs 103, no. 411 
(2004): 177-210; Timothy Longman and Theoneste Rutagengwa, ‘Memory, identity, and 
community in Rwanda’, in My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the 
Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, eds. Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 162-82. 
22 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and Valerie Chambers, Is the Bride too Beautiful?: Safe 
Motherhood in Rural Rwanda (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2012). 
23 Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, ‘Introduction: Seeing like a post-conflict state’, in 
Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, eds. Scott 
Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 4.  
24 Kiwuwa, Ethnic Politics and Democratic Transition in Rwanda.  
25 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Rwanda’s Application for Membership of the 
Commonwealth. 
26 John Collinge, ‘Criteria for Commonwealth membership’, The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 85, no. 339 (2008): 279-86. 
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democratic processes, good governance, and protection of human rights.27 While 
Rwanda could demonstrate a democratic process, its commitment to other civil 
and political rights, such as freedom of expression and association, was a different 
matter, and this posed serious problems for the CHRI.  
 
For heads of state in support of Rwanda’s application,28 there were at least two 
issues with Rwanda’s human rights problems that worked in Rwanda’s favour: 
first, the British government saw Rwanda’s accession to the Commonwealth as a 
way to ‘consolidate a post-genocide democracy with development,’29 but it also 
viewed it through the lens of ancient francophobe prejudice; and second, the loss 
of Zimbabwe six years before had left the Commonwealth with an open wound 
that had damaged its attempts to rebrand itself as an international organisation 
with a cosmopolitan outlook. What was needed was a new moral project around 
which the Commonwealth could repair itself and, for this reason, Rwanda was an 
attractive prospect. Recovering from genocide, Rwanda had shown remarkable 
speed of recovery and progress.30 With none of the heavy weight of familial 
baggage, Rwanda was a blank canvass onto which the Commonwealth could 
project its values. 31  It was a purer space into which the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, Commonwealth heads of state, and some of the organisation’s keenest 
observers, could pour their utopian aspirations for the organisation’s 
cosmopolitanism. With strong support from the African Commonwealth, as well 
as from Britain, Rwanda’s efforts to meet the conditions of the Harare Principles 
were considered to be just enough to satisfy the conditions of entry. The Report of 
the Committee on Commonwealth Membership found in favour of what they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Commonwealth Secretariat Report of the Committee on Commonwealth Membership 
2007. See also McIntyre, ‘The expansion of the Commonwealth and the criteria for 
membership’.  
28 The strongest support came from Britain and Uganda, this was no surprise as Kagame’s 
government has many Ugandan-Rwandan returnees.  
29 Richard Bourne, ‘The Commonwealth of Nations: Intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental strategies for the protection of human rights in a post-colonial 
association’, Conectas Human Rights 7, no. 12 (2010). Available at: 
http://www.conectas.org/en/actions/sur-journal/issue/12/1000365-commonwealth-of-
nations-estrategias-intergovernamentais-e-nao-governamentais-para-a-protecao-dos-
direitos-humanos-em-uma-instituicao-pos-colonia. 
30 Tony Blair, an advisor to Kagame on governance, described Rwanda as ‘one of Africa’s 
most remarkable success stories.’ Blair cited in Xan Rice, ‘Rwanda’s Commonwealth hopes 
dented by human rights criticism’, The Guardian, 19 July 2009. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/19/rwanda-commonwealth-human-rights-
criticism. 
31 This is taken from Achille Mbembe’s description of Africa, as discussed in the 
introduction chapter, through the lens of the West as an ‘absence,’ ‘lack,’ and ‘non-being’ 
of identity and difference, of negativeness - in short, of nothingness.’ See Mbembe, On the 
Postcolony, 4.  
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referred to as cautious expansion, providing no compromise was made on the 
fundamental values enshrined in the Harare Principles. 32  They argued that 
Rwanda’s accession would be in the ‘interest of the Commonwealth’s strategic 
engagement with the wider world.’33  
 
The difference between the hostile approach by Commonwealth civil society 
groups, such as the CHRI, and the welcoming approach by Commonwealth 
member states to Rwanda’s application, mirrors a divide which runs through 
much of the academic literature on post-genocide Rwanda. Filip Reyntjens 
highlights this divide when he observes that there are, ‘two radically opposed 
perceptions of Rwanda.’34 The first of these perceptions focuses on progress in 
education, health, women’s empowerment, agriculture, and the economy. For 
Reyntjens, this view of progress, with an emphasis on the positive side of 
reconstruction since the genocide, is held largely by those he labels ‘friends of the 
new Rwanda.’35 These ‘friends’ include aid agencies, former political leaders, such 
as Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, and religious or cultural personalities, such as 
Bono. They share a view, first put forward by President Clinton, that Rwanda is a 
‘strong, unified and growing nation with the potential to become a model for the 
rest of Africa and the World.’36 According to Reyntjens, many of the views held by 
these ‘friends’ are clouded by ‘international feelings of guilt,’ which obscure ‘both 
the historical background and the perception of current political and social 
dynamics.’37 Clinton’s claims have been echoed by a number of academics and 
writers who agree that the Rwandan government has achieved great things, 
particularly in the field of bureaucratic governance. Patricia Crisafulli and Andrea 
Redmond are among such writers. They have written positively about progress in 
Rwanda under the governance of Paul Kagame. As they see it, a new narrative is 
unfolding in Rwanda, ‘one of self-determination and increasing self-reliance, and 
of a country in a hurry to get where it wants to be.’38  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Committee on Commonwealth Membership 
2007. 
33 Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Committee on Commonwealth Membership 
2007: vi. 
34 Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), xiii. 
35 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xiii. 
36 Bill Clinton cited in Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xiii. 
37 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xv. 
38 Crisafulli and Redmond, Rwanda, Inc., 1-3. 
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Observers generally agree with Crisafulli and Redmond that the Rwandan 
government has successfully implemented a policy of economic development and 
modernisation, but for many this progress is flawed. Where those on the opposite 
side of Reyntjens’ dichotomisation of the literature part company with the 
‘friends’ of Rwanda, outlined above, is in their criticism that economic 
development and modernisation in Rwanda has come at the expense of human 
rights, instability, and possible future conflict. Much of this criticism is centred 
around what Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf point out are a ‘series of dramatic 
political, economic, and social projects’ undertaken by the RPF.39 These include 
‘forced villagisation, a de facto ban on ethnic identity, re-education of the 
population, and the systemic redrawing and renaming of Rwanda’s territory.’40 All 
of these projects, critics argue, might, on the surface, make Rwanda appear stable, 
but are based on a short-term goal of keeping the RPF government in power, 
which may be detrimental to long-term peace.41 Omar McDoom sums this up 
when he notes, ‘post-conflict stability premised on economic growth and strong 
leadership - but without political liberalisation in the longer term - may have a 
finite duration and a possibly dramatic ending.’42  
 
One of the fiercest critics of the Rwandan regime to date has been Reyntjens who 
notes that he, himself, has been banned from conducting research in Rwanda; 
this, he states, was the result of a 1995 memo to the Rwandan government 
concerning the RPF’s running of the country.43 Reyntjens is not alone in his 
experience of attempted censorship by the Rwandan regime, other researchers 
have recorded experiences of suspicion held by the Rwandan state towards their 
research. One particularly noteworthy example is Susan Thomson’s account of her 
encounters with the Ethics Board and Ministry of Local Government in Kigali as 
she was carrying out research on state power and its connection to the life 
experiences of peasant Rwandans.44 Having convinced the Rwandan Ethics Board 
that her research would paint the RPF in a favourable light, Thomson was granted 
permission to carry out research for her project. Yet, on a number of occasions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, ‘Introduction: Seeing like a post-conflict state’, in 
Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence, eds. Scott 
Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 4.  
40 Strauss and Waldorf, ‘Introduction: Seeing like a post-conflict state’, 4. 
41 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. 
42 Omar McDoom, Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment 
(World Development Report, April 2011), 6.  
43 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Subjects of concern: Rwanda, October 1994’, Issue 23, no. 2 (1995): 39-
43. 
44 Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power. 
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and before her research permit was eventually revoked by the government, 
Thomson notes that she was required to undergo ‘re-education’ about the ‘real’ 
Rwanda.’45  This was because, as Thomson writes, the Rwandan government 
believed that her peasant subjects had filled her head with ‘negative ideas’ about 
the genocide, about reconciliation, and about life under the RPF regime.46  
 
Both Reyntjens and Thomson’s experiences speak to a surveillance culture in 
post-genocide Rwanda, that is suspicious of anyone who might potentially upset 
the so-called ‘unity’ and peace brought about by the RPF.47 In spite of this, 
Reyntjens notes that the quality of modern-day scholarship on Rwanda is high 
despite the difficult circumstances of, as he puts it, ‘working under an oppressive 
and autocratic regime exercising a high degree of control...for both the scholars 
and their Rwandan interpreters.’48 But, while there are researchers who share 
experiences similar to Reyntjens and Thompson, there are, of course, other 
researchers who view the experience of conducting research under the RPF 
regime differently. Crisafulli and Redmond, for example, are quick to emphasise 
that their experience of conducting research in Rwanda was cooperative and 
transparent.49  
 
Yet, while these different voices and experiences further emphasise the stark 
divide between the two radically opposed views of Rwanda, there have been some 
clear attempts to bring these divided voices together to discuss, debate, and 
analyse the nuances that permeate the different sides and opinions. Phil Clark and 
Zachary Kaufman have played a key role in this process producing a volume of 
essays (the product of three conferences) which have an interdisciplinary focus 
and bring together academics, politicians, and survivors, among others. Writing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power, xvii. See also, Susan Thomson, ‘That is not what 
we authorised you to do…’: Access and government interference in highly politicised 
research environments’, in Surviving Research: Doing Fieldwork in Difficult and Violent 
Situations, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram, John C. King, Julie A. Mertus, Olga Martin-
Ortega, Johanna Herman (London: Routledge, 2009); An Ansoms, 'Dislodging power 
structures in rural Rwanda: From 'disaster tourist' to 'transfer gate'', in Emotional and 
Ethical Challenges for Field Research in Africa: The Story Behind the Findings, eds. 
Susan M. Thomson, An Ansoms and Judith Murison (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 42-56.  
46 Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power, xvii. 
47 For discussion on surveillance and the Rwandan state see: Purdeková, ‘Even if I am not 
here, there are so many eyes’; Paul Gready, ‘Beyond ‘You’re with us or against us: Civil 
society and policymaking in post-genocide Rwanda’, in Remaking Rwanda: State 
Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, eds. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 87-100. 
48 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xv. 
49 Crisafulli and Redmond, Rwanda Inc., 2.  
	   167	  
on ideas of reconstruction and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda, the 
authors rightly point out that there is a vast amount of debate, both academic and 
otherwise, around concepts such as ‘justice’ particularly, ‘what it is, what it should 
achieve and who should administer it.’50 They argue clearly, both in their own 
work and in their efforts to bring together diverse scholarship on post-genocide 
Rwanda, for the need for a range of opinion from scholars and practitioners in 
which to provide a ‘multi-faceted examination’ of the genocide and its aftermath.51  
 
Although my experience of conducting research in Rwanda went without incident, 
I was, nevertheless, aware of the surveillance culture and the level of suspicion 
around researchers as I planned my fieldwork in Kigali. This was heightened by an 
incident involving the British television media, which had the potential to sour 
British-Rwandan relations. The incident involved the airing of a documentary - 
Rwanda’s Untold Story - by the BBC in October 2014. The point of the 
documentary was to give an ‘alternative story,’ to the official narrative, that went 
against the established understanding of who had orchestrated the 1994 
genocide.52 When I arrived in Rwanda to conduct interviews in January 2015, the 
Rwandan government had banned the BBC from the country and was now 
threatening to hold an official investigation calling for the documentary-makers to 
be charged with genocide denial.53  
 
Although I understood the seriousness of the Rwandan government’s reaction, the 
possibility that this might affect my ability to carry out research on the 
Commonwealth - something that seemed quite far removed from genocide and 
the BBC - was not immediately obvious until a German contact, a civil society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Phil Clark and Zachary Kaufman, ‘After Genocide’, in After Genocide: Transitional 
Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, eds. 
Phil Clark and Zachary Kaufman (London: Hurst and Company, 2008), 3-4. 
51 Clark and Kaufman, ‘After Genocide’, 2. 
52 The documentary highlighted the growing criticism of president Paul Kagame and 
claimed that the RPF was also responsible for war crimes and more deaths than previously 
acknowledged. In response to the documentary airing, the Rwandan parliament called for 
the BBC to be banned from the country, students marched through Kigali in an anti-BBC 
demonstration, and a number of high-profile academics, writers, diplomats, and 
politicians signed a letter of complaint to the BBC’s director-general Tony Hall. For further 
detail see  David Smith, ‘Rwanda calls for BBC to be banned over controversial 
documentary’, The Guardian, 23 October 2014. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/23/rwanda-calls-bbc-banned-over-
controversial-documentary.  
53 Dugald Baird, ‘Rwanda places indefinite ban on BBC broadcasts over genocide 
documentary’, The Guardian, 1 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jun/01/rwanda-places-indefinite-ban-on-bbc-
broadcasts-over-genocide-documentary. 
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operative and gatekeeper to my contact with local Rwandan civil society 
organisations, noted her surprise at the Rwandan border security ‘allowing me 
in.’54 As a result of the BBC fallout, and of my German contact’s observation, I 
became acutely aware that being British might have an effect on interviews 
(although none of my questions were directly related to the genocide). I was aware 
that the government line on language and identity would most-likely be 
heightened in the responses of interviewees, and that I might not get to the 
personal opinions of my interviewees, but rather a more standardised view of how 
the Rwandan government believed things ought to be. As it happened, I found 
that most interviewees, as well as other people I spoke to informally, generally, 
saw Rwanda’s relationship with Britain in a positive light. But this observation 
raised an additional set of questions about the interview data that I collected, and 
the way that interviewees saw and responded to my Britishness in the interviews. 
I have already discussed this issue in Chapter 1, and in Chapter 5 in relation to 
Zimbabwe. I want now to briefly illustrate and extend these ideas to my 
experiences in Rwanda. 
 
My discussion of perspective in Chapter 5 of the thesis drew on a wealth of 
academic literature related to issues of positionality. While discussing ideas of 
power, gender, and identity, and the way that these are always present in 
interviews, I briefly touched on the dichotomy of the insider and outsider. Much 
of the literature on the process of conducting interviews in the field has begun to 
dispute the existence of a discernible dichotomy between the researcher and the 
interviewee as insider and outsider.55 Before I had conducted interviews with 
Rwandan elites, I had assumed I would be clearly in the position of ‘outsider,’ in 
that I was not Rwandan, nor a member of any elites that I was interviewing in 
Rwanda. Yet, as I began the interview process, I started to realise that what I had 
assumed would be an unproblematic positioning of me as outsider and my 
interviewees as insiders was rather messier in praxis. Writing on the idea of 
problematising the insider/outsider dichotomy, Herod has aptly pointed out, ‘the 
positionality of the researcher can shift depending upon a number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Interview with German NGO Operative, Kigali, 8 January, 2015.  
55 Lauren Breen, ‘The researcher ‘in the middle’: Negotiating the insider/outsider 
dichotomy’, The Australian Community Psychologist 19, no. 1 (2007): 163-74; Christina 
Chavez, ‘Conceptualising from the inside: Advantages, complications, and demands on 
insider positionality’, The Qualitative Report 13, no. 3 (2008): 474-94; Sonia Corbin 
Dwyer and Jennifer Buckle, ‘The space between: On being an insider-outsider in 
qualitative research’, International Journal of Qualitative Methods 8, no. 1 (2009): 54-63. 
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considerations, in the interview process.’ 56  One particular consideration, 
regarding my insider/outsider status, which also relates to my concerns over the 
BBC documentary fallout outlined above, is the fact that, although I was neither 
Rwandan nor a member of the elites with whom I was conducting interviews, I 
was, nevertheless, an Anglophone, rather than a Francophone, speaker. For some 
interviewees, who generally began the interview process by giving a brief history 
on Rwanda and highlighting the brutality of the ‘French colonial masters,’57 a 
point I will reiterate and expand on later in the chapter, the fact that I was British, 
not French, appeared to situate me as an insider.  
 
Where I was, perhaps, more in the position of outsider was in my knowledge and 
understanding of the history and politics of Rwanda. Harking back to Ackerly and 
True’s injunction, outlined in the previous chapter, that a thoughtful researcher 
acknowledges and is attentive to their own ‘social, political, and economical 
relationships’ with their interview subjects,58 beyond academic research, I knew 
relatively little about Rwanda before carrying out fieldwork in the country. What I 
did know about the history and politics of the area, about the genocide, and the 
theories about who had brought down Habyarimana’s plane,59 all appeared to 
have no connection to my own research on the Commonwealth. Since carrying out 
fieldwork and understanding from Rwandans themselves more about the 
Rwandan government’s decision to join the Commonwealth, it has become easier 
to draw a tentative line between Rwanda’s recent history and Rwanda’s 
Commonwealth membership. But when I travelled to Rwanda in January 2015, 
this line was still relatively unclear. I was particularly interested, therefore, to 
discover why Rwanda had joined the Commonwealth and how Commonwealth 
membership had been received in Rwanda: did Rwandans understand what the 
Commonwealth was and how their membership had potentially changed it? Did 
they put different interpretations on why Rwanda had joined the organisation?  
 
6.2 The Commonwealth effect on Rwanda 
 
To discuss the possible effects that the Commonwealth has had on Rwanda, it is 
helpful first to appreciate the political climate at the time of Rwanda’s accession. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Herod, ‘Reflections on interviewing foreign elites’: 320. 
57 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 21 January 2015. 
58 Ackerly and True, Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science, 37. 
59 There is a vast literature on Habyarimana and the plane crash that triggered the 
Rwandan genocide, for an detailed overview see Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: 
The Rwandan Genocide (London and New York: Verso, 2004); Linda Melvern, A People 
Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2009). 
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Much like the Commonwealth’s own apparent limbo, Rwanda, stands in a kind of 
threshold zone between malignant communitarianism and ideal cosmopolitanism 
as a result of the genocide that took place in 1994. For the past twenty-two years, 
the Rwandan government led by the President, Paul Kagame, and the RPF, have 
initiated a number of seemingly draconian measures, which they claim are 
necessary for Rwanda to have a peaceful future. The main instruments in the 
Rwandan government’s search for unity and reconciliation have meant heavy 
restrictions on political parties, civil society, and the media.  These have all been 
censored as part of the government plan to recreate the idea of Rwandan identity 
around the theme of unity.60 This has led to a number of measures, outlined 
briefly in the previous section of the chapter, that can be viewed as attempts to cut 
the civil liberties of the Rwandan population.  
 
For INGOs such as Human Rights Watch, ‘the Rwandan government has created a 
veneer of stability by suppressing dissent and limiting the exercise of civil and 
political rights. It often cites the need to avoid another genocide as the purported 
justification for such repressive measures.’61 The decision by the RPF, in 2009, to 
join the Commonwealth might be said to be a part of the government’s plan. 
Through the lens of the RPF-government policies it is relatively easy to 
understand how the Commonwealth fits into this programme of unity being 
carried out in Rwanda. But what I wanted to get a deeper understanding of in my 
fieldwork was whether this message translated into the public perception of the 
Commonwealth, if indeed there was such a thing? And if so, was the 
Commonwealth looked on favourably by Rwandans, or as a tool for furthering the 
government’s agenda?  
 
The first thing to point out when attempting to answer these questions is that 
Rwanda’s decision to join the Commonwealth had been made at the highest 
governmental level, without discussion or debate.62 As a result, most ordinary 
Rwandans have very little knowledge of what the Commonwealth is, what it does, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Kiwuwa, Ethnic Politics and Democratic Transition in Rwanda. 
61 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005. Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/wr2005.pdf. 
62 For a discussion on elite ambition in contrast with the realities in rural Rwanda see An 
Ansoms, 'Rwanda’s post-genocide economic reconstruction: The mismatch between elite 
ambitions and rural realities’, in Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights 
After Mass Violence, eds. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2011), 240-51. 
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or that, since 2009, they have belonged to its family.63 One could argue that this is 
a Commonwealth-wide epidemic, as few Commonwealth citizens have any real 
concept of the organisation, beyond the Commonwealth Games, or the Queen.64 
Nevertheless, when viewed from a different angle, it is possible to discern at least 
three ways that Commonwealth membership has had an effect, either directly or 
indirectly, on Rwanda; even if these are not immediately apparent to ordinary 
Rwandans, or indeed to the casual observer. All three contain elements that came 
up over and again in discussions with interviewees around the question of 
whether, or how, Commonwealth membership had made a difference to Rwandan 
lives. Though later sub-sections will flesh out the elements sketched here, I want, 
briefly, to suggest the contours of each, in order to provide some background for 
the discussion that follows.  
 
First, as interviewees saw it, the Commonwealth has brought more opportunities 
for Rwandans to develop their English language skills. In 2008, English replaced 
French as the official second language in Rwanda.65 The Rwandan government 
claims that because English is the language of science and commerce, the switch 
to English will bring prosperity and contribute to national reconciliation by 
improving the living standards of Rwandans.66 As the argument goes, English, not 
French, is the language of progress, of technocratic development, a way to propel 
the Rwandan state into the future. French, by contrast, was the language of 
colonial repression. One interviewee captured this contrast clearly when he told 
me: 
 
on one side, we see a power that invests in the people, and that is the 
British…who can cooperate with us. On the other hand, we have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The British High Commissioner in Kigali suggested I walk in the street and ask ordinary 
Rwandans what they knew about the Commonwealth. It became quickly apparent that at 
the grassroots level, the Commonwealth had no real impact. Indigenous civil society 
organisations approached for interviews were fearful that they would disappoint the 
interviewer, as they had no knowledge of the Commonwealth beyond the vague idea that 
Rwanda had joined. 
64 This is an argument that has been made repeatedly by W. David McIntyre and more 
recently backed up with empirical evidence gathered by the Royal Commonwealth Society. 
See An Uncommon Association A Wealth of Potential: Final Report of the 
Commonwealth Conversation (London: The Royal Commonwealth Society, 2010). 
Available at: https://www.thercs.org/assets/Research-/Commonwealth-Conversation-
Final-Report.pdf. 
65 Rwanda first introduced English to be taught alongside French in 1996, but in 2008 the 
government announced that French was to be dropped as the official second language. S. 
McCrummen, ‘Rwandans say adieu to Francais: Leaders promote English as the language 
of learning, governance and trade’, The Washington Post, 28 October 2008.  
66 Beth Lewis Samuelson and Sarah Warshauer Freedman, ‘Language policy, multilingual 
education, and power in Rwanda’, Language Policy 9 (2010): 192. 
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someone who is always a master. And this idea is even in the 
language…it appears in the language, you find a lot of words in 
French…colonial attitudes in French that we don’t see in English.67 
 
While Rwanda’s application for Commonwealth membership appears to have no 
direct connection to the switch to English as the official second language in 
Rwanda, joining the Commonwealth has nevertheless brought the British Council, 
which has been working with Rwandan teachers and businesses to help improve 
language skills. 68 In addition, as most interviewees were keen to point out, 
Commonwealth membership allows Rwandans to apply for scholarships through 
the ‘Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan,’ which offers scholarships 
for Commonwealth citizens to attend overseas institutions and gain access to 
higher learning, which potentially leads to more employment opportunities.69 One 
academic seemed to sum up the cosmopolitan potential here when he noted, ‘their 
sons one day might find themselves in a Commonwealth university, something 
which has never happened before.’70 There is a sense that if Rwandans are 
exposed to educational opportunities overseas they will bring back new ideas, 
‘learn about other cultures’ and ‘have opportunities to talk to people they would 
never meet.’71By joining the Commonwealth, Rwandans now had opportunities to 
access ideas and cultures on a global scale, thus opening up the previously insular 
culture to more of a universal, global outlook. With the idea of a more global, 
cosmopolitan outlook in mind, I particularly wanted to explore how deep this 
sense of English leading to prosperity went. How far was it rhetorical - a device for 
the Rwandan government to push their unity agenda? Was there a consciousness 
that the country was becoming more prosperous? What about those being left 
behind?  
 
Second, the Commonwealth has opened up new trade and investment 
opportunities for Rwanda. In 2014, the organisation launched the 
‘Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council’ - ‘with a mandate to facilitate 
increased trade and investment across the Commonwealth…by helping 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 21 January 2015. 
68 The British Council opened its office in Kigali in 2008. Ironically, the British Council, 
unlike its French and German counterparts, does very little to promote British culture, 
besides language classes.  
69 For a detailed overview on the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan see 
‘Commonwealth Scholarships’. Available at: http://cscuk.dfid.gov.uk/apply/scholarships-
developing-cw/. 
70 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 12 February 2015. 
71 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 12 February 2015. 
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Commonwealth governments attract investment, promote enterprise and improve 
the business environment.’72 It was very important to my interviewees to know 
that Rwanda was part of this network of large established and small emerging 
markets, to know that they were in charge of their own investment decisions, and 
not heavily reliant on partnerships with residual attachments to the old colonial 
regime. When I discussed this with a civil society operative he told me: 
 
After the genocide, Rwanda was a closed community…to them [the 
RPF] it was very important that we are part of the East African 
Community (EAC) and the Commonwealth…because we needed them 
to open windows for our businesses, the education opportunities, but, 
above all, the investment opportunities because the Commonwealth is 
connected to the EAC and it’s a big community.73 
 
This last point is interesting, it is widely acknowledged in the literature on 
development that Rwanda views Anglophone states as far more reliable sources 
for investment and development aid.74 But it is equally well known that the 
Rwandan president uses extraversion tactics to shore up what might be described 
as one of the most successful development success stories in contemporary 
Africa.75 I wanted to explore how far the discussion around the Commonwealth 
and investment opportunities stretched to aid and development. What was the 
Rwandan view of this; did they feel that Rwanda had agency?  
 
Finally, the Commonwealth requires member states to abide by its human rights 
principles.76 With this in mind, there is a sense, among some Commonwealth 
observers, that Commonwealth membership will help Rwanda foster adherence to 
these principles.77 This is an argument that human rights groups have dismissed 
as ‘extremely unconvincing.’78 Given the extensive report compiled by the CHRI 
against Rwanda’s accession to the Commonwealth, as well as the defensive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council. http://www.cweic.org. 
73 Interview with Rwandan Civil Society Operative, Kigali, 23 January 2015.  
74 Samuelson and Freedman, ‘Language policy, multilingual education, and power in 
Rwanda’. 
75 Bayart argues that African governments have not been passive objects  in the process of 
aid dependency but instead have used the discourse of democracy to extract resources 
from Western donors. See Jean Francoise Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of 
extraversion’, African Affairs 99, no. 395 (2000): 217-267. 
76	  This is a stipulation in the Report on Commonwealth Membership.  
77 David Howell, ‘Support for democratic principles’, Global: The International Briefing 
(2012). Available at: http://www.global-briefing.org/2012/01/the-message-to-all-
governments-is-let-there-be-stronger-support-for-upholding-democratic-principles/; 
Jones, ‘Rwanda: The way forward’: 349. 
78 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Rwanda’s Application for Membership of the 
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reaction from some Rwandan elites, I wanted to get deeper under the surface of 
this potentially problematic issue. Were interviewees aware of the 
Commonwealth’s human rights agenda? Did they think that the Commonwealth 
could help Rwanda? In what ways did they envisage this could be done?  
 
When I put these questions to one prominent youth leader, he seemed surprised 
that the answer was not obvious to me. Reflecting on the past two decades of 
Rwandan history, the youth leader pointed out ‘it would be easier to learn the 
Commonwealth goals, like what they want to achieve in Rwanda, the reason being 
because Rwanda is starting afresh - like from zero.’79 This idea resonates exactly 
with my suggestion earlier in the chapter, which drew on Mbembe’s observation 
about Africa as an exemplar of nothingness. For this interviewee, Rwanda was a 
blank canvas onto which the Commonwealth could project its values.  
 
This was a powerful image, and yet, what was especially pertinent about my 
interviewee’s response was that it was not the first time that I had heard it. The 
fact that Rwanda had to ‘start from zero in 1994’80 was a frequent expression used 
by Paul Kagame and it came up time and again in speeches and in the media.81  
The need to start again, to create a common narrative around the genocide has 
become so much a part of RPF and ‘official’ Rwandan thinking that it appeared to 
structure interviewees’ interpretation of many of my questions about the 
Commonwealth. A strong, common theme that ran through most interviews was 
the way in which the Commonwealth was a mirage of perfection, a means by 
which a flawed state could leave behind its dark history and find a calmer realm in 
a universal order.82 This is an idea that resonates with the Commonwealth’s 
attempt to be more cosmopolitan. But was Rwanda, as one interviewee described 
it, the ‘baby that could hold the Commonwealth family together,’83 or was this 
simply another example - in the Commonwealth’s attempts to be cosmopolitan - 
of the ideal versus the real? 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Interview with Rwandan Youth Leader, Kigali, 15 January 2015. 
80 Helen Hintjens argues that, ‘Rwanda’s present rulers see themselves as steering the 
country towards an enlightened, progressive future free of colonial and racial mental 
maps.’ Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda’: 10. 
81 Colin Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co, 2004), 168; Francois Soudan, Kagame: 
Conversations with the President of Rwanda (New York: Enigma Books, 2015). 
82 Charles Fourier wrote that utopia allows us to plug into a higher order. See Charles 
Fourier, Design for Utopia: Selected Writing (New York: Schocken, 1971). 
83 Interview with Rwandan Youth Leader, Kigali, 15 January 2015. 
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6.2.1 ‘Starting from zero’  
 
Without exception, as I mentioned in earlier sections of the chapter, all answers to 
the question of why Rwanda joined the Commonwealth were delivered by my 
interviewees in the form of a short lecture on the history of colonialism in 
Rwanda. This was almost always imbued with resentment towards the French 
government for what was officially considered to be French involvement in the 
Rwandan genocide.84 Since the genocide, acrimony between France and Rwanda 
had grown fierce.85 Rwanda’s accession to the Commonwealth was described in 
terms of a new beginning. It was a way in which to escape an abusive family. This 
was echoed in the media as well as in interviews. As the Kigali Today journalist 
Magnus Mazimpaka saw it, the decision to join the Commonwealth was seen as a 
way to ‘end the humiliation,’ it provided a means to ‘dislodge the Frenchman and 
set themselves free from the Francophonie ‘children.’’86 Mazimpaka’s was typical 
of the responses I was given. As most interviewees saw it, by joining the 
Anglophone group of Commonwealth states, Rwanda could unravel its tangled 
webs of communitarianism. But whether it had managed to completely sever 
these ties was not always clear to my interviewees.  
 
When questioned as to whether Rwanda was still a member of the Francophonie, 
interviewees were hazy on the details: ‘We’re here, we’re there. We don’t know 
where we stand, but one thing we know, we are English…French is taught here as 
a language, but the first official language is English.’87 This was a powerful 
statement, as interviewees described it, despite the uncertainty of whether 
Rwanda still retained its old ties to the French family, English seemed to have a 
stabilising effect on identity, an idea that resonated with Charles Taylor’s 
understanding of language discussed in Chapter 3. Whether Rwanda was still a 
part of the Francophonie was an irrelevant detail, for most interviewees, the only 
political family that mattered was the Anglophone family. As one academic put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 For discussion and analysis on the French connection to the Rwandan genocide see: 
Andrew Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan 
Genocide (London and New York: I. B. Taurus, 2013); Kroslak, The Role of France in the 
Rwandan Genocide. 
85 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
86 Magnus Mazimpaka, ‘Francophonie vs Commonwealth: How Rwanda bagged $3 billion 
when it said ‘au revoir’, KT Press, 29 November 2015. Available at: 
http://ktpress.rw/2015/11/fr. 
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this, ‘everyone was happy when we came to the Commonwealth.’88 This was in line 
with the official government rhetoric on ethnicity, but also seemed to line up with 
ideal-utopian aspirations. As Fanon might have put this, joining the 
Commonwealth and turning their backs on the Francophonie was a utopian wish 
to close the chapter on colonial violence with the hope of heralding a new 
humanism.89  
 
Language also assumed particular importance when asked about the effect 
Commonwealth membership had had on Rwanda’s economic prosperity. One 
Rwandan academic attempted to explain this through a Kinyarwandan analogy, as 
he put this, ‘when faced with a situation where you are forced to choose between 
having to eat a dog and starving, try to ensure that the dog that you eat is white’.90 
Britain and the Commonwealth were the white dog in this analogy. Put slightly 
differently, in comparison to the French and the Francophonie, the 
Commonwealth was the lesser of two evils. As with many examples provided by 
my interviewees, this was largely the argument of the Rwandan government, who 
had justified the switch from French to English by flaunting English as the 
language of globalisation.91 As I have already pointed out earlier in this section, for 
Kagame and his RPF administration, English brought greater prosperity and an 
improvement in living standards, both of which contributed to national 
reconciliation.92 This seemed to be a much more technical, rational approach to 
thinking about the introduction of English, and its effects on Rwanda, than the 
utopian family notion outlined above. It was also an approach that had a darker 
side, as one potentially tragic consequence of the switch to English was that a 
generation of Francophone youth were being left behind.93  
 
When I put the question of English, and its links to prosperity, to the French 
Programme Coordinator of a large INGO that had played a role in developing 
English curriculum in Rwanda, she described the changes that had taken place 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 12 February 2015. 
89 This is Mamdani’s paraphrasing of Fanon in Mamdani, When Victims become Killers. 
90 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 21 January 2015.  
91 Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda’. 
92 Samuelson and Freedman, ‘Language policy, multilingual education, and power in 
Rwanda’: 192. 
93 Recent statistics reveal that 3.9 per cent of the Rwandan populations speaks French, 
while only 1.9 per cent is fluent in English. See Joseph Assan and Lawrence Walker, ‘The 
political economy of contemporary education and the challenges of switching formal 
language to English in Rwanda’, in Rwanda Fast Forward: Social, Economic, Military 
and Reconciliation Prospects, eds. Maddalena Campioni and Patrick Noack (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 176-91. 
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over the past few years of her experience living in and around Kigali. As she put it, 
‘when I came to Rwanda, French was a requirement on most job applications, but 
now that has gone, and most of the well paid jobs are demanding English.’94 This 
meant that many Francophone Rwandans were losing out as these jobs were 
largely being ‘snapped up by returnees from Tanzania and Uganda.’95 It is worth 
pausing over these observations, if only to point out that, if, as the RPF saw it, 
there was (artificially) no such thing as ethnicity in Rwanda,96 then there did seem 
to be a growing class divide, and this was once more wrapped up in the idea of 
language. This was evident in the observations of the German INGO operative 
who had helped me gain access to local civil society organisations. As she 
observed, it was ‘fashionable to switch to English if you were in a restaurant with 
friends and everyone was speaking in Kinyarwandan or French. English showed 
you had education and money.’97 For all of the RPF’s attempts to create unity 
around the idea that Rwandans were ‘Rwandan,’ rather than Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, 
language had now replaced ethnicity as a proxy for identity.98  
 
The negative effects of the switch to English on some members of the population 
is at the extreme end of the story of the Commonwealth effect on Rwanda, but it 
contains elements that came up over and again in discussions with elites and in 
observations. For most of the Anglophone elites I interviewed this was often 
mentioned and then glossed over or treated as an educational opportunity. This is 
evident in one interviewee’s response to my question about Francophone 
Rwandans:  
 
I think when Rwanda changed or added English…at the beginning it 
was very hard for so many people who used only French. But, I think, 
the nation were sensitised and now they see an opportunity - that to 
know both French and English is an advantage for a citizen, not a 
problem.99 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Interview with French INGO Programme Coordinator, Kigali, 3 February 2015. 
95 Interview with French INGO Programme Coordinator, Kigali, 3 February 2015. 
96 Rwanda does not take an identity perspective on ethnicity, Rwandan law insists that 
ethnicity does not exist within Rwandan borders. For a full discussion on the identity-
ethnicity issue see Nigel Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Genocide Debates in 
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The use of the word ‘sensitised’ by my interviewee here is particularly telling, as it 
draws on, and helps to construct, a particularly idealised picture of the way in 
which both the RPF and the Commonwealth are attempting to reach for a 
cosmopolitan image. One potential way of creating the ideal cosmopolitanism is to 
get rid of the roots of the old communitarian family. For the RPF, these roots were 
in the French language. Therefore, by joining the Anglophone Commonwealth, the 
RPF had effectively cut off the growth of the old roots and replaced them with a 
new, more ideal, family tree.  
 
6.2.2 Interests and opportunities 
 
Broadly, as I pointed out earlier in the chapter, for many interviewees the 
Commonwealth brought educational opportunities in the form of Commonwealth 
scholarships, as well as cultural exchanges through the British Council. Common 
to many interviewee responses was the underlying notion that this was a way to 
look to the ideal future and leave the violence of the past behind. This was clearly 
evident in one youth leader’s observation when he pointed out that, ‘education - 
it’s very positive, it’s not aggressive, it’s not oppressive. It’s helping people to 
extend their minds.’100 Others followed this line of thinking, pointing out that the 
Commonwealth, and the British Council, were going to ‘educate Rwandans for the 
future.’101 This last comment is striking as evidence of the way in which Rwandans 
viewed the Commonwealth as something of an ideal cosmopolitan exemplar. 
When I raised the notion of cosmopolitanism with the same interviewee who 
informed me that he had studied at the British Council, he responded, ‘English 
helped me to be cosmopolitan...opportunities started happening immediately.’102 
When I tentatively suggested that French was considered a cosmopolitan language 
also, the interviewee disagreed, for Rwandans, he informed me, the Francophonie, 
with its sole focus on preserving French language and culture, had left them 
‘ignorant in the past.’103 
 
This evocative account of how some Rwandans viewed the Francophonie, in 
contrast with how they viewed the Commonwealth, simultaneously draws on and 
helps to construct an understanding of Rwanda’s place in the normative 
dichotomy at the heart of this thesis. This is because, as I noted earlier in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Interview with Rwandan Youth Leader, Kigali, 21 January 2015. 
101 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 12 February 2015. 
102 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 12 February 2015. 
103 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 12 February 2015 
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chapter, Rwanda appears to be suspended between the malignant 
communitarianism of its past shared history with the Francophonie, and the 
idealistic cosmopolitanism of the Commonwealth. Rwandan interviewees point 
out the problems of the past and contrast them with the idealisation that 
accompanies being adopted by an organisation with no ties to its communitarian 
roots. But what fails to come through clearly in their understanding is the fact 
that, as I have shown in previous chapters of the thesis, the Commonwealth has its 
own dark, problematic past and continuing family problems.  
 
Rwanda offers a picture of a contradictory process that might be seen as simply 
giving way to the dominance of one colonial family over another. Yet, there is a 
sense that, since the genocide, and since shaking off the influence of the French in 
Rwandan culture, what had once been understood as manipulation and 
interference from the West, was now handled on Rwandan terms. One 
particularly noteworthy observation during my fieldwork in Rwanda, that helps 
give credence to this claim, was a media frenzy, in the week I arrived in Kigali, 
around a report that the Belgian government was thought to be scrapping a grant 
of approximately $50 million in aid to Rwanda. As the media reported, the 
Belgians were unhappy with what the Belgian embassy in Kigali had supposedly 
described as Rwanda’s ‘failure to meet media freedom and governance targets.’104 
In response to this accusation, the Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise 
Mushikiwabo was reported in The New Times to have noted: 
 
Belgium has every right to determine whether, when and how to 
disburse its aid money and that the decision solely fell within Belgium’s 
sovereign rights and had nothing to do with how Rwanda relates with 
the former.105  
 
As I arrived in Kigali, the story was winding down. In response to the Rwandan 
Foreign Minister’s suggestion that Belgium could do what it wanted with its aid, 
the Belgian government appeared to change tack noting that they had not 
suspended but merely ‘postponed’ the payment ‘to allow Kigali to make progress 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Clement Uwiringiyimana, ‘Belgium scraps $50 million in aid as Rwanda fails to meet 
democracy target’, Reuters, 22 December 2014. Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-belgium-rwanda-aid-idUSKBN0K01G020141222. 
105 Louise Mushikiwabo cited in Edwin Musoni, ‘We did not suspend aid, says Belgian 
minister’, The New Times, 7 January 2015. Available at: 
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in different fields.’106 There was a sense here that when juxtaposed with its past 
memberships and relationships, Rwanda was now in control of its own destiny. 
That the Belgians, and former colonisers, had backed down when confronted with 
the Rwandan government’s supposed apathy, as far as my interviewees were 
concerned, was a victory for Rwandan autonomy. This was a particularly pertinent 
point with the more politically active interviewees. As the youth leader I 
interviewed, who had pointed me in the direction of the news story, pointed out: 
 
we don’t want to be pushed around. We decide that even if you give us 
aid, you don’t tell us what to do with it. We decide what to do with the 
money because we choose our own priorities. But when you look 
around Africa, it’s that, if I can use the word ‘kiss-ass,’ you know, most 
African countries kiss-ass and since they kiss-ass you find that it 
creates a difference between us and them.107   
 
The youth leader’s statement, at first glance, might seem to be a simple assertion 
of Rwandan autonomy. A closer reading, however, reveals a singling out of 
Rwanda as an exemplary model of independence and assertiveness among African 
states. There is a sense here that post-genocide Rwanda occupies a purer thinner 
space, away from the density and roots of its colonial family. Other African states - 
even those in Rwanda’s newly adopted Commonwealth family - do not occupy the 
same space, tied as they still are to the baggage of family. This sense of 
independence and autonomy was echoed in the Rwandan media. As one journalist 
and human rights activist pointed out: 
 
Although I don’t believe that we should de-link ourselves from the 
north, as much as we need them (the capitalist north), they equally 
need us. We need their money, they need our materials. So it is quid 
pro quo.108 
 
When I raised the issue of this journalist’s comments with the youth leader he told 
me, ‘Rwanda...exploits all available markets. And the Commonwealth, being a 
family of very many nations, provides that market.’109 There seemed to be a sense 
here that, in as far as Rwanda’s relationship with the Commonwealth family was 	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concerned, Rwanda’s membership was conditional - the child would only stay as 
long as it was convenient and worth their while.  
 
6.2.3 Shared values 
 
While interests and opportunities were clearly important for the still fragile state, 
as many interviewees saw it, shared values were too. Many Rwandans I spoke to 
were attracted to what they called the ‘moral authority’ of the Commonwealth.110 
As one journalist in the New Times put it, the Commonwealth ‘may have emerged 
as a reminder or representation of British imperialism but can now be harnessed 
for the benefit of all its members.’111 This stood in stark contrast to the neo-
colonial rhetoric espoused by Robert Mugabe and Yahya Jammeh, as they 
withdrew their states from the Commonwealth. The more savvy Rwandans I 
spoke to were aware of the Zimbabwe situation and used this as a tool with which 
to juxtapose Rwanda. In reaction to Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth, one interviewee noted, ‘If you realise something is wrong, you 
don’t solve it from without, you solve it from within.’112 In a similar vein, and 
likewise reflecting on the Commonwealth and Zimbabwe, another interviewee 
observed, ‘if you are in a big family and you share orders or you are facing the 
same problems, you will create a kind of internal sub-network to overcome some 
problems.’113  
 
What is especially pertinent about these observations is that many interviewees 
failed to realise that, in dealing with its own problems with the family it had left 
behind, Rwanda had not attempted to solve the problems ‘from within,’ but had 
withdrawn from the family and was continuing to take measures, which included 
the alienation of some of its own French speaking citizens, to maintain something 
of a distance. In this respect, interviewees failed to see the similarity with the 
Zimbabwe situation and picked up instead on Zimbabwe’s problems with human 
rights.  
 
This discussion of Rwandans’ understanding of human rights issues in the 
Commonwealth points to the ways in which Rwanda’s accession to the 	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Commonwealth can both challenge the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism and 
reify it. A powerful image of this reification filtered through when Rwandans 
talked about the Commonwealth in the language of family. As one academic 
pointed out, ‘You find that in the Commonwealth, this idea of family-ship. You 
want people to be together, you want people to live in harmony.’114 Harmony was a 
theme that appeared to recur throughout the interviews I carried out with 
Rwandans. Reflecting on the Commonwealth family in its entirety, a youth leader 
drew on a similar theme, for him the Anglophone grouping represented:  
 
A group of people irrespective of their different backgrounds, 
irrespective of different cultures, aspiring to the same goals - free and 
fair, a free community, a healthy community, a democratic community, 
a human rights respecting community, a peaceful community, that’s 
what I see.115  
 
For Rwandans, who had a recent history entwined in a family that was far from 
harmonious, the Commonwealth presented an opportunity to leave behind the 
thick, messy, nastiness of family, and inhabit a much thinner space as the newest 
member, with no roots attached, of an organisation which was striving to be 
cosmopolitan. 
 
6.2.4 Forced idealisation? 
 
I have attempted in this section to explain how Rwandans describe the changes 
that they perceive to have taken place since joining the Commonwealth in 2009. 
But, lest this chapter conveys too inflated a sense of the ethical credentials, 
prospects for harmonious relationship, or representativeness for the 
Commonwealth’s true realisation of cosmopolitanism, two caveats are in order. 
First, harking back to my discussion earlier in the chapter around critical 
literature on Rwanda, the Rwandan government continues to be the focus of 
numerous reports, which show that not everyone is benefitting equally from 
Rwanda’s economic and political progress.116 This was echoed by the CHRI in 
their bid to get heads of state to understand the gravity of the decision to admit 
Rwanda into the Commonwealth. In this context, it is important to ask whether 
Commonwealth membership has helped Rwanda clean up its human rights record 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Interview with Rwandan Academic, Kigali, 21 January 2015.  
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116 Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide identity politics’: 10.  
	   183	  
in the years since its entry to the organisation.117 A measurement of such things is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, however, without wishing to generalise about the 
human rights situation in Rwanda, there continue to be reports on the Rwandan 
government clamp down on civil and political rights and of arrests over crimes of 
‘divisionism,’ ‘ethnic ideology,’ and ‘genocide mentality.’118 During my fieldwork in 
Rwanda, I observed that a number of articles in the state sponsored media reacted 
rather aggressively to any suggestion that the Rwandan government were failing 
to protect the civil and political rights of Rwandans.  
 
A second caveat that should be borne in mind is that Rwanda’s decision to join the 
Commonwealth, as I have mentioned, was a top-down political decision. As one of 
my interviewees put this, ‘Rwanda coming in, it was mostly political but 
fortunately the decision came to meet the needs of the people whether they asked 
for it or not.’119 This seemed to be an unwitting repetition of what Samuelson and 
Freedman have described as the Rwandan government’s policy of heavy-handed 
rule making, in which the people are just supposed to play along and dutifully 
make the shift.120 While this might not conform to what those who opposed 
Rwanda’s Commonwealth application see as the preferred behaviour of states in 
the cosmopolitan Commonwealth, it does, nevertheless, present Kagame in the 
role as the good father rescuing Rwanda from a troubled past by making decisions 
for the good of the future.  
 
This discussion of caveats both point to the ways in which Rwanda’s accession to 
the Commonwealth can both enhance the organisation’s cosmopolitanism and 
trouble it. And yet, this understanding of the different ways in which becoming a 
member of the Commonwealth has affected Rwanda only tells half the story of the 
Rwanda’s role in helping the organisation to realise its cosmopolitanism. What 
about the other half? Having set out and elaborated on three possible ways in 
which Commonwealth membership has had an effect on Rwanda, I now want to 
reverse the direction of the argument and explore the extent to which Rwanda’s 
membership has affected the Commonwealth.  
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6.3 Rwanda’s effect on the Commonwealth 
 
As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are a number of Commonwealth 
officials who have a tendency to justify the Commonwealth’s continued relevance 
with the observation that states are lining up to join the organisation. Therefore, 
as they see it, membership must be of some value. While this may be the case, 
most of the states that have evinced an interest in joining the Commonwealth 
have not pursued their application much further than the enquiry stage. 121 
Rwanda’s accession, as the first country to join the Commonwealth under its new 
membership criteria, therefore, has been an important test case for a more 
inclusive, cosmopolitan Commonwealth. 122  But, almost seven years after the 
controversy around Rwanda’s application to join the Commonwealth, I argue that 
Rwanda’s membership has not lived up to the hype. Up until this point, 
interviewees largely confirmed the view that membership had been a positive 
experience for Rwanda but, what did they think Rwanda brought to the 
Commonwealth? Did they believe that Rwanda’s Commonwealth membership 
made a difference to other Commonwealth members? Did they see the Rwanda’s 
experience as a positive model for other states to follow? There were two main 
approaches to the way that interviewees answered these questions. The first was 
an uncomplicated view of the practical side of Rwanda’s conflict management 
skills. The second approach was a much more idealised way of describing how 
Rwanda could contribute to helping and healing the Commonwealth.  
 
In this section, I want to describe the ways in which this idealisation manifests in 
the ways in which interviewees see Rwanda’s role in the Commonwealth going 
forward. The Rwandan government rhetoric, and policy on unity, lend themselves 
well to this idealisation, but I also got the sense that this was something that 
interviewees, in their various roles as youth leaders, trade unionists, civil society 
representatives, were proud of doing themselves. This bestowed a sense of agency 
to Rwandans: with Rwanda’s help, things could be improved for everyone. The 
many youth leaders I spoke to, both in official interviews and in everyday 
conversation, were clear in their vision of sharing the lessons of the Rwandan 
genocide with others. Rwanda’s membership in the EAC and the Commonwealth 
was helping to facilitate this. As one interviewee put it, ‘Rwandans have a story to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 For a comprehensive list see te Velde, The Commonwealth Brand. 
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tell about what happens when people choose divisions.’123 One youth leader - who 
had been working directly with Commonwealth youth initiatives as one of the 
‘Queen’s Young Leaders’ - was clear about the ways in which Rwanda’s 
membership in the Commonwealth would make a difference to the organisation: 
 
When you look at the passion and our interests in the Commonwealth 
are different from other countries, from other young people which 
represent from other countries. Most of them are: ‘I, I, I, I, I want this,’ 
and  here in Rwanda it’s all about ‘we, we, we, we,’ because we are 
chasing a common vision. So, I think that creates a very big 
difference.124  
 
There is a sense here that Rwandans are searching for a ‘we-feeling,’ where there 
is less of a feeling of selfishness, than of understanding how hardline 
communitarianism can get out of control, and how to prevent this from 
happening. Rwanda was a success story, but whatever lay behind the official 
government rhetoric, whatever draconian measures the Rwandan government 
had taken to unite the country, and however much other Commonwealth heads of 
state had ignored on-going issues of human rights protection to allow the 
accession of Rwanda, interviewees seemed to look beyond this to a more universal 
reparation which would lead to something better for everyone, not only 
Rwandans. This was a familiar theme in most interviews, a concern for the ‘moral 
equality’ of all human beings: ‘states have a moral obligation to help their 
neighbours. We need to think about Ebola, peace-building. We have a moral 
obligation.’ 125 
 
This idealisation feeds into the way in which the Commonwealth has seen its role 
in the world since 1991. But there is a difference between the way Rwandans 
describe this, and the way in which Secretary-Generals and some British 
politicians talk about the Commonwealth. From the Secretariat comes highly 
idealised descriptions of what the Commonwealth is capable of, tethered to 
utopian dreams of making the organisation strong again. 126  For Rwandans, 
rhetoric is accompanied by more practical solutions to Commonwealth 
problems.127 This is at its most graphic when it evokes the powerful image of what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Interview with Rwandan Human Rights NGO Operative, Kigali, 23 January 2015.  
124 Interview with Rwandan Youth Leader, Kigali, 15 January 2015. 
125 Interview with Rwandan Human Rights NGO worker in Kigali, 23 January 2015. 
126 See Ramphal, ‘The Commonwealth in the global neighbourhood’. 
127 This feeds into Richard Bourne’s idea that the Commonwealth is strongest when it 
supports civil society. See Richard Bourne, ‘The Commonwealth: Problem solving in our 
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Rwandans have been through, how the dark forces of particularism destroyed 
their sense of humanity, how Rwandans have learned to repair themselves, and 
how they want to share these ideas and experiences with others. As one 
interviewee put it, ‘home-grown solutions to solve your own problems, that’s what 
Rwanda provides. Rwanda offers training days for people to go back to their states 
as peace builders.’128  
 
For interviewees, this sense of reparation went in two directions, ‘what we want to 
do is to share Rwandan experience, but also to listen to the Kenyans…So Rwanda 
brings preventative measures but it also brings the spirit of resilience.’129 Most 
interviewees linked this multidirectional reparation to their Commonwealth 
neighbours in Africa, and the problems that spilled across borders, such as Ebola, 
terrorism, and civil war. As one interviewee put it, ‘Boko Haram…it’s a tragedy 
that is yet to erupt, but what such things do, they divide nations. If they are 
rooted, they divide nations and then people rise up against each other. So, I think, 
that is something people can learn from Rwanda.’130 Behind this reasoning lay the 
experience of what could happen if these things did become ‘rooted.’ When I 
raised the issue of controversy surrounding Rwanda’s supposed ‘meddling’ in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the answer always came quickly, 
Rwanda had a moral obligation to be in the DRC, it was simply helping its 
neighbours in a cosmopolitan sense: ‘You don’t have to go very far, you just need 
to first help solve the problems of those around you…At the end of the day, caring 
for neighbours in the Commonwealth will actually make it stronger.’131  
 
These arguments might resonate with the Commonwealth idea that it is a family, 
and families take care of each other as well as their neighbours. But, while the 
language of family did appear in interviews, what my interviewees gave me was 
much less of a sense of family and much more of a sense of egalitarianism among 
members of an organisation. Gone was the sense of familial obligation for the sake 
of history that we saw in the case of Zimbabwe in the previous chapter, replaced 
by the idea of shared values, opportunities, and give and take. As one interviewee 
noted: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
globalised era’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 
96, no. 388 (2007): 29-36. 
128 Interview with Rwandan Youth Leader, Kigali, 15 January 2015. 
129 Interview with Rwandan Civil Society Operative, Kigali, 23 January 2015.  
130 Interview with Rwandan Human Rights NGO Operative, Kigali, 23 January 2015. 
131 Interview with Rwandan Civil Society Operative, Kigali, 23 January 2015.  
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opportunities for others for investment, exchange in policy, in country 
management, in conflict resolution, in genocide prevention. All of this, 
I think Rwanda is participating actively and is a space for other 
countries, other members of the Commonwealth to come and invest, to 
work.132 
 
It is this sense of enlightenment Rwandans appear to have achieved which 
interested me, and the way in which interviewees believed that this was something 
they could share with the rest of the Commonwealth. But was this really 
something Rwanda could transfer to other members of the Commonwealth?  
 
6.4 Conclusions: Rwanda as cosmopolitan exemplar?  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, and as a follow on from my discussion of 
methodology in Chapter 1 and Chapter 5, I discussed some of the problems of 
doing research in Rwanda as a result of the RPF government’s attempts to control 
the image of the Rwandan post-genocide state. In this climate of surveillance, 
where any questioning of the so-called state of unity created by the government’s 
ethnicity law might be considered a crime, it becomes difficult, as I have 
discussed, when conducting interviews, to separate interviewee’s personal opinion 
from that of the standard government line.  
 
In comparison to interviews carried out in Zimbabwe, where each interview 
produced rather different answers than the one before, my interviews in Rwanda 
produced seemingly similar results. This leads me to wonder whether the 
interviewees were, for all intents and purposes, painting the RPF’s version of 
Commonwealth-Rwanda relations that it wished the rest of the world to see. This 
is not to say that my interviewee’s responses to my questions about the 
Commonwealth’s effect on Rwanda were not significant to my research. The very 
fact that interviewees appeared at times to be towing the government line told me 
very important things about Rwanda’s contribution to the Commonwealth’s 
cosmopolitanism. If Rwanda was curtailing freedom of speech as well as clamping 
down on Rwandans discussing ethnicity, then this was going against the main 
tenets of cosmopolitan theory, which are individualism, egalitarianism, and equal 
rights.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Interview with Rwandan Trade Unionist, Kigali, 19 January 2015. 
	   188	  
In this chapter, then, I have been discussing the effect of Rwanda’s membership 
on the Commonwealth, as well as the effect of the Commonwealth on Rwanda. 
But there is a darker story, that I have only briefly alluded to in the discussion so 
far. This is the idea that Rwanda is still a very violent state, where the government, 
through the aid of draconian measures, that have attempted to redefine Rwandan 
identity and curtail freedom of speech, has tight control of what people are 
allowed to say, do, and think.133 Since the genocide ended, the RPF have been 
accused of a long list of human rights violations and intimidation tactics which 
include: mass killings, uprooting the rural poor, the arbitrary arrest of journalists, 
the attempt to discredit International Criminal Tribunal judges, and the 
intimidation of aid agencies.134 The fall out and banishment of the BBC, that I 
discussed earlier in the chapter, was, it seems, one of the latest, in a long line of 
people, or organisations, that has criticised what appears to be a very volatile 
government that does not take criticism lightly.135  
 
The story of Rwanda’s accession to the Commonwealth is set against the backdrop 
of this government repression. Although justified to a large extent as being 
necessary to improve Rwandan ties with the East African Community, the 
decision to apply for Commonwealth membership is widely interpreted 
(particularly by the Western media) as an insidious ploy, by both the Rwandan 
government and the British, to castigate the French. For the British, this is part of 
an ongoing Francophobe rivalry, but, for the Rwandans, it is a much more serious 
castigation that is connected to France’s role in the 1994 genocide.136 The turn to 
English as the official second language of Rwanda plays a large role in this. 
Kagame and many of Rwanda’s highest ranking politicians are returnees from 
exile in neighbouring Anglophone states - particularly Uganda - and have largely 
succeeded in pushing out any Francophone influence, which they see as being 
connected to the French government. But the switch to English has also had a 
detrimental effect on the education and employment opportunities of many 
Francophone Rwandans, as I discussed in the main body of this chapter.137 None 
of the aforementioned intimidation tactics or human rights violations suggest that 	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Rwanda could be the poster-child for an international organisation’s attempts to 
be cosmopolitan. Where, then, does this get us in as far as the main point of the 
chapter, which has been to understand how Rwanda might be an exemplar case 
for the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism?  
 
I have suggested - based on commentary from my interviewees - that there are 
ways in which both Rwanda and the Commonwealth have been mutually 
beneficial to each other. Rwanda has opened up the Commonwealth to more 
inclusivity and diversity, has brought with it expertise on conflict resolution, and 
is an exemplar state for gender equality. Conversely, the Commonwealth has 
provided Rwanda with access to a wider economic community, through which it 
can boost its economy and the wellbeing of Rwandans, as well as bringing Rwanda 
more in line with its fellow East African Community member states. Additionally, 
Rwandans can now benefit from access to Commonwealth educational 
scholarships; although, nothing here suggests that these are particularly or 
exclusively cosmopolitan endeavours. But is this enough to claim that Rwanda as 
an ideal model for Commonwealth cosmopolitanism? 
 
If the criteria for cosmopolitan exemplar were simply expansion and inclusivity, 
then the answer would be yes. But it would be simplistic to suggest that inclusivity 
and acceptance of the ‘Other’ were the only cosmopolitan criteria under 
investigation. What about human rights, democracy, and the rule of law? Having 
weighed up my interviewee testimony alongside the actions of the Rwandan state, 
it is not clear, in practical terms, how Rwanda could ever be an exemplar for the 
Commonwealth’s turn to cosmopolitanism. My conclusion then is that, 
theoretically, as a blank canvas on which to build a cleaner platform for 
cosmopolitanism, without the family baggage that accompanies other 
Commonwealth Anglophone states, Rwanda, for the Commonwealth, was an 
exemplary choice, which brought with it concrete lessons about the dark side of 
malignant communitarianism. However, on a more practical scale, it is difficult to 
reconcile the idea that Rwanda is an exemplary model of equality, universality, 
and egalitarianism when the Rwandan government is exercising what we might 
call anti-cosmopolitan tactics against its own population.  	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If there is a relevance for the United Nations then we must say there 
is a relevance for the Commonwealth, because these are all building 
blocks of the one big global family. When we came into 
independence, Mugabe said we would like to build one united nation 
and there is a place for all of us under the Zimbabwe sun. There must 
be a place for all of us under the African sun, and there must be a 
place for all of us under the global sun. So, on that basis, quite clearly 
any constellation of like-minded must remain relevant. 	   -­‐ Zimbabwean	  Politician,	  20	  March	  2015	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7 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
I began this thesis with the observation that relations between post-colonial states 
in the African Commonwealth, and their former coloniser Britain, appear to offer 
a more nuanced understanding of relations between states in the international 
arena than is typically theorised by communitarian IR theorists. Communitarian 
IR theory implies and depends upon assumptions about the homogeneity of 
families and communities and the way we are tied to the communities into which 
we are ‘to begin with.’1 This means that who we are, where we were born, and the 
cultural practices we inherit, form the basis of our identities and relationships 
and, communitarians argue, control the boundaries of our relationships and 
ethical responsibilities. In the conventional communitarian thesis, the most 
meaningful cultural and ethical ties are those between people, families, 
communities in the domestic arena, nevertheless, as I have shown in the 
preceding chapters, relations between Commonwealth states often appear to take 
on these communitarian traits.  
 
My ambition in this work has been twofold. Firstly, to investigate the idea put 
forward by Commonwealth Secretary Generals and some British policymakers 
that the Commonwealth is a family of nations by looking at African 
understandings of the Commonwealth and the idea that it is a family, while at the 
same time injecting some long overdue critical and theoretical analysis into what 
is a very stale and prosaic Commonwealth literature. And, secondly, to explore 
ideas and identity among Commonwealth member states through the lens of 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in normative IR theory. Viewing the 
Commonwealth through the twin lenses of cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism is a risk that I have been encouraged to take by Rahul Rao’s 
study of the language of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in subaltern 
protest.2 Equally frustrated with the neat polarisation of cosmopolitanism and 	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communitarianism by authors such as Chris Brown and Janna Thompson, Rao 
maintains that one is faced with at least three ways of drawing conclusions when 
confronted with such polarities. These are: (1) to come down firmly on one side 
and defend your chosen position; (2) to reconcile the two with a third way or 
middle path; or (3) to hold the polarities in tension with one another ‘using each 
to provide critical perspective on the other but recognising the kernel of truth in 
both.’3 I confess, at times during this research project I have not known exactly 
where the Commonwealth sits in Rao’s typology. This is because, the 
Commonwealth appears to be both communitarian and cosmopolitan, giving it 
the appearance of being suspended between both theories, as I have argued, in a 
kind of threshold zone. This is not a third way or a reconciliation, rather, the 
organisation often appears to be in limbo between looking to the communitarian 
past and looking towards the cosmopolitan future.  
 
The most important observation for this argument has been the view of the 
Commonwealth through the communitarian lens. This began in Chapter 3, with 
my attempt to bring together many of the elements that run through 
communitarian theory which serve to underscore what communitarian theorist 
mean when they invoke the notion of community. A comprehensive view of what 
communitarians mean when they talk about community is lacking in the 
literature. Nevertheless if we read the work of communitarians alongside one 
another, then we begin to see a pattern emerge of inheritance, shared history and 
values, and solidarity (a ‘we-feeling’). The Commonwealth fits this pattern rather 
well as I have shown. The shared history and values between Commonwealth 
states - which include shared language, shared legal and administrative systems, 
and, to some extent, culture - all work together to underscore the fact that when 
we view the organisation through a communitarian lens, the Commonwealth 
family appears to be communitarian. But rather than conform to a neatly 
packaged, over-simplified culturally homogenous community, the Commonwealth 
is a much messier and more ambiguous family/community than the one put 
forward by communitarians.  
 
All of these things point towards the many ways in which the Commonwealth 
troubles the communitarian thesis. But while the Commonwealth appears to be 	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3 Rao, Third World Protest, 201. 
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communitarian, as I have shown, it has also attempted to be cosmopolitan with a 
turn towards a more individual-rights-for-individual-family-members approach. 
This was based largely on the search for a new focus, after the dismantling of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa effectively brought the Commonwealth’s mission 
to facilitate the process of decolonisation to an end. When the problems in 
Zimbabwe challenged the Commonwealth’s attempts to protect the rights of 
ordinary Zimbabweans, the organisation turned its gaze towards new membership 
criteria and expansion as a way of maintaining a cosmopolitan focus. Having been 
damaged by the withdrawal of Zimbabwe and the loss of one of its most prolific 
family members, the Commonwealth needed something different, something less 
steeped in the messiness of family and the grubby infighting between family 
members. Rwanda provided that ‘something.’ As a fragile state attempting to leave 
behind its own problematic and malignant communitarianism, Rwanda provided 
a blank canvas onto which the Commonwealth family could project its ideal 
cosmopolitan aspirations. But with the Rwandan government attempting, rather 
brutally, to control the way in which Rwandans talk about themselves and their 
identity, in a bid to not repeat the violence of the recent past, could Rwanda’s 
accession really help project the Commonwealth from a messy family where 
members fight into a  cosmopolitan organisation?  
 
The empirical side of the thesis explored this question in relation to the thoughts 
and views of a number of Rwandan elites as they reflected on what being a 
member of the Commonwealth family meant to the Rwandan people. The 
language they used expressed strongly cosmopolitan themes: they idealised the 
Anglophone organisation and the ability of the Commonwealth to look towards 
the future, and they appeared to see their own membership as a way to help fellow 
Commonwealth members to heal the wounds of the past and cast their gaze 
towards the future too. But the ways in which they talked about the 
Commonwealth, particularly the ways in which most interviewees appeared to 
provide uniform answers, seemed to suggest that the image of Commonwealth-
Rwandan relations was something that the Rwandan government were very much 
concerned with portraying as ideal. Perhaps this is not surprising. It seems 
unlikely that these elites would want to go against the government line, especially 
since Rwanda’s membership in the Commonwealth is still relatively new and 
relationships are developing. But with the reality of the Rwandan government’s 
steadfast grip on the civil and political rights of Rwandans, in time this might 
mean that as far as the Commonwealth’s communitarian aspirations are 
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concerned, the accession of Rwanda might prove to be more of a stillborn child 
than the saviour of the ideal cosmopolitan organisation.  
 
When I raised the issue of Rwanda’s Commonwealth membership with 
Zimbabweans, some elites, as I discussed in Chapter 5, expressed annoyance that 
the Commonwealth had allowed Rwanda in. For Zimbabweans, currently on the 
outside of the Commonwealth family looking in, states such as Rwanda, which did 
not share the history or values of the Commonwealth family were ruining the 
fabric of the organisation. This was one of the many ways in which Zimbabwe 
proved to be an exemplary case for problematising the idea of the family. 
Zimbabwe, a member of the Commonwealth through its shared history, withdrew 
from the Commonwealth when the family criticism became too much for the 
Zimbabwean president to handle. But, while the Zimbabwean head of state 
withdrew Zimbabwe from the organisation, many Zimbabweans themselves argue 
that they are still a part of the Commonwealth family. This dichotomy between 
inside and outside grew messier in the language that Zimbabweans used to reflect 
on their troubled state’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth which, in a reversal 
of the Rwandan cosmopolitan approach to Commonwealth membership, reflected 
strongly communitarian themes. The search for ways to comprehend what some 
Zimbabweans thought was a betrayal or abandonment of the Zimbabwean people 
by the rest of the Commonwealth family, coupled with the belief that Zimbabwe 
would return to the Commonwealth because of its shared history with the group, 
gave a real insight into the messiness of the Commonwealth family.  
 
Memory theorist Gavriel Rosenfeld has suggested that we look back to the past 
only when times are easy and we have the luxury to do so.4 But this overlooks how 
the difficult present is more likely to encourage an interest in the past, as historian 
Dan Stone observes - the more uncertain the present and future is, the more 
important memory becomes to people. 5  This appears to be the case with 
Zimbabwe. As the Zimbabwean state sinks further into disarray and the markers 
of Zimbabwean sovereignty begin to erode,6 Zimbabwean interviewees reflect 
their anxiety and despair with their current situation by casting their gaze back to 
a different time in a family that is credited as helping to bring Zimbabwe to 	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regional relationships’, European Journal of International Relations (2015): 7. 
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independence. The Zimbabwean case proved that even though families are messy, 
dark, and often cruel places, no matter what happens within a family, the ties 
between members will always be thicker. While, on the one hand, this appears to 
confirm the communitarian idea of thick ties between family, community, tribe, 
and nation, on the other hand, it shows how and why the Zimbabwean case is 
exemplary in troubling the idea that these ties are confined to the domestic arena.  
 
What I have attempted to do in this thesis then is both to pin down, and open up 
to scrutiny, the way communitarian theorists theorise and understand 
communities. I have sought to complicate existing communitarian theory by 
reaching further back than such theories usually do, and by concentrating pre-
eminently on the Commonwealth family in Africa. The discussion of the 
Commonwealth’s communitarianism highlights a pattern in how the past is 
related to ongoing identity. The shared history of Commonwealth states appears 
to be important for the states themselves and not simply for the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the Commonwealth literature, which frequently refers to the 
Commonwealth as a unique and special family. What this means for 
communitarian IR theory is that, in as far as historical relations go, when we 
adjust the lens to take in the historical relationships between states in these 
metaphorical families of nations, relationships appear much more nuanced.  
 
Harking back to Rao’s typology earlier in the chapter then, these findings situate 
the Commonwealth - although perhaps slightly more nuanced - within the third 
category. While the case of Zimbabwe points towards family-like ties between 
states, the case of Rwanda shows that there is room for accommodation and 
inclusiveness in spite of the critical baggage that accompanies such a move. The 
Commonwealth’s attempts to be both cosmopolitan and communitarian provides 
a tension that while shaking up the organisation’s communitarianism by opening 
membership up to more states, has not done any serious damage. This may open 
the Commonwealth up to a more critical perspective and bring Commonwealth 
literature itself out of its current lethargic impasse and into the much brighter 
light of tension, analysis, and critical perspective. But, is this enough to seal the 
fate of the Commonwealth’s endurance?  
 
Moving beyond the theoretical focus, I noted at the beginning of the thesis that 
one of the aims of the thesis was also to reflect on the family as the key to 
Commonwealth endurance. It was tempting to argue at the outset that the potency 
	   196	  
of the family label was merely a metaphor employed by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the Queen. Nevertheless, the familial language employed by 
Zimbabwean elites, coupled with the curious attachment to the Queen, displayed 
through the years by a number of African heads of state, has proven to be more 
than mere rhetoric. Even when rogue family members and their demonised 
leaders, such as Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe, truly problematise the idea of 
family by withdrawing from the Commonwealth altogether, there remains a sense 
of affection towards the Queen. with the passing of the big independence leaders 
such as Nehru and Nkrumah, feelings of Commonwealth loyalty have begun to 
fade and the ties of kith and kin dissolved. One need only look towards Barbados 
and Jamaica,7  as well as Australia, New Zealand and Tuvalu, that have all 
attempted to become republics thus loosening the familial bonds between 
themselves and the British motherland.  
 
So far in the chapter, I have tried to bring together the main points and threads 
running throughout the thesis that reflect on and help to provide answers to the 
puzzle that I outlined in the introduction to the thesis. But one of the other issues 
raised, and one of the reasons behind the genesis of this project, was my 
frustration with the lack of any critical or theoretical analysis on the 
Commonwealth. In the introduction chapter, I explained that this thesis is one of 
a minority of studies that takes a critical and theoretical approach to the 
Commonwealth, as well as adding a further original element in the inclusion of 
African voices, for the first time in the literature. As Rwanda is still a relatively 
new member of the Commonwealth - only joining in 2009 - there is still a dearth 
of information on the state’s accession, integration, and effect on the 
Commonwealth. This thesis is the first in-depth study of Rwanda-Commonwealth 
relations, and has made an original contribution to Commonwealth literature both 
by including empirical evidence in the form of interviews with Rwandan elites and 
by laying down the foundations for future theoretical and critical research and 
analysis on both the Commonwealth itself and on Rwanda. But, while a more in-
depth analysis of the history, relations, and possible future of the Commonwealth 
family label has offered a much broader focus and opened up the Commonwealth 
to scrutiny, there are many more issues around Commonwealth state relations, 
questions about expansion, and skeletons in the Commonwealth family closet that 
are ripe for critical and theoretical excavation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Mortimer, ‘Jamaica’s Prime Minister says they want to ditch the Queen but keep the 
Commonwealth’. 
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Beginning with the question of relevance, for example. I observed in Chapter 6 
that it has become a cliché for Commonwealth officials, and in the Commonwealth 
literature, to observe that the organisation must still be relevant because there are 
a number of states evincing an interest in joining. The question that arises from 
this observation is whether Rwanda was really considered, from the beginning, to 
be a test case for the organisation’s cosmopolitanism; or did the East African 
state’s accession to the Commonwealth simply help the British and Rwandan 
governments advance a francophobe agenda? The answer, I believe, is both. The 
question of which came first is now irrelevant, as Rwanda is now firmly a part of 
the Commonwealth, but how Rwandans view the Commonwealth and its 
usefulness and relevance to the Rwandan state may have repercussions for the 
Commonwealth’s future. This is because, as I observed in Chapter 6, there were 
certain points in the discussion with Rwandan interviewees where I got the 
impression that Rwanda would only remain in the Commonwealth as long as it 
was convenient to the Rwandan government’s agenda. Rwanda’s role in the 
Commonwealth resonates keenly with the organisation’s attempts to be 
cosmopolitan in the way in which it projects and positions itself as an egalitarian 
member of an organisation, come to lend its expertise in conflict management and 
reconciliation. But what happens to the Commonwealth’s cosmopolitanism, or 
indeed the organisation’s relevance, if, or when, the exemplar state leaves?  
 
Second, there is the question of memory. I referred, throughout the thesis, to the 
fact that the Commonwealth rarely delves deeper into its past beyond the simple 
platitudes to its shared history. Although the idea of memory threatened to take a 
more active role at many points throughout this thesis, a detailed analysis of why 
the Commonwealth does not address its memory problem, how far this ties into 
the British view of the Empire as benevolent, and the effects this has had on 
Britain’s relations with certain Commonwealth states, has been beyond this study. 
There has never been a sustained discussion of memory among Britain and 
members of the Commonwealth family, even when the opportunity has presented 
itself quite clearly in the form of an ongoing lawsuit between the survivors of 
concentration camps in Kenya and the British government. The lawsuit has 
exposed the British concealment of documentation of the systemic torture carried 
out by the British colonial administration in Kenya during the Mau Mau 
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rebellion. 8  The former Foreign Secretary, William Hague, in 2013, issued a 
statement in the House of Commons that the British were not responsible for the 
sins of their fathers; 9  this is a very different approach to how other 
Commonwealth member states have dealt with their own family histories. 10 
Hague’s statement, and the discovery of more incriminating evidence of the 
systemic violence carried out by the British colonial administrations across the 
Empire, raises an interesting question: how have other Commonwealth member 
states responded to the ongoing Mau Mau lawsuits? What do Commonwealth 
member states, beyond Kenya, think about the subject of colonial compensation 
and reparation? And, moreover, will further claims, from other parts of the 
Commonwealth, affect the so called unity and uniqueness of the Commonwealth?  
 
Moving beyond memory, a third important question that I have been unable to 
develop is how far the approach of this study can be complicated further by 
different approaches to, and cultural understandings of, what is meant by family 
and the different members in it. At the beginning of the thesis I outlined the 
definition of the family, for the purposes of the thesis, was based on a British 
notion of family, this, I noted, was because of the British usage of the language of 
family to refer to the wider Empire, and the ongoing use of familial language, to 
describe the Commonwealth, by the Queen. Additionally, for example, in Chapter 
2, I highlighted issues which I noted seemed to demand a more psychoanalytical 
approach to questions around the Queen’s historical relationship with some 
Commonwealth heads of state - such as Kwame Nkrumah. Would a 
psychoanalytical - perhaps feminist - analysis of these often seemingly erotic 
relationships give a much different platform from which to launch a study on the 
Commonwealth family? I argue that it would. The effects to which a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Caroline Elkins, ‘Britain has said sorry to the Mau Mau. The rest of the empire is still 
waiting’, The Guardian, 7 June 2013. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/06/britain-maumau-empire-
waiting. For a discussion of the aftermath of the lawsuit and memory in Kenya see also, 
Mwanzia Koster, Mickie, ‘Recasting the Mau Mau uprising: Reparations, narration, and 
memory’, in Kenya after 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones, 
eds. Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Mickie Mwanzia Koster and Jerono P. Rotich (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 49-63. 
9 William Hague, ‘Statement to Parliament on settlement of Mau Mau claims’, 2013. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-
settlement-of-mau-mau-claims.  
10 I refer here to the different truth and reconciliation commissions that have taken place 
in recent Commonwealth history, the most recent of which - the Canadian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission - came to an end in December 2015 when the Commission 
released its final report. For the full report see: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada, ‘Findings’. Available at: 
http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/index.php?p=890.  
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psychoanalytical approach to the Queen’s role as mother, and the different 
approaches and reactions to this, is fascinating and could help to further 
complicate the messiness of the Commonwealth family label.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I discussed the ways in which Zimbabweans understand 
their government’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the ways in which 
many of the Zimbabweans, who I interviewed, claimed that although their state is 
officially no longer a member of the Commonwealth, only the President left, the 
rest of Zimbabwe is still in it. But Zimbabwe is not the only African state that has 
withdrawn from the Commonwealth in recent years. In 2013, on the eve of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Sri Lanka, the Gambian 
President Yayha Jammeh made a surprise announcement to the Gambian people 
that their state was withdrawing from the Commonwealth declaring that Gambia 
would, ‘never be a member of any neo-colonial institution and will never be a 
party to any institution that represents an extension of colonialism.’11 
 
Although the Commonwealth Secretariat and the British Government expressed 
regret over Gambia’s withdrawal, the difference in the reaction to Zimbabwe’s 
withdrawal and the reaction to Gambia’s withdrawal is striking. Where the 
Commonwealth has been concerned with the return of Zimbabwe, almost to the 
point of obsession, nothing much has been said about Gambia’s return. The 
degree to which the reaction to the Zimbabwean and Gambian cases differ is 
fascinating in itself, but an empirical study of Gambian opinion on the situation, 
and whether Gambians feel that Gambia will return to the Commonwealth in the 
future might help to further complicate the communitarian view of the 
Commonwealth family through a comparison of two African states that have 
withdrawn from the Commonwealth - one of which talks about return to the 
family, and another which has possibly turned its back on Commonwealth 
membership altogether.  
 
Objections will undoubtedly be raised that the excavation I have carried out in 
this study is focused too heavily on the African Commonwealth and thereby 
excludes important Asian or Caribbean representations that may have provided 
much different views of the Commonwealth and the family, particularly from the 
point of race. I plead guilty to this and believe that my reasons for focusing on the 
African Commonwealth - because the cases of Zimbabwe and Rwanda are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 BBC, ‘UK regrets the Gambia’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth’.  
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exemplars of the cosmopolitan and communitarian debate - has been justified. 
Nevertheless, my brief discussion of the pivotal role of Nehru and India in the 
theoretical chapters of the thesis raises the question of India’s role in the 
Commonwealth today. Is India’s membership as important to Commonwealth 
endurance as it was almost seventy years ago? How does India view its 
relationship with the organisation today? And finally, if India withdrew, would 
other states follow? These are all questions for another thesis.  	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